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Al-Ahram Weekly 18 - 24 February 1999 Issue No. 417 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 18 - 24 February 1999 Issue No. 417
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Special Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters A fragile lease of power
By Hisham El-Naggar"I intend to go on, and on, and on..."
Margaret Thatcher's unfortunate little phrase, uttered in the heyday of her power, might well have been adopted as their battle cry by a fair number of Latin American presidents.
In a continent which used to be quite insistent that one term was enough for a president -- for any president -- two-term premiers are no longer an oddity. And if some of the present bunch were to have their way, three and even four consecutive terms at the nation's helm would soon be nothing unusual.
Indeed, in some ways the surprising thing is how resilient the idea of a time limit on a president's hold on power has proved in a continent long known for caudillismo (strong personal leadership). Most Latin American countries have, or had, constitutions which prohibit a president from succeeding himself. The main justification for such a drastic restriction was to avoid a situation in which the last couple of years of a president's mandate were turned into the occasion for massive spending on pork barrel projects and populist measures. Short-term measures designed to win votes, it was argued, might well lead to no end of trouble in the long run.
There have, of course, been exceptions. Fidel Castro has been in power for more than three decades. This longevity probably stems from el màximo l’der's identification with the revolution he led, which has ensured him an immense, and enduring, popularity. His critics may call him a dictator. Still, most Cubans living in Cuba, even those who, economically, are in far from good shape, cannot conceive of another leader as long as Castro is alive.
Another striking exception was Argentina's Juan Domingo Perón. Believing that constitutions, after all, were never intended to be eternal, Perón promptly mustered public support for a revision which would allow him to run again for office. Such was his popularity, that he won his second presidential election easily, and was ousted only when his (mostly right-wing) enemies engineered a coup against him in 1955. Otherwise, many believe he would have had a good chance -- quite a bit better than Maggie Thatcher had, in any case -- of going on, and on, and on.
Argentina's new military rulers immediately amended the constitution to reinstate the ban on second terms. They need hardly have bothered: until Perón was finally allowed to run again in 1973 (when, as if to prove his point, he won), no subsequent Argentine president got to finish his first term, the army preferring each time to step in and second-guess the voters.
Democracy is now back in fashion in Latin America, and military rule is definitely passé. Perhaps as a result, the idea that presidents could be allowed to serve their countries for a little longer than the miserly five or six years permitted by their constitutions has been floated -- more often than not, by the very incumbents who would otherwise lose the opportunity to follow the people's orders for a second term.
The first president to bring about a constitutional change in his favour (allowing for a second term, but not a third one) was Peru's Alberto Fujimori. He based his campaign for constitutional "reform" (a term often contested by his adversaries) on the fact that he needed more time to consolidate the stabilisation and modernisation of the country's economy.
Argentina's Carlos Saśl Menem followed suit, using a very similar argument. It is important to note that, in most Latin American countries, public relief at the disappearance of hyperinflation is very real. As a result, voters are less averse to the idea of a single person enjoying an extended period of power, if they believe that is the only way to avoid a return to instability.
Brazil's Fernando Henrique Cardoso played on the same fears, winning a landslide victory last year in an election made possible by the same constitutional changes that had been made in Peru and Argentina. Those who voted for him convinced themselves that keeping Cardoso in power was the best way to maintain foreign investors' confidence in the country and avoid a destabilising devaluation.
Alas, they were wrong. The world markets lost no time in informing them of their mistake, acting with that alacrity which is part and parcel of the process of financial "globalisation". Not even the prospect of Cardoso holding on to power was enough to calm investors troubled by a sizeable fiscal deficit, current account shortfalls and -- more immediately -- a decision by the governor of the state of Minas Gerais to declare a partial moratorium on his state's debt.
Could it be that the world is learning that policies matter more than personalities in Latin America?
The continent, it should be pointed out, was beginning to draw the same conclusion even before the button-pushers in New York and Singapore. When Fujimori and Menem began suggesting with increasing urgency that the country's interests meant further constitutional reform would be necessary, in order to give them a third go at the presidency, they encountered substantial opposition from a weary electorate which had already decided that twice was enough.
The result is likely to be a more sophisticated political system, in which the alternation of personalities does not necessarily mean a drastic revision of policies. In the case of Argentina, virtually all opposition politicians with a realistic chance of making it to the presidency are emphatic about not wanting to change the main lines of the current economic system (a responsible fiscal policy, predominance of the private sector and currency stability). In Mexico, not only the president is certain to change in the next election (Mexico has stuck to the one-term limit), but the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party may also lose its long-standing monopoly over power: yet the opposition's programme is not dramatically different from the present government's globalisation-conscious regime.
This move towards a more consensual political arena may give rise to the long-awaited strengthening of political institutions, which is considered indispensable to consolidate the rule of law and make for smoother decision-making. As major policy changes become less likely, the electorate may turn to "fine-tuning", insisting instead on more imaginative social policies, greater efficiency in public spending, more environment-friendly growth and -- if they are lucky -- greater transparency.
At the same time, term limits do not necessarily mean that today's Latin American leaders are doomed to early retirement. Some may reinvent themselves, in the manner of Argentina's former President Raśl Alfons’n, who is now a venerable party supremo, perceived as being above the political fray. Another, perhaps less reassuring, model is Brazil's former President Itamar Franco, who has been reborn as the very governor of Minas Gerais who precipitated the real's devaluation and, with it, President Cardoso's woes.
Nor does the constitution prohibit two-term presidents in Argentina, Brazil and Peru from running again after skipping a term or two (or three or four). After all, Perón was re-elected by a nostalgic electorate after an absence of eighteen years from the political scene. Menem, perhaps Fujimori and -- though it seems much less likely -- even Cardoso, may be hoping that they too will accomplish a similar renaissance, in a rather less distant future.
