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Al-Ahram Weekly 4 - 10 March 1999 Issue No. 419 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 4 - 10 March 1999 Issue No. 419
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Focus Travel Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Dangerous side effects
By Hassan Nafaa *The US administration now openly declares that it intends to topple the Iraqi regime. American officials, from the president down, no longer have any compunction about making press statements to this effect. The US is serious -- this much is clear from the Free Iraq Act recently passed by Congress. The second and longest article of this act contains a list of Saddam Hussein's "crimes" -- waging chemical warfare on Iran and the Iraqi Kurds, attempting to assassinate former US President Bush, refusing to cooperate with UNSCOM, reneging on his commitment to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction... The third article states that the US must work to replace the Iraqi regime by a democratic government. The fourth contemplates the means of accomplishing this in coordination with Iraqi opposition forces, and vests the US president with the power to designate which of these forces qualifies to receive US aid ($2 million for publicity and $97 million in military support).
The standards the president should apply in this selection process are delineated in the fifth article, which stipulates that the recipient must represent a broad-based opposition and demonstrate its commitment to democratic principles, human rights, peaceful coexistence with Iraq's neighbours, and the preservation of Iraqi territorial integrity. The sixth article calls for the prosecution of Saddam Hussein and his senior aides before an international tribunal. Finally, the seventh expresses the hope that these objectives will be met so that the Iraqi people can be welcomed back into the international community.
Although the Free Iraq Act appears to express unequivocal American resolve, things are not actually that clear. The allocation of such a paltry sum for such an important, complex and potentially dangerous mission suggests that the US has not thrown all its weight behind its decision. No deadline has been set for achieving its target, which also suggests that toppling Saddam is not a top US priority at this time.
To unlock the obscure mysteries of US policy on Iraq, we must first answer one central question. If the US really wants to topple Saddam, why did it not do so during the war to liberate Kuwait, when its land forces were poised to march on Baghdad? The American answer to this, first formulated by former US President Bush, has been reiterated ever since by every US official. The US ambassador to Egypt has repeated it several times, most recently in his meeting with Egyptian intellectuals at this year's book fair.
The Bush response contains three main elements: the US was reluctant to jeopardise the solidarity of the international coalition it had put together in order to liberate Kuwait; marching on Baghdad would have entailed unsustainable losses in the US forces; the US did not believe that the Iraqi regime would last long following its resounding defeat, particularly given its difficult domestic circumstances.
US policy subsequent to the liberation of Kuwait, however, renders the Bush argument inadequate. America's determination to perpetuate the international alliance was not so strong as to prevent it from pursuing its own course of action against Iraq once the war ended. Nor did the US have to wait eight whole years to see that defeat had not dislodged Saddam from power. Thus, the only point that seems even slightly credible is that regarding the US administration's reluctance to "sacrifice American lives".
Conspiracy theory, ultimately, does not serve to explain anything. It is not unreasonable to presume that the US has always wanted the Saddam regime removed and a more amenable government in its place. Wishing is one thing, however; translating these wishes into reality is quite another. The US always knew that air strikes alone would be insufficient to topple Saddam and that, were it to pursue this objective, it would have to engage its land forces and risk a politically unsustainable death toll. As a result, this course of action was ruled out from the start. On the other hand, the US was not prepared to see the Iraqi regime return to the international fold as though nothing had happened. Saddam could not be permitted to turn the military defeat of Iraq into a political victory. Above all, he could not be allowed to defy US policy again. Given these positions, the US had only one alternative: to "keep Saddam in his cage". This policy was based on a sustained economic embargo to forestall the reconstruction of the Iraqi state and society, and a military attrition campaign to prevent Saddam from even thinking about retaliatory action.
The US discovered that its containment policy brought several benefits. The continued existence of the Iraqi regime, and the opportunity to exaggerate the danger it poses to the region, supplied the perfect justification for the presence of US military forces in the area. It also proved an extremely useful way of augmenting US arms sales, hampering Arab reconciliation and providing Israel with the opportunity to impose new realities in Palestine.
With time, however, it became clear that the policy had run aground. Economic sanctions caused immense human suffering while failing to debilitate the regime. UNSCOM was revealed to be a network of intelligence agents working for the US and Israel, rather than the Security Council. Indeed, such was the loss of UNSCOM's credibility as an impartial body that it became the object of derision even among many nations sympathetic to the cause of Iraqi disarmament. Then, the US strikes, both because of their inefficacy at shaking the Iraqi regime and because of their timing, began to arouse deep suspicions with regard to the US's true motives. Many began to perceive that American domestic considerations were the actual motive of the strikes. Eventually, the Gulf countries began to grow uncomfortable with the prolonged game of cat and mouse the US was playing with Iraq. Increasingly, they began to feel that they were the butt of an immense economic and political blackmail scheme. Now, the Americans realised, they would have to adopt a serious strategy to get rid of Saddam. Yet this strategy would have to resolve the conundrum of how to demonstrate seriousness of intent while avoiding an actual land invasion of Iraq.
The solution presented itself around three foci: increasingly brutal air strikes to totally dismantle the infrastructure and control centres of the Iraqi army, as was the case last December; the neutralisation of Iraqi air defence mechanisms to render Iraqi airspace entirely vulnerable, which is what is occurring at the moment; finally, mobilising the Iraqi opposition to mount a land offensive under intensive US and British air cover, preparations for which are underway.
Still, the new strategy does not appear to offer good prospects. The intensive US-British air bombardment of Iraq last December precipitated angry reactions around the globe. To the Arabs, in particular, it was an unjustifiable act of aggression. What is important here, though, is that the US-British assault did more harm to the anti-Iraqi regimes in the Arab world than to the Iraqi regime itself. The strike so exposed the weakness of these regimes that they were forced to distance themselves from US policy, or at least demonstrate that they were no way involved in the American plans. Worse, it seems that Desert Fox did not achieve its military objectives, which may mean that the US will feel that it must stage a repeat performance so as to ensure the efficacy of its new strategy before moving on to its subsequent phases.
The prospect of another Desert Fox may well trigger an explosion of popular anger throughout the Arab world. This scenario is especially plausible given that the current US-British war of attrition against Iraq air defences has proven the failure of Desert Fox quite conclusively. Moreover, rather than announcing the imminent collapse of the Iraqi regime, it seems to have confirmed its tenacity and, therefore, can only serve as a constant reminder to the Arab people of an American belligerence quite dissociated from any principle of international legitimacy.
The no-fly zones over Iraq were not imposed by the UN or the Security Council. Iraq's violation of these zones, therefore, does not constitute a breach of international law or of the UN Charter. This fact alone casts the US as the aggressor and Iraq as the defender of its national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Turning to the final pillar of US strategy, all the evidence suggests that the Iraqi opposition abroad is so weak and divided that it will never be in a position to mobilise forces capable of engaging effectively with Saddam's army. The US is the first to recognise this fact. Yet the steps it is taking to remedy this situation will tend to weaken, rather than strengthen, the Iraqi opposition, which is becoming a tool of the nation that has always been the most biased in its support for Israel. No self-respecting Arab could welcome a government borne to power on American spears. The Arabs are not particularly fond of the current Iraqi regime, which has brought so much misery to its own people and the region as a whole. They are not about to accept the American proxy instead, however.
In sum, it appears that America's new strategy is doomed to fail. The longer it lasts, in fact, the more evident it will become that it is simply a continuation of the old blackmail scheme. If the US can bait the countries of the Gulf again, it will be able to undermine the region's potential for several more years. The problem is that America's predicament puts the Arabs in a difficult position. Its policy can only weaken the pro-American governments in the region, broaden the gap between them and their peoples, and open the door to widespread instability. Although the Arabs feel that the resolution issued by the recent Arab foreign ministers' summit fell short of what was required, the true test in the coming phase will be their governments' ability to formulate a diplomatic solution. This would mean that America's aggression against the Iraqi government and people has to stop. But these governments do not seem capable of bringing the US to comply with diplomacy. Half the governments are willing but unable; the other half are more closely involved with the US than they should be. One wonders whether these governments are aware that, if they go all the way with the US, there will be no turning back.
* The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.
