'Hot pursuit' vies with peace

Why is Turkey outraged by a peace agreement which was supposedly reached to end a four-year-old bloody conflict in its backyard?

Leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Massoud Barazani, and his rival Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), insisted that they only signed a deal to end their bitter rivalry and to arrange for a power-sharing formula in the Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq.

The agreement, a copy of which was obtained by Al-Ahram Weekly, stipulated, among other things, that the two sides will set up a new government for the autonomous Kurdish region which will be responsible for bringing a semblance of normality to the region and take control of the day-to-day administration, including collecting customs duties and taxes. A three-month deadline was established for implementing the agreement, which also called for elections of a new legislative council for the Kurdish area.

But the most important part of the Washington accord as far as Turkey was concerned -- and this remained secret -- is that the two Kurdish factions agreed that they will be committed to fighting the Turkish Kurds, who have been using northern Iraq for years as a launching pad for their attacks against Turkey.

Although such a move was designed to allay Turkey's fears and obtain its blessing for the deal, Ankara, as Ecevit's remarks indicated, remained vehemently opposed to the Kurdish reconciliation. On Saturday, it announced that it would restore full diplomatic ties with Baghdad, severed after Turkey joined the US-led international coalition against Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, in the hope that such a move will convince Baghdad to join its efforts to contain the Iraqi Kurds.

Turkey's worries stem largely from the fact that an end to Kurdish in-fighting in northern Iraq will probably force its army to halt its hot pursuit of rebels of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) in the area. Turkey, which has been supporting Barazani's KDP since the Kurdish war started in 1994, has been sending thousands of troops to fight the PKK guerrillas who have been operating from areas under Talabani's PUK control. It clearly takes the promises by the two Iraqi Kurdish groups to prevent the PKK's attacks with a pinch of salt.

Ironically, neither the US, Turkey's main military ally, nor Saddam Hussein's government, seem ready to accept Turkey's tough position, especially if Ankara tries to torpedo the agreement by increasing its military presence in northern Iraq. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who presided over the initialisation of the accord, described it as "a new and hopeful chapter."

Indeed, it was one of her closest aides, David Welsh, who went to northern Iraq in July to negotiate and finalise the deal. American officials have privately described the agreement as "essential to reaching the objective of overthrowing Saddam." If that is the case, it will be hard for Washington to see one of its allies trying to hamper its efforts in getting Saddam.

Meanwhile, Iraq has welcomed Turkey's decision to restore diplomatic ties as "a step in the right direction," but has stopped short of endorsing Ankara's outrage against its own Kurdish rebellious groups. In fact, Iraq sees Turkey as being partly responsible for the situation in its northern region where it has not been able to restore its control on its Kurdish population for more than seven years. Moreover, Iraq at that stage will most certainly not try to antagonise the Kurds for fear that hostilities with them or even rising tension will be an invitation for the US to intervene militarily in support of the Kurds. Such a move could provide Washington with a pretext to initiate its much-talked-about schemes to oust Saddam.

At any rate, the hostile Turkish reaction to the Kurdish accord and Baghdad's wait-and-see approach might not make "the hopeful chapter" end happily ever after. It is doubtful that the agreement can hold without support from both Baghdad and Ankara. The two countries have always been able to outmanoeuvre the Kurds and create a pincer movement whenever their mutual interests are threatened by the Kurds.

Although the Kurdish leaders this week seemed to be sounding relatively optimistic about the prospects of their agreement, they do realise that Turkey's approval, and to a certain extent, that of Baghdad, is important to make their agreement work. The Kurds are not strong enough to stand on their own and their leaders know from previous experience that the US has never been the trusted friend whom they can rely on in times of crisis. Again, they can only feel torn between their endeavour to achieve national aspirations and the interests and ambitions of their strong neighbours.