Half a century after the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, in implementation of a truncated version of the UN General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947 calling for the partition of the former British protectorate into two states, it is high time for the rest of the resolution to be implemented. Until the package deal contemplated by the resolution has been finalised, that is, until an Arab Palestinian state is established, the legitimacy of the resolution is itself in question.
As matters now stand, the only available mechanism by which to reach this goal is the Middle East peace process. Judging by its performance to date, the process is unlikely -- at least, in its present form -- to lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state as the sine qua non for a just and equitable solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. That is not to say that the alternative to the peace process is necessarily war if only because the international setup would not tolerate all-out war in the Arab-Israeli conflict. An outbreak of hostilities would be closer to generalised terrorism throughout the region than to conventional warfare -- a 'lose-lose' situation for all the protagonists.
It will be remembered that the seeds of the Middle East peace process were sown during the Second Gulf War. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait convinced the Gulf -- and other Arab -- states that Saddam posed a more immediate threat to their security than any other regional party, including Israel. American diplomacy, particularly George Bush's Secretary of State James Baker, succeeded in selling them on the idea of neutralising Israel as an enemy so that they could devote their efforts to countering the Iraqi challenge. Hence their acceptance of the peace process launched at the 1991 Madrid conference.
But it has proved impossible to build an equitable peace with Israel when the point of departure for an Arab-Israeli peace was basically an Arab-Arab war. For even the most moderate Israelis, those who believe Israel's salvation lies in making peace with her Arab neighbours, will always be tempted to exploit the contradictions within Arab ranks to avoid making the 'concessions' necessary for a breakthrough. Of course, on the Arab side, these 'concessions' are rights; but in Israeli eyes, even the most moderate, they are 'concessions'.
These moderates are caught between two fires: on the one hand, they need to move forward with the peace process, which entails making concessions in the name of peace; on the other, the resistance of an important constituency in Israel which opposes the very idea of concessions, acts as a constraint on their ability to do so -- even assuming they want to. As a result, the proponents of peace in Israel come out looking indecisive and inconsistent -- to the advantage of hawks like Netanyahu. This is what happened after Rabin's assassination and Peres' takeover as acting prime minister. The situation ended with the return of the Likud to power. Some could argue, of course, that Peres' defeat and Netanyahu's victory were not predetermined. In fact, however, this outcome was dictated by the very logic of things; even if it could have been avoided in the 1996 elections, the Likud was bound eventually to come to power. For in the long run, Israel's hawks are much more consistent in their stand than its doves.
It is also in the logic of things that all agreements between Israel and the various Arab parties were signed behind the backs of the other Arab parties. Each Arab party has dealt with Israel separately, beginning with the Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel, continuing with the Oslo Accords between Israel and the leadership of the PLO and ending with the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty.
It is clear then that a whole new approach is necessary if any progress towards peace is to be achieved. The current peace process is obviously moribund; even its sponsor, the United States, is unable to breathe new life into it. The Clinton administration claims that it has a new 'initiative' for the resumption of the talks but has failed to substantiate the claim by coming forward with its 'initiative' in the open, perhaps because it realises how difficult it will be to have it implemented.
A new start is therefore unavoidable. That is not to say that the agreements reached under the auspices of the Madrid peace conference should be torn up, for this could create a still more critical situation, but that a new content should be given to the process launched from the Spanish capital. The fiftieth anniversary of the creation of Israel could be an opportunity to imbue the peace process with such a new content.
The Intifada, which was neither a procedural nor a legal process, nevertheless proved that the balance of power could be changed through direct action in the street. The same applies to southern Lebanon, where Hizbullah's resistance to Israeli occupation proved that the continued occupation of Lebanese territory was beyond the price Israel was ready to pay. Now Israel itself is proposing some form of withdrawal from southern Lebanon, exactly as it previously proposed to withdraw from most of Gaza when it was proving too hot to handle during the Intifada. While the proposal is not entirely innocent, being aimed in part at driving a wedge between Syria and Lebanon, it is also a reflection of Israel's recognition that its continued occupation of south Lebanon is exacting a heavy price.
The lesson to be drawn from the experiences of Gaza and Southern Lebanon is that a change in the balance of power is necessary for a new start. But that is not in itself sufficient. It would be wrong to conclude that the present impasse is due only to a lack of balance in the power game. If the impasse is to be overcome, the very rules of the game need to be changed. And there is no denying that peace can only be achieved if all the parties come out winners. It cannot be envisaged in a win-lose situation nor, a fortiori, in a lose-lose context.
Half a century after the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, in implementation of a truncated version of the UN General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947 calling for the partition of the former British protectorate into two states, it is high time for the rest of the resolution to be implemented. Until the package deal contemplated by the resolution has been finalised, that is, until an Arab Palestinian state is established, the legitimacy of the resolution is itself in question.