Mediaeval theocracies in a modern age

By Ahmed Sobhi Mansour *

Any classification of "Islamic states" is political and demagogic, not scientific. Such states have nothing to do with the true Islamic state created by the Prophet Mohamed, who laid its foundations as decreed by the Qur'an. Today's so-called Islamic states are not based on absolute freedom of faith and a delicate balance between a free market, social justice, human rights and true participatory democracy. The modern secular state in its present form, in fact, is a step on the way to the realisation of the true Islamic state.

The Islamic state established by the Prophet Mohamed gradually withered after the Arab conquests, and disappeared entirely with the rise of the military-tribal Umayyad state. Later, this military state was replaced by the Abbasid model, in which the caliph ruled exactly as Europe was ruled by monarchs claiming divine right. The legacy of the Abbasid era disregards the councils in which the Arabs participated democratically and learned how to rule themselves. In this sense, there was little difference between the Abbasid and Fatimid caliphs, the Ottoman sultans, and the Roman emperor or Henry VIII.

When Europe rose against the oppression of king and church, a new era began. With the fall of the Ottoman Sultanate and the imposition of European colonial rule, a new phase of renaissance was at hand for Arabs and Muslims. The model for this renaissance was not the secular European model, but that of the Islamic caliphate, which prevailed during the Abbasid era. The Islamic heritage was transformed into a sacred tradition, which the Sunnis attributed to the prophet and the Shi'ites to the prophet and his descendants through Ali and Fatma.

Pride in this sacred heritage combined with the Western colonial challenge, a sense of Arab identity combined with the inability to catch up with Western and Eastern civilisational development, pushed the Muslims to turn to their glorious past and strive to establish states reflective of their heritage. The Saudi kingdom, Pakistan and Khomeini's Iran, as well as the Sudanese regime and the Wahhabi Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, are examples of attempts to recreate the Islamic state of the golden age.

Afghanistan became a haven and a training ground for the underground movements that sought to establish Islamic regimes in Kabul and elsewhere. Saudi Arabia helped finance these groups, and the Americans helped overthrow the Communist regime; yet ultimately, the mujahidin failed dismally, their dreams dashed on the hard rock of reality. Afghanistan now is not an Islamic state, but a theocracy rooted in the traditions and culture of the Middle Ages and characterised by extreme fanaticism, religious bigotry and violation of the right to political participation and freedom from oppression.

A real Islamic state is built on the principle of absolute freedom in faith and thought. Differences in belief can be judged only by God on Judgment Day, not by those who choose to designate individuals or groups as apostates. Islam also prohibits murder, except as punishment for murder, and even in such cases the murderer may escape the penalty and instead compensate the victim's family through the system legalised in the Qur'an. God has decreed that Muslims may fight only in self-defence and in an attempt to reinstate absolute freedom of worship.

The movements that have striven to create Islamic states in Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen believe in the same mediaeval doctrines that run counter to the principles of the Qur'an and the practice of the Prophet.

Such theocracies uphold the idea that any difference in opinion or religion justifies the extermination and elimination of opposition groups. Prior to the establishment of the so-called Islamic states, these groups never confronted any issue related to the lives of people or their civilisation and culture. These groups focus on declaring people to be apostates whenever possible, thereby justifying their attacks on the property and lives of their opponents.

More deplorable still is the fact that non-Muslims both inside and outside those theocracies are subjected to the wrath of the militant groups, which disregard and routinely violate all international laws and conventions. An example is Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa permitting the murder of Salman Rushdie on grounds of apostasy. The assassination of Farag Foda and the attempt to kill Naguib Mahfouz are examples of the penalty these groups impose upon "apostates". The assassination of the Iranian diplomats in Afghanistan is another example of the atrocities committed by such groups.

Afghan society may be Sunni, but the fanatics and extremists who are in power can condemn all society and decide that it must be exterminated. Mass murder is regarded by these groups as an act of faith that can bring them closer to God, especially during Ramadan, as evidenced by the blood baths they created in Algeria.

The lives of non-Muslims, furthermore, are worth nothing to them. The mass killings of innocent victims such as the Egyptian Copts or the tourists in Luxor and Cairo and others in Europe, America and Africa, are clear examples of the sheer indifference with which these groups regard human life. The taking of the American hostages in Tehran, the assassination of the Iranian diplomats in Mazar Sharif, or the attempt to assassinate President Mubarak in Addis Ababa are merely various aspects on a single conviction: that international laws and conventions have been drawn up by apostates and unbelievers, who deserve to be exterminated at any rate.

Such bloodthirsty organisations have rarely succeeded in establishing a viable political regime. Even if they manage to establish a stable government, it soon collapses under the weight of power struggles and the liquidation of contending groups at the hands of the most powerful and violent faction. This fact held true in the Middle Ages, the ages of theocracies, and remains valid in the age of globalisation and human rights. Indeed, the only reason such states and organisations continue to exist is the protection the US offers them, in its continuous endeavours to keep the entire area in a state of backwardness and underdevelopment. Domestically, these theocracies practice cultural and religious terrorism, yet are always markedly reluctant to introduce real political, economic, social and religious reform. Because of the corruption of the so-called Islamic reform movement, radicalism and extremism will continue to impede our progress -- exactly what regional and international forces are trying to achieve.

The struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran over leadership of the Islamic world is the most recent manifestation of a long history of Sunni-Shi'ite conflict. Sunni persecution of Shi'ites continues until today. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the success of the Afghan resistance, new arenas of fundamentalist Sunni-Shi'ite conflict have been opened. In this context, the American role has been to help Saudi Wahhabi influence to penetrate Pakistan and Afghanistan and across the Iranian borders. The Taliban themselves are students of the Islamic colleges established by Saudi Arabia in Pakistan.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, America fabricated an enemy that could be easily overcome and against which it can mobilise all its allies. Each time global power configurations change, new alliances emerge in which some friends turn into enemies and some enemies turn into friends. Unfortunately, Iran, with its ancient history and the theocracy established by Khomeini, was deemed a most suitable enemy. The influence of Saudi oil and Sunni culture, the war with Iraq and, now, the possibility of a conflict with Afghanistan (which neither the British, the Russians nor, later, the Soviets survived unscathed) have contributed to undermining Iran's position.

These mediaeval theocracies will not only destroy the future of their own people, thus rendering a great service to America, but will also destroy Islam. We must implement rigorous reform, based on human and citizens' rights. Our degree of success will determine our ability to create a true Islamic state, in which religion belongs to God and citizens have reason to hope and strive for equality.