Whither Egyptian-American relations?

By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed

On the eve of the dialogue, President Mubarak flew to Libya to inquire about the health of Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi, in an apparent defiance of the Security council ban on flights in and out of Libya. However, it was later announced that Egypt had sought permission from the UN sanctions committee before undertaking the trip, and that no one had raised any objection. Under the sanction committee's procedures, permission is automatic when there are no objections. Still, Ms Albright expressed her disapproval and said that one visit on humanitarian grounds to Gaddafi was quite sufficient.

The Clinton administration's strategy towards the Middle East, formulated by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Martin Indyk, is known as the 'double containment' policy. The key idea is that whatever the differences between Iraq and Iran, both 'rogue' states must be contained simultaneously if regional stability is to be maintained and the peace process promoted. The strategy is based on the assumption that ensuring both the security of Israel and the stability of the Gulf oil area entails supporting moderate Arab regimes which are ready to promote peace with Israel, while isolating 'rogue' states that encourage terrorism. If the Clinton administration is now ready to exhibit some flexibility when it comes to Dr Khatemi's Iran, it remains uncompromising concerning other so-called 'rogue' states like Libya and Sudan. By opposing air strikes against Baghdad and disregarding flight restrictions into Libya, Cairo is obviously not toeing the line.

Actually, it is hard to see how Cairo can be expected to toe the American line at a time Washington is so inflexible towards a number of Arab states while allowing Netanyahu to get away with one violation after another. Such flagrant double standards have allowed the Israeli prime minister to virtually kill the peace process. The talks still underway are less in the hope of resurrecting it than of avoiding having to admit its demise and look for an alternative, a prospect none of the parties is now ready to contemplate.

Experience has proved that Egyptian-American relations are adversely affected whenever the peace process is exposed to setbacks and Egyptian-Israeli relations become strained. And rarely have these relations been more strained than they are now. Significant in this respect is the way the alleged scandal involving the Egyptian ambassador to Tel-Aviv has been handled by the Israeli authorities. Whatever the truth of the charges brought against him by an Israeli belly dancer -- and it is hard to believe that the occupant of such a sensitive post could have acted so irresponsibly -- the unprecedented decision to strip him of diplomatic immunity so he can stand trial is hardly conducive to halting the downward slide in Egyptian-Israeli relations.

Everything seems to indicate that Netanyahu is not particularly interested in maintaining good neighbourly relations with Egypt, that he is, in fact, more concerned with using pre-emptive diplomacy to deter the other protagonists and ensure the unconditional implementation of his strategy. Washington's unwillingness -- or inability -- to call Netanyahu to order has had unfortunate repercussions on Egyptian-American relations. However, both Cairo and Washington see the need to avoid a worst-case scenario. To that end, they are trying to establish a mechanism which can prevent differences over specific issues snowballing into major crises affecting the overall relationship between them. One such potential crisis is the present campaign launched by members of Congress and other hostile quarters in America against Egypt's alleged persecuting of Copts.

There is no denying that the two parties do not see eye to eye on many issues. For example, there is the Israeli-Turkish file and the emergence of a military axis between the two states, a development that is blessed by the US and seen as a serious threat to pan-Arab national security. Then there is the growing importance of Africa in Washington's foreign policy agenda. President Clinton's recent visit to Black Africa signals the onset of a more vigorous American policy towards the continent. A project now in the works is the formation of peace-keeping forces in hot spots of conflict outside the umbrella of the Security Council and the Organisation of African Unity. Not surprisingly this is provoking serious Egyptian reservations.

Along the same lines, Egypt apprehends the extension eastwards of NATO, and, in the light of Russia's opposition to that extension, its impact on the security of the Mediterranean area. There is also the nuclear file, which has acquired new urgency following the recent blasts set off by India and Pakistan on the subcontinent. Cairo is keener than ever on the implementation of its proposal for a de-nuclearised Middle East. But where does Washington stand on such a proposal, which obviously includes Israel?

Egypt is also interested in pursuing the Egyptian-French initiative to convene an international conference which, in the absence of the two main protagonists, the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority, would issue a statement on how to overcome the present deadlock in the peace talks. But would Washington agree to a gathering that is bound to expose Israel's prime minister?

For the first time since the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed two decades ago, the reduction of American economic aid to Egypt is being discussed in the context of the American-Egyptian dialogue. Cairo insists that any reductions be attributed to obvious improvement in Egypt's economic performance, not to leave the door open to speculation that it reflects a cooling off of relations between the two states. On the other hand, Washington is not expected to decrease its military assistance to Egypt, because it is interested in maintaining strong links between the military doctrines of both armies.

The dialogue was aimed at investing Egyptian-American relations with a permanent, strategic character, highlighting the idea that the two parties could agree to disagree on given issues and that relations between them should not be made contingent progress in the peace process. The new character of the relationship should find expression in its economic aspect through the gradual transformation of American economic assistance to Egypt into upgraded trade relations and joint investment projects.

Egyptian-American relations should not be used to serve the bilateral relationship between the US and Israel, nor should the solidity of Egyptian-American relations depend on how far Cairo is ready to put pressure on the Palestinians to yield to Israeli demands. However, if the relationship is to enter a new and healthier phase, the burden of the required changes cannot be assumed by Egypt alone.