Crossing from despair to hope

By Osama El-Ghazali Harb *

The world at large, and more especially Israel, Egypt's Arab neighbours and, possibly, young Egyptians (whose knowledge of the war is derived from the media and history books), may wonder if these annual celebrations are not an overreaction, an exaggerated propaganda campaign or, at best, unjustified jubilation. Yet this is clearly not the case.

The past 50 years of Arab-Israeli conflict witnessed a series of all-out wars: the wars of 1948, 1956 and 1967, the War of Attrition, from 1968 to '70, the October War in 1973, and the Lebanese War (1982). Among them all, the October War is a singular exception. Israel admitted to its defeat a few days after the war broke out, then claimed to have altered the situation through a counter-attack in which its forces were able to reach the western bank of the Suez Canal and advance to within almost 100 kilometres of Cairo.

From the Egyptian perspective, the October War was fundamentally different from all previous wars between the Arabs and Israel. Egypt's victory is a reality which is undiminished by Israel's infiltration to the western bank of the Canal. To repeat a truism, the key to understanding the significance of the October War for Egypt is an understanding of the impact of the defeat of 1967. In fact, the damage caused by the psychological trauma of the June '67 defeat can be fully fathomed only by Egyptians who lived through the experience.

In their long history of struggle against the British and French occupation, Egyptians suffered in a different way: as a country with limited resources, pitted against the military superiority of a major power. With Israel, the situation was very different. For the Arab masses, Israel was a tiny artificial entity, created by imperialism. They knew nothing more about the enemy. Propaganda had inflated the image of the Egyptian army, reputed at the time to be the strongest in the Middle East. In the midst of Egyptian ecstasy over Nasser's political victories and Egypt's leading role at the African, Islamic and non-aligned levels, the defeat of June 1967 struck like lightning. It was devastating, but especially so as far as young people were concerned.

The millions who spontaneously took to the streets on 9 and 10 June, when Nasser declared his resignation, seemed to be giving vent to emotions they could no longer contain. They filled the streets to express their determination to fight and avenge themselves. During the following few months, the armed forces were purged and reorganised. The first mass demonstrations of the Nasser era took place in 1968, when the people at last unleashed their anger against the true perpetrators of the defeat.

Yet the gravest repercussions of the crushing fiasco that was the June War were no doubt its psychological consequences. It was a humiliating and degrading blow to national self-confidence; for most people, this sense was compounded by overwhelming guilt that they had failed to perform their duty. But there was also the need to reconsider all they had previously regarded as incontrovertible truths. New political trends, opposed to the regime and offering alternatives to the political system, attracted many young activists. While efforts to reorganise the army were being stepped up, the vast majority of Egyptians entertained doubts and fears regarding how serious Nasser and, later, Sadat was about going to war. Launching the attack of October 1973 seemed the only option. Israeli and Western intelligence failed to take the inevitability of the step into account. This was a fatal mistake. But they had also failed to note the enormous psychological pressure exerted on Egyptian decision-makers. For any Egyptian president, the decision to fight was a matter of survival in the most fundamental sense.

The declaration of war lifted an enormous psychological burden from the shoulders of Egyptians, particularly the younger generations. When the troops crossed the canal, it was as if the entire population had crossed over, from despair to hope, from devastation to triumph.

The October War was also the most decisive turning point in the history of Arab-Israeli conflict. Before the war, Arab responses to Israeli challenges were passive, principally restricted to rhetoric and propaganda. The Arabs had been defeated and Israel's military superiority had been confirmed. After the war, the Arab response was active and effective. As regards Israel's expansionist plans to occupy Egyptian and Syrian land, the war was a blow. October also put paid to claims of Israel's overwhelming and absolute military supremacy, which had become an insurmountable obstacle in the minds of the Arabs.

After the October War, Egypt, the Middle East and the whole world changed. Sadat acquired a new legitimacy. The one-party state was replaced by a new multiparty system, while the centrally planned economy had been replaced by the Open Door policy. The war helped bring the Palestinian question to the fore once again, and renewed the confidence of Arabs from the Arabian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean. The war may even have stimulated the surge in oil prices, which freed financial surpluses to fund mammoth developmental and construction schemes, unprecedented in oil-exporting nations. The war also laid bare the international balance of power, and especially the limits of entente at that particular stage in the Cold War between the eastern and western blocs.

But the most important consequence of the October War is the role it played in making peace between Egypt and Israel possible. The self-confidence and realism Sadat had acquired were the driving force in his visit to Israel, and gave him the impetus he needed to get the peace process, difficult and arduous as it is, rolling.