A war fought for peace

By Ahmed Abdel-Halim *

These lessons did not prevent Egypt from preparing for another war. The basic principle in preparing for the October War was self-reliance and the reorganisation and retraining of the armed forces, as well as sound strategic planning to make the best possible use of these forces. Diplomatic efforts garnered support for the Egyptian position, and ensured that the international community knew Egypt was in the right.

According to Egyptian political and strategic thinking, the war had to be limited to two fronts: the Egyptian and the Syrian. The aim was to change the balance of power in the region and put paid to Israel's use of "security needs" as justification for its military superiority. It was intended that the war should last long enough to allow the Arabs to use oil as a strategic weapon. The aim was also to prevent Israel from counter-attacking and mobilising its reserves. On the basis of Israel's capabilities, Egyptian strategists worked out four courses of action Israel was likely to follow. It could launch an attack on the Egyptian and Syrian forces; declare general mobilisation; embark on a political and diplomatic campaign to neutralise any hostile Arab moves; or take no action whatsoever.

Egyptian decision-makers hoped that Israel would take no action. They based this anticipated result on Israel's belief that maintaining a situation of cold hostility in the region would enable it to neutralise a potential Egyptian attack and continue to occupy the territories it had seized during in June 1967. This state of uneasy tension also allowed for the growth of the Israeli economy and ensured an increasing flow of foreign aid to Israel. War, on the other hand, would have meant possible military defeat, as well as the loss of life, weapons and equipment. Clearly, for Israel at least, there were considerable strategic advantages to staying out of a war.

Although the war began on 6 October, 1 October was the day on which the deadline for the attack was determined. This date was particularly crucial given the possibility that Israel could order a general mobilisation. From the Egyptian perspective, there were three possibilities. Israel could mobilise before 1 October, either as a precautionary measure or because it had received information that Egypt was planning an attack. If this had taken place, the attack would have been postponed and ordinary military manoeuvres would have been simulated.

If Israel did not mobilise before 6 October, that was the day on which Egypt would launch its attack. In this case the attack would proceed as planned.

Finally, Israel could mobilise between the 1st and the 6th. Egypt would then have been prepared to attack before the completion of mobilisation.

The Egyptian plan of attack included three phases. First, it would attack Israel while disguising the attack, politically and strategically, as an ordinary military manoeuvre. A joint Egyptian/Syrian attack forcing Israel to fight on two fronts was considered preferable. But Egypt, if necessary, was prepared to attack on its own, taking advantage of the time it took Israel to mobilise. As soon as the attack showed signs of success, and in order to neutralise the possibility of US military aid to Israel, the Arab oil-producing nations would begin to exert pressure on Israel's Western backers.

Israel, on the other hand, had few options: to launch a pre-emptive air strike; to mobilise, fully or partially, before the Egyptian attack; or to take no action whatsoever. Israel discarded the first option for political reasons, and was left with the choice between mobilisation and inaction.

The Israelis had great confidence in their military capabilities, and dismissed the idea that Egypt could launch a successful attack. They thought the effects of any attack could be easily contained. They even thought that a general Arab offensive could be reversed through an Israeli counter-attack. Israel also estimated that Egypt would not attack Israeli forces on the east bank, and believed that Egypt's real aim was to cause Israel to mobilise fully, a very costly process.

In great secrecy and utter calm, the Egyptian armed forces carried out a strategic deployment. The aim was to change the positions of the field armies gradually, without arousing suspicions. This placed the armed forces in a favourable position to launch an attack on 6 October.

The Egyptian attack on Israeli forces stationed in Sinai led rapidly to the use of the oil weapon. After a week of fighting, during which the Egyptian forces had achieved their goals, Israel had lost a great number of tanks and warplanes, as well as most of its ammunition. Israeli losses were so high that the Israeli government appealed to the US to airlift weapons directly to the battlefields in order to stave off a total defeat. President Nixon indeed ordered the Pentagon to arrange an airlift to Israel and to supply it with all its military needs during this crisis.

The Saudi Arabian government then informed the US that it considered US military aid to Israel the expression of a clear bias, and announced that it would stop oil shipments to the West. President Nixon, however, ignored this warning and, a few days, later the Arab nations had stopped the oil flow to the West.

This daring move caused the US to advocate economic and military action. But the diplomatic efforts of then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger led to a disengagement on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts, and in turn to an Arab lifting of the oil boycott. The outcome of the crisis, however, was clear. Egypt had won the war.

The war revealed the extent to which Arab unity could be mobilised toward common ends. It restored the armed forces' confidence, and rehabilitated them in the eyes of the Egyptian people. It changed the balance of power in the region and, indeed, the world. It made it possible to envisage peace in the region. The Arabs were able to avoid repeating the mistakes they had made in previous clashes with Israel. A national and pan-Arab framework was developed; political and strategic moves were planned carefully.

The October War was a war for peace. Now all we need to do is to achieve that peace, on the basis of justice and mutual benefit.