Israel and the US are urging the Palestinians to move now to permanent-status talks, without worrying about Israel's non-compliance with its "interim period" obligations. Perhaps reasoning, on the basis of experience, that anything both Israel and the US want them to do must be bad for them, the Palestinians are resisting.
Focusing now on the fundamental permanent-status issues, however, could serve both Palestinian national interests and the cause of peace if the Palestinians could set the agenda through a public appeal for peace. They could argue that they refuse to permit the failure of the greatest opportunity in 50 years to achieve peace with some justice. They could also recognise the fact that the enormous imbalance of power does not permit them to obtain their rights under international law or impose their preferences as to how a just and durable peace can best be built.
They should appeal to the Israelis to choose between the only principled alternatives. They could pledge to work with Israel, not simply to drag out a never-ending peace "process" but to actually achieve peace.
They could accept either a one-state or a two-state solution. In a one-state solution, the entire territory of the former Palestine Mandate would be a single democratic state, free from any form of discrimination based on race or religion and with equal rights for all who live there -- a true democracy. In a two-state solution, Israel would continue to exist within its internationally recognised borders, and Palestine would continue to exist within that small portion of the former Palestine Mandate occupied by Israel in 1967, subject only to a mutually acceptable formula for sharing sovereignty in Jerusalem (the only part of the Palestine Mandate where sovereignty claims currently overlap) and to reciprocal boundary adjustments. The only third alternative is apartheid.
If Israel chooses a democratic, non-racial state, the Palestinians could cooperate to build it. If Israel prefers a two-state solution, then it must make two other choices.
Palestine could accept either to divide sovereignty in Jerusalem, the capital of Palestine as well as of Israel, in accordance with the clear position in international law that all expanded East Jerusalem is occupied territory, or to share sovereignty over an undivided Jerusalem, within the current municipal boundaries unilaterally fixed by Israel, as a "condominium" which would be the one and indivisible capital of two sovereign states. In either case, the entire city should afford free access to all Israelis and all Palestinians.
Palestine could accept that all Israeli settlers currently living in Palestine, as well as their descendants, should have a right of permanent residence -- on the clear understanding that they would be legal residents of a foreign state, subject to the non-discriminatory laws of that state, with no special rights arising from race, religion or citizenship and with no foreign army of occupation on Palestinian soil. If, however, Israel's vision of peace requires the annexation of further Palestinian lands, Palestine could be willing to negotiate cessions of Palestinian land bordering Israel with the objective of transferring the least possible land including the largest possible number of settlers -- on the clear understanding that any cessions of Palestinian land to Israel would be matched by cessions of Israeli land to Palestine and that all settlers living in settlements not transferred to Israeli sovereignty would then be promptly repatriated to Israel.
These are not easy choices for Israel, but they must be made if reconciliation -- and peace and security for Israelis and Palestinians -- are ever to be achieved.
The Palestinians could appeal to all Israelis to accept that the land both Israelis and Palestinians love can be shared, that both Israelis and Palestinians must win or both will continue to lose, and that there must be a common destination at which both peoples would be satisfied to arrive.
Such an appeal would serve the cause of peace in at least three significant ways. It is easy, indeed automatic, for Israelis to reject any Palestinian position without offering a viable alternative. It would be much more difficult to reject both of two alternatives, each of which would appear extremely reasonable (indeed generous) in the eyes of world (and even American) public opinion. A choice between a one-state and a two-state solution would make it blindingly clear that, by continuing to reject a Palestinian state, Israel would be choosing apartheid. It would increase the pressure on Israel to accept that a Palestinian state is both inevitable and desirable -- and to do so soon.
It would be difficult to reach a Palestinian consensus on all these fundamental issues, and, if reached, such a position would then, almost certainly, be rejected by Israel simply because it is the Palestinian position. By publicly appealing to Israel to choose between different approaches to the fundamental peace issues, each of which would be potentially acceptable to Palestinians, a long, difficult and ultimately useless process of seeking a Palestinian consensus on these issues could be rendered unnecessary.
If a country's negotiating positions and objectives are completely contrary to international law and universal standards of justice, ethics and morality, that country must wish to keep them hidden from public view. If, however, a country's negotiating positions and objectives are fully consistent with international law and universal standards of justice, ethics and morality, that country should publicly proclaim them -- loudly, clearly and often.
Even if, as is entirely possible, the Netanyahu regime were to dismiss such an appeal for peace with contempt, then it would at least be clear to the entire world that the "Oslo process" has nothing more to offer, that the Palestinians have sought peace through negotiations in complete good faith and that there is no reason to wait until May 1999 to affirm the existence of the state of Palestine (already proclaimed in November 1988 and recognised by over 100 other states at that time) in all the Palestinian territories conquered in 1967 (including those still occupied) and to apply for full member status for Palestine at the United Nations. Palestine would be doing so while holding both the moral and the legal high ground and in a context of unparalleled international sympathy and support.
If Palestine were a UN member state, the end of the occupation would no longer be a question of "whether" but simply of "when". If UN membership were applied for in such circumstances, US President Bill Clinton, with no more elections to worry about, an eye on his place in history, and fully aware that even his wife supports Palestinian statehood, might well act in a wise and decent way -- in the best interests of America, Israel, Palestine and peace.
*The writer is an international lawyer who comments frequently on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
