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Al-Ahram Weekly 11 - 17 March 1999 Issue No. 420 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 11 - 17 March 1999 Issue No. 420
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Focus Special Features Travel Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Islamism in transition
By Diaa Rashwan *It appears likely that Islamism will enter the 21st century in a very different form and substance than that which we have seen in this century. If we are to arrive at a deeper understanding of the changing features of the various groups falling under the general umbrella of the Islamic movement in Egypt and the Arab world, we must use analytical tools grounded in the specificity of this phenomenon itself, without unduly sacrificing modern methodologies of inquiry in the social sciences.
It is my belief that the long historical record of Islamic groups and factions, dating back to the first Fitna (the civil war for control of the Muslim community that lasted from 656 to 661), can serve to identify several recurring traits which we may combine to delineate a paradigm for the study of modern Islamic groups. Certainly, the 14 centuries of uninterrupted activity and the continual resurfacing of certain traits during this period should offer academically legitimate grounds for the delineation of a more accurate paradigm than one derived solely from a study of today's Islamic groups and factions.
Paradigms, if they are to have any empirical validity in the study of social phenomena, must be founded upon the extended observation of recurrent traits or features. The centuries-long history of the Islamic movement offers this possibility. This is not to say that the study of contemporary Islamic groups and the differences between them should depend solely on the analytical models we can derive from Islamic history. Yet there can be no doubt that such a study would gain considerably in depth and precision with the addition of analytical tools beyond those available in the arsenal of the modern social sciences. Simultaneously, the analytical models derived from Islamic history may become more potent tools of inquiry when enriched by contemporary social science methodology. In other words, my reluctance to rely solely on modern Western methods of investigation is not a reflection of any " ideological" hostility towards Western social science, but rather an expression of my quest for the greatest degree possible of empirical precision in the study of the contemporary Islamic movement. This can be achieved by drawing effectively on the particularity of Islamic history -- the context in which these groups developed.
The Egyptian arena is occupied by a large number of Islamic groups and associations of different sizes, focuses and political and ideological orientations. In the application of Islamic historical experience, the ideological facet, along with other related aspects, becomes central to the delineation of the distinctions between these groups. Some analysts may differ with an assessment based on this approach, having themselves approached the issue through the perspective of modern Western social sciences, which lend greater weight to factors such as disparity in social origin, variations in the nature of the leadership or modes of political performance, or differences in the geographical-social context in which the groups emerged and developed. Yet however important these factors may be in categorising Islamic groups in Egypt, they do not occlude the fact that the most suitable criterion for classifying and distinguishing between these groups remains, above all, the ideological factor, an element which inherently carries a greater validity due to the particular nature of these groups, and the Islamic movement in general.
Thus, social scientists might variously classify these groups as "religious", "social", "political", or " protest" movements, depending on the criteria they apply. In the final analysis, however, the ideological orientation is the ultimate determinant of the development of these groups in their quest to realise the political, social and economic enterprise which, they believe, constitutes an integral part of the mission of Islam. The groups may differ in their perception of the way that such an enterprise relates to the tenets of Islam. They may also differ in their interpretation of some of the tenets of Islam themselves. They are united, however, in their conviction that their enterprise is an unequivocally "Islamic" one. Some scholars may argue that all political and social movements are founded upon an ideological vision for change that constitutes a framework for organisation, action and development. That, however, does not preclude the supremacy of ideology for the groups in the Islamic movement, upon which the fulfillment of the religious enterprise imposes a "sacred bond" that must be implemented in its entirety. Moreover, because of the very religious nature of this quest, it is driven by significations that have a far deeper and more powerful impact than those conveyed in the ideologies of non-religious socio-political movements. The influence of religious ideology extends to all aspects of the Islamic movement, from symbols and terms of reference to tactics and strategies, a factor which alone distinguishes this movement in general from all other social and political movements, however similar they may appear on the surface.
THE HISTORIC FISSURE: Turning to the specific ideological circumstances of the Islamic movement in Egypt, which have been affected by interplay with other historically and culturally specific factors, it is possible to place the Islamic groups in two general categories on the basis of ideology emanating from the Islamic historical experience.
Leading Muslim Brotherhood ideologue, Sayed Qutb (top), was condemned to death, but his legacy gave forth a terrible vengeance. The Brotherhood, however, continued to uphold the orientation of its founder, Hassan El-Banna (right)
The first comprises those groups whose system of beliefs and religious interpretations justifies their condemnation of certain individuals, societies and nations as heretical and, consequently, vindicates their recourse to violence against those branded as such. Specifically, their system of beliefs is founded upon three central convictions. The first is the fundamental Islamic belief in the unity of God and the absolute primacy in human existence of dedication to the worship of God. The second entails the obeisance to the commands of God and his Prophet. The third is that scripture imposes a categorical and unquestionable restriction upon the ideological development of these groups and their movement. The Qur'anic scriptures and the Prophetic sayings are the sole authorities guiding patterns of organisation, action and behaviour rooted in the Islamic legacy of the Prophet and the Rightly Guided Caliphs. These groups read contemporary events in the Arab world through the lens of that distant epoch and identify today's players, forces and contradictions according to the reference framework it establishes.
The second type of Islamic group in Egypt includes ideologically motivated political and social groups that seek immediate political power in order to effect their vision of the political-ideological programme they deem best for the country and its people. This ultimate goal sharply distinguishes this category from the former, which subscribes to blind obedience regardless of all considerations of wisdom and purpose. Thus, the groups that fall under the second category extend their reading of contemporary events beyond the lens of early Islam and the strict application of Qur'anic and Prophetic scriptures, to a perspective that runs the full 14 centuries of Islamic history. As a result, they are both less literal in their interpretation of many Islamic precepts, and more open to many modern Islamic, as well as non-Islamic, conceptions. Islam, to these groups, is an historical-cultural legacy that furnishes the source of their inspiration for political and social reform, combining ideological theory with political pragmatism. As such, these groups only differ from other left-wing or liberal groups with respect to the specific content of their ideology.
In spite of the many sub-categories that fall under these two major trends in the Egyptian Islamic movement, the Muslim Brotherhood is the most representative of the open Islamic ideology, while Islamic Jihad and the Gama'a are the major exponents of the narrower view.
In light of this classification, it becomes clear that the religious violence Egypt has experienced over the past quarter of a century -- since the mid-'70s, in fact -- was waged exclusively by the ideologically motivated groups, whereas the violence exercised by the Muslim Brotherhood in the '40s and '50s was more politically motivated. Whereas Jihad and the Gama'a justified their violence in terms of heresy or other religious references, the Brotherhood justified their acts of violence in terms of specific political objectives.
Throughout the 20th century, which gave birth to the two major modern trends in the Egyptian Islamic movement, the distinguishing features discussed above have remained constant. The past five years, however, have seen such substantial changes in the nature of the most representative groups as to strongly suggest a radical transformation in the defining contours of the movement as a whole.
CHANGING FORTUNES: From its founding in 1928 in Ismailiya by Sheikh Hassan El-Banna until the mid-'90s, the essential principles of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood remained virtually unaltered. El-Banna outlined these principles in his address to the Brotherhood's fifth conference. The Muslim Brotherhood, he said, seeks a return to the purest sources of Islam, the Qur'an and the Sunna (Tradition) of the Prophet; it seeks to follow a Sunni path toward which the Muslim Brothers should strive in every activity; it aspires to Sufi integrity, because the Muslim Brothers have dedicated themselves to the realisation of good, purity of heart and soul, perseverance in work and devotion to God; it wishes to establish a political body, for the Muslim Brotherhood demands government reform within, and the revision of relations between, the Islamic community and other nations, toward which end it seeks to instill among the people the highest sense of pride, dignity and dedication to their Islamic national identity. It is also a healthy society, devoted to the development and preservation of sound bodies, since believers who are physically strong are dearer to God than the weak; an academic and cultural alliance, in accordance with the principle that Islam has rendered the pursuit of knowledge a duty incumbent upon every Muslim man and woman; an economic association, since Islam also concerns itself with economic arrangements and financial gain; and, finally, a social concept, since the Brotherhood is dedicated to remedying society's ills.
The Brotherhood suffered several setbacks in its early decades of existence. The first of these occurred in 1938, when the "Shabab Mohamed", a militant group closely resembling the Islamic groups of the '70s and '80s in its espousal of violence, split off from the mother organisation. The second occurred in 1948 with the assassination of Hassan El-Banna and the urgent need to find a suitable successor. Under the new leadership, a more critical internal threat to the Brotherhood developed with the growing influence of its underground paramilitary branch. This latter attempted to assassinate Gamal Abdel-Nasser in 1954, and the resultant rift between the Brotherhood's declared and underground leaderships was increasingly exacerbated by its violent conflict with the revolutionary regime that had assumed power in 1952. The suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood under Nasser landed most of the Brotherhood leadership in prison, and it was this setting in which the ideas of Sheikh Sayed Qutb, undoubtedly the founding father of the notion of religiously legitimised violence in modern Egypt, took increasing hold, sapping the Brotherhood of its membership and vying with it in its claim to voice the religious opposition. Yet in spite of these many crises, the Brotherhood maintained intact the ideological and organisation foundations bequeathed to it by Hassan El-Banna.
THE GENERATION GAP: The mid-'90s, however, brought the organisation to a new and unprecedented threshold. The generation gap within the Brotherhood is the most important factor that could bring about a fundamental transformation in its historical character. The Brotherhood currently consists of four generations, differing in expertise, social background and political inclination. Controlling the prominent leadership positions in the Office of the Supreme Guide are the founders' generation, represented by the current Supreme Guide, Mustafa Mashhour, and the older generation, as represented by Ahmed Seif El-Islam Hassan El-Banna. Over the past 20 years, this control has been challenged by the middle generation, epitomised by Essam El-Erian and Abul-Ela Madi, with the moral and strategic backing of the youngest generation, which represents a diversity of occupational and regional backgrounds.
The most tangible manifestation of the generation clash in the late '90s has been the attempt of the third and fourth generations to establish a Wasat, or Centre, Party. The bid to form this party, which has yet to receive official approval, has been vehemently opposed by the two older generations, which have gone so far as to call for the resignation from the Brotherhood of those members who persist in the attempt to establish the Wasat Party. The mutual acrimony that this issue has engendered, in addition to the fact that the majority of the Wasat Party's advocates continue to push for its formation, are indicative of strongly entrenched positions and a power struggle in which one side is pressing for more influence, while the other digs its heels in, fearful that the new party will supplant the traditional Office of the Supreme Guide as the official voice of the Brotherhood, instead of remaining a subordinate political party.
This relates to the second factor affecting the future course of the Brotherhood. Of the five individuals who have held the Office of the Supreme Guide since the Brotherhood's founding, none, regardless of their intellectual, political and organisational talents, possessed the compelling charismatic sway of the organisation's founder, Sheikh Hassan El-Banna. This situation has had both positive and negative implications. On the positive side, it has meant that the Supreme Guide has had to extend the decision-making process across a broader base within the first two generations, thus lending the leadership a collective character. Yet this process, in turn, has engendered a certain solidarity within that leadership and encouraged its sense of historic title to the Brotherhood's leadership, to the detriment of the younger generations.
END OF THE BROTHERHOOD?: The third factor is external, and centres around the Brotherhood's relations with the Egyptian state. From the period extending from the assassination of President Sadat to the late '80s, the Brotherhood benefited from the general process of national reconciliation and political liberalisation. The considerable freedom of movement it enjoyed at the time enabled it to extend its influence within political and social sectors it had never been able to penetrate before. These included the parliament, various syndicates, university students' unions and teachers' organisations. The parliamentary elections of 1987 demonstrated to the government the considerable potential of the Brotherhood, which had entered into an alliance with the Labour and Liberal parties under the common slogan "Islam is the Solution".
The turning point in government tolerance for the Brotherhood may be situated around 1992, the year in which the organisation was able to gain control over the council of the Bar Association, which had long been the preserve of the liberals. The end of that year saw the most fierce wave of violence against the state perpetrated by the Gama'a and Jihad. The government was particularly outraged by the vaguely worded statements issued by the Brotherhood, which did not constitute a sufficiently vehement condemnation of these acts of violence.
From 1993 onwards, the government began to move concertedly against the Brotherhood. The intensity of the clash was fed both by the organisation's growing influence in various sectors of society and the growing official perception that there were no fundamental distinctions between the Brotherhood and the more militant Islamist groups. Indeed, a predominant attitude at the time was that the Islamist movement in Egypt was a single entity, in which the Brotherhood represented the political wing, with the other groups serving as its paramilitary wing.
The generation clash, the absence of a sufficiently charismatic leader and the ongoing pressures exerted by the state have combined to augur the end of the Muslim Brotherhood as it was known throughout the 20th century. This is not to suggest that the original concept of a Muslim Brotherhood as formulated by Hassan El-Banna will have lost its validity, for the Egyptian Islamic movement has yet to formulate a comprehensive alternative. One can predict, however, that the unified organisation may disintegrate into an assortment of political, syndicate and community organisations only loosely connected with the concept of the Muslim Brotherhood.
According to some modernists in the Brotherhood, this will be a positive development, for it will enable the pursuit of what Hassan El-Banna believed was the only course to Islamic revival, which "begins from the reform of the individual, passes through the family, the community, the government and then to the Islamic state, the Caliphate and mastery of the world." There is a trend among the younger generations to adapt ideas from other cultures, and to seek inspiration from contemporary Egyptian intellectuals sympathetic to the Brotherhood, in an attempt to bring the Brotherhood closer to the profound changes that are taking place at the end of the 20th century.
ENTER THE JIHADISTS: Of all the radical Islamist groups that have emerged since the '70s, those representing the 'Jihadist' trend have been the most prominent, and posed the greatest threat to the political and economic stability of Egypt. These were the groups that assassinated Sadat on 6 October 1981 and whose violence against the state escalated sharply after 1992. By contrast, the influence of other two trends -- the fundamentalist, represented by Al-Da'wa wal-Tabligh, and the ultra-extremists, represented by Al-Takfir wal-Hijra and the Shawqiyun -- both prominent in the '80s, has largely declined in favour of the Jihadist trend. There have always been important theoretical differences between the two major Jihadist groups, Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya and Jihad. One difference has focused around the principle of al-'udhr bil-jahl (the excuse of ignorance). Both groups hold that Egyptian society is in a state of Jahiliya, a term that refers to the pre-Islamic era and indicates "ignorance" of the true precepts of Islam, but which does not reach the bounds of heresy. Yet while the Jihad holds that those who have the "excuse of ignorance" should be excluded from membership until they revert to true Islam, the Gama'a feels it can recruit among this category in order to increase its support base.
A related theoretical difference between the two groups is their respective attitudes toward underground activity. While the Jihad is committed solely to clandestine armed activity aimed at effecting a coup d'état, and the subsequent establishment of an Islamic government and society, the Gama'a believes it is possible to combine clandestine armed operations and the overt propagation of its beliefs in order to recruit more members.
As a result of these theoretical differences, the Jihad has remained a relatively small, closed, highly secret society while the Gama'a, by contrast, has extended both its covert and overt activities to become the largest and most influential radical Islamic group in Egypt.
PACIFIST RADICALS: On 5 July 1998, there emerged the first major harbinger of profound transformation within the radical Islamist groups and particularly the Gama'a. On that day, a number of Gama'a founders called for an end to all acts of violence against the Egyptian state. Their pledge was reiterated on 22 October by Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, the spiritual leader of the Gama'a, currently under detention in the US; again on 31 October by 10 of the historic leaders of the Gama'a, who have been in prison since 1981; and once again on 19 November, by seven prominent Gama'a leaders known for their extreme militancy and currently in prison. The rapid succession of the three statements in a few weeks suggests that the pacifist trend within the Gama'a has drawn together against its opponents within the group and its critics outside. Indeed, the attacks from outside galvanised many of the mid-level leaders in the group to close ranks with their historic leaders and their spiritual guide.
The significance of these developments cannot be underestimated, for they point to a substantial qualitative transformation in the nature of the Gama'a, from a militant Islamic group to a political grouping with an Islamic ideological platform. In other words, it would appear that statements announcing the Gama'a's cessation of violence against the Egyptian government extend beyond the tactical to comprise a theoretical reassessment of its refutation of the Islamic legitimacy of the Egyptian government, and a revision of the theoretical and ideological underpinnings upon which the many radical Islamic groups in Egypt and the Arab world have based their use of violence against the Jahili state and society. Both the Gama'a and the Jihad have reoriented their justification for the use of violence "outward", and notably against the US and Israel. This has been attributed by some to the toll their rank and file have suffered during two years of violent confrontation with the government.
While this may indeed have been an operative factor, it is nevertheless insufficient to explain such a fundamental shift in their ideological thinking. Certainly, the developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict played an important part in their reordering of priorities. In this regard, it is interesting to note another distinction between the two groups. The Jihad has joined the "International Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders" responsible for the strikes against the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam last August. The Gama'a disassociated itself from involvement in this Front. At the same time, the ambiguity of its stance on the operations underscores the continued presence of an opposition to the pacifist trend within the Gama'a, based primarily in Afghanistan and morally and materially fed by the intensely radical Islamic groups there.
In all events, the evidence suggests that the pacifist reorientation within the Gama'a may soon take clearer shape, in the promulgation of a new charter of principles to supplant the previous declarations in which this group justified its recourse to violence. Such a charter would naturally precipitate a sharper rift between the proponents of the pacifist reorientation, who represent the majority of the Gama'a leadership, and the recalcitrant minority which, should the rift intensify, may eventually split off. Should this occur, the Gama'a will have made the transformation from an extremist religious group to a political grouping operating within society on the basis of an Islamic ideology. Indeed, it is most probably in this form that it will enter the 21st century.
* The writer is an expert at the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies and the managing editor of the annual State of Religion in Egypt Report.
