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Al-Ahram Weekly 21 - 28 January 1999 Issue No. 413 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 21 - 28 January 1999 Issue No. 413
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Focus Economy Opinion Culture Features Living Travel Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Summit fever
By Salama Ahmed Salama
There has been no sign yet that a meeting of Arab foreign ministers to discuss the Iraqi crisis has been postponed, as in previous cases, in ambiguous circumstances. Intensive efforts to guarantee a minimum level of consensus have been maintained.
With threats that military attacks will resume after the feast, the results of such a meeting are difficult to predict. The warnings sent by Gulf states and the threats from Baghdad do not suggest that the Arabs have as yet found a common language. But as we know from experience, surprises could be in store. The unexpected agreement between several Arab countries on the sighting of the crescent that marks the beginning of the feast could be followed by an equally astonishing agreement on a number of principles, although these may be impossible to implement. Sadly, some believe that the agreement on the crescent qualifies Arab leaders to make inspired decisions on matters crucial to the nation.
Since the foreign ministers have failed to agree on basic issues, there is no need for a summit. A failed Arab summit would be at least as damaging as the Gulf War. It could only aggravate the fragmentation of the Arab body politic.
Some claim that the Arabs are able to take a unified position on a single issue, that the scars left by the Gulf War have healed, that Saddam Hussein's bombastic threats have had no effect, that major states benefiting from the maintenance of their troops and military bases in the Gulf region will one day welcome, let alone encourage, Arab rapprochement -- but these are illusions, not predictions.
Still, the worst form of self-deception is the belief that the US raids on Iraq, mobilisation of Iraqi opposition groups as a preliminary to overthrowing the regime, or CIA and Mossad plans are all designed to rid the Gulf regimes of Saddam (who is in fact the thorn planted by the US in the side of these same Gulf states). Only Saddam Hussein has been more dishonest by calling for the unification of the Mashreq (the Arab east) against the United States, Britain and Israel.
To put an end to this self-deception, the Arab ministers must agree on a package of basic principles which would allow Iraq to resolve its problems with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In return, the Arabs must pledge to resolve Iraq's conflict with the US and the international community.
In such a framework, Iraq would have to honour certain commitments. It would have to recognise its borders with Kuwait, refrain from using force or interfering in Kuwait's domestic affairs, and release Kuwaiti prisoners of war. In return, the Gulf states, Egypt, Syria and Jordan, could do everything in their power to halt the military operations the US continues to carry out under the pretext of safeguarding Gulf security. The Arabs can do this by demanding, loudly and clearly, that sanctions be lifted; amending the structure and terms of reference of the inspection teams; drawing up a time-table for the gradual reduction of US and British military presence in the Gulf; and setting a deadline for Gulf dependence on US protection.
The effectiveness of the Arab mutual defence agreement would have to be enhanced, the agreement establishing a mechanism for an effective Arab security system reviewed, and the plan for an Arab Court of Justice revived.
Convening an Arab summit is not necessary at this point. Summits are usually unsuitable venues for conflict resolution. More often, they have served as arenas for asserting power and imposing leadership. Most frequently, summits allow the participants to exchange niceties and shout slogans with which the Arab masses have become totally disillusioned. Time could clear an atmosphere riddled with grudges and animosities which hamper genuine rapport. Until this has occurred, however, we would do better to opt for a meeting of Arab foreign ministers and seek to expand its mandate, bearing in mind that changing ministers is far easier than changing presidents.
