Al-Ahram Weekly   Al-Ahram Weekly
18 - 24 February 1999
Issue No. 417
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 Back issues Current issue

 
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Arafat's ladder

By Graham Usher

Speaking at a Fatah rally in Hebron on 12 February, Palestinian President Yasser Arafat revived the debate over the form of the political association between Jordan and any future Palestinian entity. "We want [King Abdullah] to know that the Palestinian National Council has agreed to a confederation with Jordan," said Arafat. More alarming still -- as far as Jordan was concerned -- were the comments by PA spokesman, Nabil Abu Rdeineh, that discussions on a "confederacy" between Jordan and the Palestinians should happen sooner rather than later. "We are ready for a confederacy with Jordan before or after establishing a Palestinian state," he said. "If Jordan wants immediate coordination and discussion over... creating a confederacy, we are ready."

This is probably the last thing Jordan wants -- largely because of the troubled genealogy of the confederation idea.

In 1985, the Palestinian National Council (PNC) endorsed the idea of a confederation between Jordan and any future Palestinian state. Never set out in detail, the decision had been taken in the context of a rapprochement between Arafat and King Hussein following the PLO's eviction from Beirut in 1982. Following a souring in relations between the PLO and Jordan in 1986, however, the confederation idea, though never formally abandoned, was quietly shelved. Since then, the unspoken status quo -- shared by both King Hussein and Arafat -- was that the issue of a confederation should only be raised after a Palestinian state had been established "on Palestinian soil". It is this status quo that Arafat and Rdeineh's comments have thrown into doubt.

The question is why raise the issue now? Quick to downplay any idea of a change in policy, one Jordanian minister was quoted by Reuters as saying that Arafat was not calling for immediate talks on confederacy but was rather "expressing a wish for close ties with King Abdullah".

This may be true. Ever since the signing of the Oslo Accords and Jordan's peace treaty with Israel, Palestinian negotiators have been privately dismayed at King Hussein's reluctance to discuss jointly those final status issues of common concern. Ready to act the fireman on interim issues like the Hebron redeployment and the Wye River negotiations, the late king kept a studied silence on matters to do with borders, Jerusalem and, above all, refugees. With the final status negotiations yet to begin, Arafat may be making a belated pitch to coordinate positions with King Abdullah by resurrecting the confederation idea, which enjoyed at least the formal blessing of his father.

But there may also be other motivations behind Arafat's call. In recent weeks, the Palestinian leader has been under inordinate pressure to publicly postpone his "right" to declare unilaterally a Palestinian state when Oslo's interim period expires on 4 May. As part of the Wye River Agreement, the US gave Israel a written pledge that it "opposes and will oppose" any unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood. Last month, the European parliament also made it known that a "premature" Palestinian UDI would create a "complex situation" in the region. Israel's Labour and Centre parties have also stated that a Palestinian state should be "a result of negotiations" rather than an independent Palestinian action.

The unspoken assumption behind this chorus of restraint is that any attempt by Arafat to go it alone would almost certainly help Binyamin Netanyahu's election prospects rather than those of Ehud Barak, especially if the Israeli leader, in retaliation, carries out his threat to annex those parts of the Occupied Territories under Israel's control. Such an action would bury whatever tenuous hopes the US and Europe have about resurrecting Oslo in the wake of the Israeli elections.

It is a scenario Arafat probably shares. His problem is that having climbed the tree of threatening a unilateral declaration of statehood on 4 May, he needs a dignified way to descend from it. By floating the confederation idea, he could mount a retreat in the name of "coordination and discussion" with Jordan rather than climbing down meekly due to American and European pressure. Should the confederation idea also receive a positive response internationally -- and especially in Washington -- Arafat could also claim this as another implicit recognition of a Palestinian state.

So far, the international response to his call has been led by Jordan. "As for confederation or any other future relation between Jordan and the Palestinians," commented Jordan's information minister, Nasser Joudeh, on 14 February, "we will cross that bridge when we come to it". For now, "the most important thing... is that Jordan concentrates... on helping and supporting Palestinians win their full rights on Palestinian soil, meaning the establishment of their national state."

This is a polite way of saying that confederation should stay on the shelf and that Arafat, having climbed the tree of 4 May, should not look to Amman to provide him with a ladder.

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