When President Hosni Mubarak made his latest visit to France, the prevalent feeling was that the "peace process" was on the verge of total collapse. Netanyahu had just rejected the American initiative to jump-start the peace process and was threatening to fight the US administration from within, through Congress, in order to pressure the administration to introduce fundamental alterations to its original proposal.
Given the US administration's incapacity to curb the deteriorating situation, Egypt and France took action to forestall the ultimate collapse of the "peace process" and launched a joint initiative to hold an international conference to salvage peace. The Franco-Egyptian initiative, taken without prior consultation with the US, clearly reflects both parties' dissatisfaction with the American position. It also expresses the Arab, and perhaps European, refusal to permit the peace process to collapse, or even remain in this stagnant deadlock. It is a declaration that the peace process must be resumed at any cost, that the final word will not be left to rejectionists and advocates of violent confrontation on the Arab and Israeli sides.
The French and Egyptians also agreed that Israel must not be invited to the conference. This agreement conveyed a strong implicit condemnation of the position of the Israeli government, which they hold fully responsible for bringing the peace process to its current impasse. That the Palestinians were also excluded, in my opinion, merely represents an attempt to mask this condemnation, so as to avoid giving the Israeli government any ammunition with which it could undermine the conference from the outset.
But can an international conference to salvage peace even be held under these circumstances? Presuming it is held in the first place, can it really achieve its aims? An answer to these questions requires careful analysis of the stated aims of the Franco-Egyptian initiative and the circumstances under which it was proposed. At first glance, it is difficult to imagine that an international conference of this nature could be held without the participation of the US, unless one of the purposes of the conference was to transfer the leadership of the peace process to another party. Such a move would be virtually impossible under current international circumstances. At first glance, too, one would think it highly unlikely that such a conference, if not attended by Israel, could succeed in its aim of rescuing the peace process, unless one of its purposes is to create a mechanism to pressure Israel into accepting the very conditions it would not accept from the US. Again, regional and local circumstances would render such a task seemingly insurmountable.
Consequently, the Franco-Egyptian initiative would appear to have a long-term tactical aim. At that level, then, the initiative was undertaken originally to place calculated pressure on both the US and Israeli governments. To the US, it carried the implicit message that Arab and European patience has begun to run out, and that confidence in America's sponsorship of the peace process and its capacity to steer it to safe shores has been undermined. The US must therefore make up its mind quickly. Either it should reveal to the entire world the contents of the initiative it proposed to the Israelis and Palestinians and explain why it failed, or it should exert sufficient pressure upon the intransigent party in order to compel it to accept the conditions necessary to salvage the peace process.
The Franco-Egyptian initiative also conveyed the implicit message that, even if the Israeli government can fight the US administration on home ground and force it to back down, the international community, intent upon saving the peace process, has other alternatives. As expected, the Israeli government rejected the Franco-Egyptian initiative with the greatest contempt. It paid the initiative little attention; editorials in the Israeli press asked derisively what value such a conference could have if the main parties involved were not invited.
The reaction in the US was not as arrogant. Although the US administration would naturally not show enthusiasm for a project about which it was not consulted beforehand, it did signal immediately that some benefit might come from it, and made no attempt to deride or undermine it when the initiative was made public.
Yet the Franco-Egyptian initiative cannot move into effect until the US declares that the Washington initiative -- intended to obtain Israel's agreement to withdraw from 13 per cent of the West Bank and to enter immediately into final status negotiations -- has failed. As the US has not made an official declaration to this effect, by not rejecting the Franco-Egyptian initiative outright, it may be using it as an extra card to pressure Israel into accepting its own initiative. Israel would obviously recognise that the conference France and Egypt are calling for would necessarily attempt to commit Israel to far more radical measures than the Americans are seeking. This factor alone would constitute an additional incentive for Israel to refrain from openly rejecting the American initiative.
Thus, many interests have converged at the tactical level in tacit agreement to keep the Franco-Egyptian initiative hovering, and to generate the impression that there are other alternatives to the American initiative. In this perspective, the failure of the American initiative need not spell the final collapse of the peace process.
This convergence of interests has granted the beleaguered US administration some respite. It can now continue attempting to convince the Israeli government to accept its initiative.
At the same time, the Israeli government has found some extra time to deflect an open break with the US and to intimate that it is still exerting all possible efforts to arrive at a formula that would be acceptable to its discordant coalition government.
The Franco-Egyptian initiative, meanwhile, must await the results of the current tug-of-war between the US and Israel. However, the context indicates that US-Israeli relations, in spite of the antagonisms we see on the surface, are headed not toward a clash but toward a tango. The Arabs, and particularly the Palestinians, are expected to dance along.
Not only have the Americans shown endless patience and turned the other cheek to every Israeli slap on the face, they have let the Israelis void the initiative of any elements that could have propelled the peace process forward in the long run. Israel has convinced the US administration that there is no need for a third phase of withdrawal and that withdrawal must not begin before the Palestinian Authority fulfills a lengthy list of incapacitating demands.
The Palestinian Authority, for its part, had accepted the American initiative in principle, on the grounds that it offered a chance to break the deadlock. At the same time, it insisted upon the third phase of Israeli withdrawal, as the Oslo Accords dictated, from all territories in the West Bank, with the exception of the Israeli settlements and East Jerusalem, since their status is to be determined by the final phase of negotiations.
To give the impression that they are still committed to the Oslo stipulation of a third phase of withdrawal, the US and Israel entered into talks which revolved around new proposals for a gradual Israeli withdrawal from no more than 15 per cent of the West Bank territories supposedly included in the third phase of withdrawal. There are indications that the PA is inclined to accept these new proposals, which means that it will enter the final status negotiations with Israel controlling over 50 per cent of the West Bank.
Perhaps solutions of this sort will "jump-start" the peace process. The movement they stimulate, however, will necessarily be very limited and of very short duration. Because they fail to provide any real impetus, the peace process will once again quickly grind to a halt, bringing on a new crisis.
So the US initiative, with Israeli modifications, will only lead to a dead end. Even if Israelis and Palestinians cooperate in the short run, Israel will play along only to force the PA to relinquish any possibility of regaining the West Bank and establishing an independent Palestinian state. Israel seeks only to force the PA to declare war on Hamas, and to put off withdrawal from any Palestinian territories -- no matter how microscopic -- while pursuing settlement construction at breakneck speed.
If, on the other hand, Israel rejects the American initiative, even after having tailored it to its own demands, and the US acknowledges that its initiative failed, it is difficult to imagine that the Franco-Egyptian alternative will be effective in rescuing the peace process. The US will never blame Israel for the collapse of the peace process. Nor will it accept that sanctions be imposed with the purpose of compelling Israel to modify its stance. All the Franco-Egyptian initiative can aspire to, if it seeks American approval, is to urge Israel to accept the American proposals. The result? The peace process will spin back into the vicious circle.
The appeal for an international conference to salvage peace is, in itself, a strategically sound idea. It will accomplish nothing, however, if it seeks only to put the American initiative into effect. What is required, therefore, is an international conference of a different order, one that will rectify the structural imbalances of what is referred to as the "peace process".
The new Middle East peace conference, I propose, should be conducted in the manner of the conferences held in the wake of major wars. It should last for at least two or three months and not adjourn until all problems have been aired and agreement has been reached on a full range of solutions acceptable to all sides. It should not aim to dismantle previously signed accords, but rather to build upon them, address the provisions that have not been implemented, seek the shortest route to the implementation of outstanding commitments, and generate a balanced and cohesive framework encompassing the various aspects of the issues under discussion. Only in this manner will it be possible to eliminate all ambiguity or misunderstanding.
Because it would address many crucial issues, such a conference would secure the enthusiasm of many parties. On crucial issue, for instance, is the question of Palestinian representation, now that Israel has recognised the PLO and a Palestinian Authority has been established on the ground. The representation of the Palestinian people has been one of the major stumbling blocks in all previous peace conferences, including Madrid.
It has become perfectly clear, particularly to the Arabs, that separate, secret or piecemeal negotiations only complicate matters and push the region toward war rather than peace. Peace must be comprehensive if it is to prevail, and the only way to a comprehensive peace is an international conference, attended by all concerned parties, that will treat all outstanding issues in one go.
The new Middle East peace conference would be an opportunity to rectify the flaws in the structure of the negotiating process, which gives the US sole control over the course and pace of negotiations. The conference I am suggesting would bring in the European Union, Japan and the UN and grant them roles commensurate with their influence in the global system. Such a prospect would secure the wholehearted approval of these three powers.
I can fully sympathise with those who insist upon tightening the diplomatic blockade against Israel. The current Israeli government is responsible for the deadlock in the peace process, because it refuses to abide by the commitments undertaken by its predecessor. We should therefore guard against any breaches in the blockade. Regardless of the measures we take, however, I am certain that Israel, with US assistance, is able to breach this blockade -- all the more reason why we must, as of this moment, search for a new beginning that will offer strong guarantees of success.
Otherwise, negotiations will resume their habitual course, entitling us only to celebrate a short period of calm before the storm.
*The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.
