Probing the 21st century [3]

Democracy and ideology

By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed

There is a basic difference between the notions of democracy and ideology. They might even be at antipodes. Democracy operates on the principle of feedback, offering the opportunity for a constant reappraisal of ideas and systems in response to public demand; it is a mechanism by which the danger of becoming trapped in a specific set of ideas, a specific mould, can be averted, as it is always open to new horizons. Ideology, on the other hand, is governed by the principle of constancy, not change, in the sense that it consecrates a given intellectual buildup which cannot be deviated from.

If ideology was 'defeated' at the end of the 20th century, it is because it was unable to rise to the challenges of the Information Revolution. The free flow of information allowed for a constant renewal of ideas and a continuous reshuffling of intellectual setups, striking a mortal blow at the totalitarian approaches which characterise the struggle for ideological supremacy. The Information Revolution was instrumental in the downfall of ideology thanks to the achievements of science and technology. Indeed, technology, particularly in the fields of computer science, satellites, electronic mail, Internet, etc, is a key element in any talk of the future of ideology and democracy. Thanks to the communication networks, a new phenomenon has come into existence, namely, 'collective intelligence', where thinking and inventiveness can be pooled and undertaken in common, thus expanding the field of scientific endeavour and paving the way for 'artificial intelligence'. Democracy is better equipped to meet the requirements of the Information Age than ideological dogmas.

Of course, it can be argued that democracy is more likely to flourish in developed societies than in non-developed societies, which are concerned primarily with the issue of catching up, and where each school of thought is more likely to see any other less as a factor of enrichment than of obstruction in the race to catch up. In that sense, underdevelopment and democratic behaviour are incompatible. This is all the more true if we remember that 'catching up' means making an alien set of values, those of the already developed societies, the basic frame of reference, rather than the values which emanate naturally from the specific cultural legacy of each society -- a further reason for alienation and frustration.

It is safe to assume, therefore, that not all societies will see democracy as offering them the best chance for achieving progress and development in the coming century. In a way, there appears to be a kind of critical threshold which developing societies are bound to come up against at one time or another. Some will make the breakthrough into the developed world; most, however, will not, their failure to achieve that objective driving many to look for their frames of reference in the past, the only safe haven from the insurmountable challenges of the future.

Moreover, not all developed countries are necessarily keen on having democracy generalised and extended to all societies, as this would inevitably affect their ability to maintain a dominant status and undermine their control over international institutions. Is the US, for instance, genuinely interested in the democratisation of the UN, or in opening channels such as the Davos forum to the elites of all countries?

Actually, 'globalism' is an ambivalent notion. It does not assume a priori that any given state, however important, should be privileged. Multinational corporations often find it advantageous to establish their headquarters in tiny countries such as Luxembourg or Liechtenstein to avoid the restrictive laws of major states. The mechanisms controlling markets are different from those which control states. This dichotomy between market mechanisms and the prerogatives of state sovereignty hinders the spread of democracy.

In any case, democracy, being an open system so to speak, will always remain deficient to one extent or another, exhibiting loopholes that non-democratic forces, whether authoritarian, totalitarian or bureaucratic, will take advantage of. One source of potential problems is that, in the absence of a theoretical model of a totally unfettered market, market economies tend to deepen rather than level out disparities between the various social strata. Moreover, as trans- and supra-national networks acquire greater leverage, a 'globalist' identity is emerging which, with the weakening of the sovereign state, encourages the development of a wide variety for forces of fragmentation, whether they operate on a platform of nationalism, chauvinism, ethnicity or otherwise. It is therefore difficult to sustain unipolarity, more specifically, the unchallenged domination by one specific set of values after the breakdown of ideological bipolarity. Only democracy can help overcome this historical impasse.

The mechanisms of the Information Revolution are 'neutral'. From the purely technical point of view, they can produce the democratisation of information, the opportunity for every citizen to be adequately informed and contribute consciously to the affairs of state. They can also produce the reverse, that is, make the manipulation of information such that no citizen can be sure whether the information he receives and the way it is presented is reliable. In the final analysis, whether information is manipulated or objective is not a technical, but a political problem, whose outcome will depend on how willing people are to fight for their rights. There is no fatality, with the advent of the new century, that the outcome should not serve the cause of progress.