Narrow escape

Members of an American NGO protesting sanctions in Baghdad on Tuesday (photo: AFP)

Only a few hours before he rescinded his 31 October decision to stop cooperation with the UN weapons inspectors, a massive air strike by the United States was looming large over Iraq to punish Saddam for his defiance and compel him to allow the UN teams back to work in Iraq.

The latest crisis erupted at the beginning of this month when a defiant Saddam cut all links with the inspectors responsible for eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, threatening another confrontation with the United Nations. He said he would not resume cooperation with the inspectors unless the Security Council agreed to set a time limit to the inspections and decided on when the economic sanctions on Iraq would be lifted.

Yet, a mere two weeks later, the Iraqi leader had to swallow his words and agree to allow the UN inspectors whom he had accused of being CIA and Mossad spies to resume their missions unconditionally.

But why did Saddam try to challenge the UN again and was he misjudging the international community's -- and in particular the United States' -- resolve?

According to Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz, Saddam's latest decision to halt cooperation with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was prompted by Iraq's frustration over the Security Council's failure to start a comprehensive review of the inspectors' activities in Iraq that would have determined a date for the lifting of sanctions.

After a similar crisis in February, which was defused by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Iraq had demanded the review. But it was only after the confrontation with chief inspector Richard Butler on 5 August that the Security Council authorised Annan to formulate such a review as a carrot to persuade Iraq to continue its cooperation with UNSCOM. Yet, when Annan presented his report in late October, Iraq realised that its substance did not give a clear-cut answer to its demands that the review would eventually lead to the lifting of the crippling sanctions. Based on this, Iraq made its 31 October decision.

Undoubtedly, this move reflected Saddam's frustration with the international isolation imposed on his government as a result of the eight-year embargo which has curtailed Iraq's oil sales and destroyed its economy. However, the questions remain: why now and what did Saddam hope to benefit from this latest challenge to Washington, which is the driving force behind his isolation and the continuation of sanctions? Theories about Saddam's motives and the timing of his latest challenge are in abundance, although most of them seem illogical and unreasonable.

One theory suggests that Saddam triggered the crisis in an attempt to overshadow the latest Palestinian-Israeli peace deal signed at the Wye Plantation last month in order to send a strong message to the Americans that he is still a major player in Middle East politics who cannot be side-stepped. Another theory is that he wanted to outmanoeuvre President Bill Clinton, whom he thought was weakened by the Monicagate affair. Still, a third theory is that he drew the wrong conclusion from the support he got during previous crises from countries like France, Russia and China and thought he would get that support again. A fourth theory has it that he was convinced there would be a strong Arab backing if he waged another war against the UN.

Regardless of the goals he was trying to achieve, Saddam appeared to be gambling that the 15-member Security Council and especially the US would not want a fight. As it turned out, this was not a reasonable bet. Not only did Iraq not receive the support it thought it would, but Iraq's condemnation inside the Council, even among the most sympathetic members, was unexpectedly fast and unanimous. The hawks, namely the US and Britain, expectedly showed unwavering resolve.

Annan gave Iraq the cold shoulder and the Arabs blamed Baghdad for the crisis and held it responsible for whatever consequences might arise, as US air forces and sea armada began converging on the Gulf for another showdown with Iraq.

Thus Saddam had no choice but to back off and allow the inspectors to resume their work.

But now, and although Iraq claims victory in the standoff, the prospect of the sanctions being lifted is still as remote as ever. Indeed, by ruining whatever support it has managed to garner in the Arab world and inside the Security Council, Iraq has turned all its tactical victories into a strategic loss. Not only was it forced to back down, but it now has to go through a series of tests to prove its compliance with the Security Council's resolutions.

And to add insult to injury, Clinton has attached conditions to his warning following Iraq's acceptance to allow the inspectors back.

"Iraq has backed down but that is not enough," Clinton said. "Now Iraq must live up to its obligations."

Clinton listed conditions which he said Iraq will have to abide by if it wants to avoid a military strike. These include resolving outstanding issues raised by UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), giving unfettered access to the inspectors, turning over all relevant documents they ask for, reinstating Iraq's acceptance of the destruction of all weapons of mass destruction and refraining from interfering with the work of inspection teams.

To avoid any loopholes in the new agreement, the US and Britain made it clear that they will be ready to strike without warning if Saddam were to break again his pledge to cooperate fully with UN arms inspectors who started their journey back to Iraq on Tuesday. But will it work? This remains to be seen.

Amid relief following the deal, leaders of both the United States and Britain, who have succeeded in trapping Saddam, announced that they are now considering ways to topple the Iraqi leadership. "Now, with the Americans, we are looking at ways to bolster the opposition and improve the possibility of removing Saddam Hussein altogether," British Prime Minister Tony Blair told parliament on Monday.

Such a flagrant pledge can hardly be seen as an incentive for Saddam to comply with UN demands and refrain from another confrontation. If Annan was right in his description of the latest crisis as being "a war of frustration between the two sides", then, with a long history of mistrust, miscalculation and reneging on commitments, the world may soon find itself before another standoff in the Gulf.