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Al-Ahram Weekly 28 Jan. - 3 Feb. 1999 Issue No. 414 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 28 Jan. - 3 Feb. 1999 Issue No. 414
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Focus Economy Opinion Culture Features Living Travel Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters An opportunity to be seized
By John Whitbeck *Binyamin Netanyahu presumably believes that he has checkmated Yasser Arafat by scheduling Israel's elections for 17 May and 1 June, soon after 4 May -- the date on which the "Oslo process" terminates in accordance with the terms of its various agreements, and on which President Arafat has repeatedly promised (or "threatened", to use the term adopted by the American and Israeli press) to proclaim the establishment of the State of Palestine on the soil of Palestine.
While reading Mr Netanyahu's mind is scarcely an exact science, he appears to believe that he has cleverly trapped President Arafat in a situation in which his antagonist is damned if he does and damned if he doesn't. If he does "proclaim" the state on 4 May (or, more precisely, reaffirms its existence, since it was already proclaimed on November 15, 1988 -- and promptly recognised by over 100 other states), Mr Netanyahu promises (or threatens) to "annex" most of the West Bank (all of "Area C" and perhaps "Area B" as well) and to send in the army to blockade the small pockets of land under Palestinian control and bring them to their knees. He appears to believe that this would assure his reelection, and has even suggested in a speech to the Likud Central Committee that President Arafat may now change his mind about acting on 4 May so as not to help him be reelected.
Of course, if President Arafat fails to act on 4 May, he will forfeit his remaining credibility with his own people and, perhaps after considerable intra-Palestinian conflict, be replaced by someone less reasonable, less accommodating, less peace-oriented and hence more easily demonised (as he once was) to the detriment of Palestinian aspirations for fundamental human rights and justice. Either way, Bibi the brilliant strategist wins -- or so he appears to believe.
In fact, on careful analysis, it is far more likely that Mr Netanyahu has checkmated himself, making 4 May an even more desirable date on which to reaffirm the existence of the state of Palestine on the soil of Palestine, and ensuring that Palestinian statehood will be established in the most favourable circumstances imaginable.
Imagine that, on 4 May, President Arafat confirms publicly that the state of Palestine has been legally sovereign in all the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967, including Jerusalem, since the state was proclaimed in 1988, and that the "Palestinian Authority" through which the state established its presence and authority on a portion of its national territory has ceased to exist with the termination of the "Oslo process". Imagine that he declares publicly that all Palestinian government institutions established on Palestinian territory as organs of the "Palestinian Authority" are now government institutions of the state of Palestine. Imagine that this state is appealing for diplomatic recognition from all states that have not already recognised it, and applying to further upgrade Palestine's status at the United Nations (from "permanent observer", a status in which "Palestine" replaced the PLO in December 1988, one month after Palestine's "declaration of independence", and which was upgraded to an effective "super-observer" or "quasi-state" status in July 1998) to full member state.
Imagine further that, at the same time, President Arafat confirms his eagerness to negotiate with the new Israeli government all outstanding permanent-status issues (including final boundary demarcations and an equitable sharing of an undivided Jerusalem) on an accelerated basis, with a view to achieving new relations based on peaceful coexistence, mutual respect and human dignity, which will finally provide both peace and security for Israelis and Palestinians in the land both peoples love.
How would the international community react? Its consistent support for Palestinian statehood was again demonstrated on 9 December 1998, when the UN General Assembly adopted its annual resolution confirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination by a record vote of 162 (including all European Union states) to two (Israel and the United States), with only six abstentions, while adding for the first time the significant phrase "without excluding the option of a state".
At the Security Council level, China and Russia already recognise the state of Palestine. In December 1998, the French Foreign Ministry organised a two-day symposium in Paris on "The Issue of the Palestinian State" at which French support for Palestinian statehood, on both legal and policy grounds, was made clear to all the Arabs, Israelis, Europeans and Americans invited to attend and a French diplomat cited the figure 140 for the number of states which currently recognise the state of Palestine. It is difficult to believe that the United Kingdom, having consistently supported Palestinian self-determination in international organisations, will veto UN membership for Palestine (notwithstanding the British inclination to follow the United States blindly, for, if the US chose to veto, a British veto would be unnecessary, while if the US chose not to veto, a British veto would be inconceivable).
How would the United States react? In January 1998, President Bill Clinton moved to within a subtle nuance of endorsing Palestinian statehood when he publicly told President Arafat that, in the American view, an essential goal of the peace process is that the Palestinians should be able to "realise their aspirations to live as a free people". During his December 1998 visit to Gaza and his speech there, he moved closer still.
The United States will no doubt be urging (or threatening) President Arafat not to do anything on 4 May. The reason is simple and understandable. An affirmation of Palestinian statehood and an application for full UN membership would force the United States to make a difficult decision it would rather avoid. Its decision would either outrage the Israel-First Lobby in the United States and a significant minority of the Israeli public, or the entire Arab and Muslim world, already in a state of unprecedented anti-American fervour in light of America's hyperactivity toward Iraqi violations of international law and UN resolutions and its passive acquiescence toward Israeli violations of international law, UN resolutions and the agreements Israel has signed with America's blessings and encouragement.
If, however, the United States had to make a decision, it would be more likely to do the right thing in the context of an impending Israeli vote on whether or not to return Mr Netanyahu to power than in any other conceivable circumstances. Americans believe, probably correctly, that their refusal to give Yitzhak Shamir the $10 billion of loan guarantees he had demanded was instrumental in the Israeli electorate's decision to replace him with Yitzhak Rabin. President Clinton and his Middle East "peace team" clearly have no desire to deal with Mr Netanyahu one day longer than they are legally obligated to do so.
If, notwithstanding Mr Netanyahu's contemptuous trashing of the Wye River Memorandum, to which President Clinton and his associates devoted so much personal time and effort, the United States were to veto Palestinian membership in the UN, then Mr Netanyahu could present himself to his electorate as "the world's sole superpower", to whom even the United States must kneel in humble submission. If, on the other hand, after Mr Netanyahu had made opposition to Palestinian statehood the first plank in his electoral platform, the United States were to permit Palestine's admission to the UN as a member state, while virtually all other states (including those of the European Union) were extending full diplomatic recognition to Palestine, Mr Netanyahu would be made to look ridiculous and anachronistic. He would be finished. If the United States made such a decision prior to the first round of the Israeli elections, it is unlikely that, in the expected multi-candidate field, Mr Netanyahu would even qualify for the 1 June second-round run-off.
In the context of the American decision-making process, it is extremely fortunate that there will be an uncommonly long 18 months between this year's Israeli elections and next year's American elections. This should be perceived as diminishing the "political costs" of a pro-Palestinian decision. Given an opportunity to ensure Mr Netanyahu's replacement by a more Rabin-like figure, it is most unlikely that the United States will forsake the chance and choose instead to put American citizens and embassies throughout the world at risk of an explosion of Arab and Muslim frustration and rage.
What could Mr Netanyahu do? It is far from certain, particularly after Shimon Peres's repeated declarations that a Palestinian state is in Israel's own national interest, that he could find a Knesset majority to support "annexing" Palestinian lands in the waning days of a campaign in which he was in deep political trouble. It is also far from certain that Defence Minister Yitzhak Mordechai (or his successor) would order the army to invade the West Bank for reasons which transparently relate more to electoral manoeuvring than to national security -- or that, if given, such orders would be followed. Furthermore, even if Mr Netanyahu could carry out either or both of these threats, it is most unlikely, with polls repeatedly showing a majority of Israelis ready to accept a Palestinian state, that such provocative behaviour would help, rather than harm, his electoral fortunes. They would, however, be certain to outrage international opinion, and strengthen sympathy and support for Palestine. Mr Netanyahu would be damned if he does and damned if he doesn't.
If President Arafat can keep his nerve and keep his promise, May 1999 will bring checkmate and early retirement for Binyamin Netanyahu, and a giant step forward toward peace with some measure of justice and a better life for Israelis, Palestinians and all the peoples of the Middle East.
*The writer is a Paris-based international lawyer who writes frequently on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
