Talking fixes

By Graham Usher

The two were scheduled to meet yesterday (Wednesday) to "overcome remaining differences" over the American proposal for a 13.1 per cent Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank "so that we can proceed immediately with accelerated permanent status talks," according to a statement released by US President Bill Clinton on Monday.

The meeting appears to be the only fruit of US special envoy Dennis Ross's weekend trip to Israel and the Occupied Territories, originally intended to prepare for a summit between Clinton, Netanyahu and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, which was scheduled to be held on Monday. No sooner had Ross stepped off the plane, however, than Netanyahu made it clear that he would not attend any Washington summit under American duress. He counseled, rather, that the two sides work on a "creative fix" to bridge the gap between the US demand for a 13.1 per cent withdrawal and his own insistence that any West Bank pull-back of more than nine per cent "endangers Israel's security needs".

The "fix" may have been met, though the details are murky. According to the Israeli newspaper, Ma'ariv, the chief component of the "compromise formula" currently being touted is that Israel initially undertake a redeployment of nine per cent. The remaining four per cent needed to comply with the American proposal would be held in "trust" by the US and transferred to the Palestinian Authority (PA) once it has fulfilled its security obligations under the 1997 Hebron agreement.

But there remain differences between the US and the Israelis even over this formula, which is presumably why Albright wanted to meet with Netanyahu sooner rather than later. According to Israel's Ha'aretz newspaper on Monday, Netanyahu wants the territory "entrusted" to the Americans to be four per cent. But the Americans want two per cent as a way of dragging the Israeli leader from nine per cent to a "double digit redeployment". The Americans also want the "entrusted" territory to be transferred to the PA at a date close to the second redeployment while Israel is looking for a probation period of between six months to a year.

It is not yet clear whether the PA has been consulted about these new arrangements. According to PLO negotiator Saeb Erekat, the only American proposal the Palestinians have accepted is one that calls for a phased redeployment of 13.1 per cent. "We won't accept a centimetre less than that," he said on Monday.

Should Albright and Netanyahu reach some kind of deal after their meeting yesterday, Arafat will be under enormous pressure to accept it, however "creatively" it is fixed. For many Palestinian commentators, this is the inevitable denouement of a Palestinian negotiating strategy that has placed all its cards in the Americans' hands. This is why there has been increasing criticism of Arafat's decision to accept the American proposal, even from inside his own Fateh movement.

By accepting the American proposal of a 13.1 per cent withdrawal, says Fatah Central Committee member Hani Al-Hassan, Arafat has agreed to enter the final status talks with only "around 16 per cent of the West Bank under the PA's full control and 22 per cent under its partial control." He added that "this leaves Israel with 62 per cent of the West Bank to bargain over," gravely weakening the Palestinian position when it comes to negotiations on Jerusalem, settlements and borders.

But what is causing most concern among Palestinians is the confusion over the third redeployment, supposedly guaranteed (by the then US Secretary of State Warren Christopher) in the 1997 Hebron agreement to occur "no later than mid-1998". In an interview with the The Gulf newspaper on 9 May, Arafat said that under the American proposal the third redeployment has been devolved to a "supervisory committee" made up of the US, Israel and the PA. The Israelis are insisting that this committee be "collapsed" into the final status negotiations on borders. US State Department spokesman, James Rubin, only says that "there are different interpretations" over the third redeployment.

These different interpretations go to the heart of the conflicting visions Israel and the PA have of the Oslo process. Netanyahu insists that he has an American guarantee that the extent of any further redeployments will be on the basis of Israel's security needs which "we [Israel], and we alone, will determine." The Palestinians argue that, while percentages of land are not specified in the Oslo Accords, what is specified is that by the end of the third redeployment, Israel should be out of everywhere in the West Bank except for settlements, East Jerusalem and "specified military locations." Taken together, say PA officials, these three areas compromise no more than 10 to 20 per cent of the West Bank, with the rest under the PA's full or partial control.

Until there is clarity on the second and third redeployments it is difficult to see how resolving the current crisis in the Oslo process will not produce a greater crisis as soon as the final status talks begin.

But most Palestinian analysts are convinced that the only way Netanyahu will accept a second redeployment of 13.1 per cent is in return for a cancellation or "postponement" of the third. Is it possible that Arafat would agree to this -- under US pressure -- simply to keep some mutant of Oslo alive?

"If he does so, it will be one of the most fateful decisions of his political career," says Hani Al-Hassan. "To postpone the third redeployment as Netanyahu wants is to accede to his vision of a final settlement in which Israel keeps 50 per cent of the West Bank. No Palestinian can accept this."