Al-Ahram Weekly On-line
26 Nov. - 2 Dec. 1998
Issue No.405
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 Current issue | Previous issue | Site map

Globalism and bipolarity

By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed

Sid The term 'bipolarity' has come to be closely associated with the confrontation that prevailed throughout most of the second half of the 20th century between two blocs of states: the western bloc, led by the US and representing world capitalism, and the eastern bloc, led by the USSR and representing the ideology of communism.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the communist pole seemed to signal the end of bipolarity as a feature of political life. However, this assumption did not take into account the possibility that bipolarity could acquire new forms adapted to a different global game on the eve of the twenty-first century.

The contemporary world is often described as the era of globalism, which has acquired specific characteristics in the post-bipolar world order. Contrary to the previous period marked by the confrontation between two mutually exclusive ideologies, globalism seems to indicate that we have now reached a stage where humankind as a whole attributes itself to one world, one set of values, one fundamental ideology -- a stage which American scholar Francis Fukuyama described as 'the end of history', by which he meant not the end of the unfolding of historical events, but the end of differences over the principles that should guide historical development.

However, Fukuyama's thesis was very quickly defeated by the realities of the contemporary world, in which, despite the end of the former confrontation between capitalism and communism as the overriding conflict in which all others were subsumed, conflicts did not disappear. On the contrary, liberated from the deterrent power of the strong polarisation at the summit of the international community, they proliferated. And another American scholar, Samuel P. Huntington, came up with a 'correcting' thesis that sought to interpret the phenomenon not in terms of 'class struggle', which was no longer en vogue, but in terms of what he called a 'clash of civilisation'.

Thus globalism has not ushered in a new historical era based on the disappearance of conflict. What has changed is that conflict is no longer polarised as it was before, no longer kept in check under the pressure of bipolarity at the summit of the global buildup. The global structure is now closer to that of a web or net than it is to that of a pyramid. In the previous world order, the basic unit, at least theoretically, was the sovereign state. State sovereignty, according to the rules of international legality, was supreme and inviolate. Bipolarity at the time took -- at least theoretically -- the form of two mutually antagonistic pyramidal structures, with the superpowers at the top and the various states subjected to a hierarchy within one or the other of these two pyramids.

With the emergence of globalism, the sovereign state is no longer the basic unit. No longer the absolute, inalienable and inviolate prerogative it once was, sovereignty is today violated in both real and symbolic terms. Unlike a pyramid, a web is a complex structure with many corners and heads, but no privileged one as the case is with the pyramid. The world economy is today acquiring the form of a tightly-knit worldwide net; so too is the media, with Internet, the mother of all nets, as its central core. Such global networking has brought about new forms of polarisation, including an updated version of bipolarity with many of the features of the previous version but also with entirely different ones. This is not surprising, given that the fundamental structure now re-generating bipolarity is not the pyramid but the web.

In this new context, one pole could present itself as the personification of the 'new world order'. The United States, for instance, sees itself as that personification. However, this introduces an ambiguity. When the US talks of the present world order, does it see the UN as the mainstay of that order, or does it see itself in that role? Which of these entities is the decisive force? In the post-bipolar world, are we witnessing a uni- or multi-polar world order?

One corollary of this ambiguity is what has come to be described as the double standard issue. There are states seen a priori as friendly to the US and hence as deserving of tolerance and leniency whatever infractions of the world order they commit; and others which are seen a priori as 'rogue states that deserve to be treated harshly whatever they do. The application of double standards is particularly obvious in the Middle East, especially if a comparison is drawn between the very different ways the US treats Israel and Iraq respectively.

Ultimately, the unspoken ambition of the United States to take over the role of the UN, to become, as it were, the primus inter pares between the great powers, has laid the groundwork for a new bipolarity, a confrontation between the forces of good, as represented primarily by the United States, and those of evil which, after the fall of the Soviet Union and the Evil Empire it personified, had to be invented. The new counter-pole is not a state as such, but an amorphous force known as 'global terrorism', which has become a generic term used to describe any activities running counter to the new world order's assumption that all conflicts can and should be resolved by peaceful means. Under the previous bipolar world order, certain forms of violence were legitimate. Wars of liberation by anti-colonial forces were legitimate. So was resorting to force against occupation. Israel has occupied territories belonging to other states for over three decades and can go on occupying them indefinitely with impunity.

In such a context, a majority of world states are understandably unable to espouse the US point of view on every issue of contention, but fear that if they demur too forcefully they might be categorised as 'rogue' or 'terrorist' states. The fiction of a terrorist counter-pole is thus a useful tool in the United States' bid to become the sole superpower in a unipolar world, while still pretending to respect democracy in world affairs and uphold the UN as the key decision-maker worldwide.

Such a setup makes it difficult to be anything but pessimistic on the future of the Iraqi crisis. The UNSCOM inspectors will go on escalating their demands with impunity. Iraq will continue to rebel as far as it can go short of provoking a backlash. In other words the stage is set for further clashes in the future.