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Al-Ahram Weekly 18 - 24 March 1999 Issue No. 421 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 18 - 24 March 1999 Issue No. 421
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Features Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Twenty years of the peace dividend
By Abdel-Moneim Said *On 26 March, 20 years will have passed since the signing of the Camp David Accords. During those years, we have witnessed many events, some pleasant and some less so, but all dramatic and thrilling, to say the least. Although I am not one of those who think that the peace treaty was the cause of the many catastrophes that followed, from the 1982 invasion of Lebanon to the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War, not to mention Arab dissension and lack of progress, I do agree that it was a hallmark in Arab, and particularly Egyptian, history. No sooner had the ink dried on the treaty than differences of opinion on practically everything were emerging.
There are several outstanding points we should look at on this occasion. The first concerns the Arabs in general. The treaty offered a radically new way of dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict, marking a break with the three previous decades, which led to the withdrawal of the Israelis from Sinai, and the retreat of the Israeli empire from the Suez Canal, the line of its greatest expansion, back to Egypt's international border with Palestine as it stood during the British Mandate. This all came about because the Egyptian leadership seized the right moment to launch a diplomatic and political drive in the West to push Israel back. Had it not done so, the results of the October War would have evaporated. Besides, this occurred after the opportunity presented by the world energy crisis had been lost because certain Arab states refused to enforce the oil embargo. This still hampers Arab-Israeli negotiations at present.
At the time, the number of Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories was very limited; the number of Israeli settlers in occupied Palestinian lands did not exceed 5,000, as well as a few hundred in the Golan. Today, there are 170,000 settlers in the West Bank alone, apart from East Jerusalem, and 14,000 in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights. Had Syria and the PLO followed Egypt's suggestion that they join the peace process, the situation would have been very different. Perhaps there would have been no Israeli invasion of Lebanon, no Iran-Iraq conflagration, no Gulf War. Furthermore, the underlying principles which marked the Egyptian-Israeli treaty would have been less difficult to apply on the other Arab fronts.
It is futile, though, to say "if only this had happened". Perhaps the Arab nation needed a crisis of this sort to help it come to terms with itself, the region and the rest of the world. The Madrid Conference marked a fresh start in the peace process, which had petered out during the 1980s, and paved the way before the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, the Oslo agreements and the progress made on the Syrian track until February 1996. In short, a new approach to the conflict became available. This marked a new era, and the end of the 30-year phase which preceded the signing of the treaty. The old approach had not only confirmed the existence of Israel, but led to its expansion several times over.
The process of renewal has not been easy, because those in favour of the old approach exist throughout the Arab world. Their voices are loud and critical and they pay more attention to how loudly their slogans ring out rather than what results they achieve. Their attitude is best reflected by the fact that they actually glory in the continuation of the occupation, since it allows them to show once again how steadfast they are, and to condemn the complete liberation of Egyptian lands as a symbol of surrender. Egypt has as many problems as it has citizens but, since the start of the conflict, it has been left to foot the bill on behalf of the Arab nation. As a result, the foremost champion of the Arab cause has had the lowest standards of living. The peace treaty was a turning point in modern Egyptian history; for the first time, Egyptians were able to deal with their problems directly and, despite trials and tribulations, the results have been encouraging.
Average income has increased, despite population growth. Not only are Egyptians richer than they were 20 years ago, they are also healthier. Life expectancy has increased by 10 years. We have broken out of the narrow valley to change Egyptian geography and history. All this would have been impossible before peace and liberation, because Egypt is not a nation that can show patience with the occupier or accept the shame associated with occupation while glossing it over with hollow slogans. We are incapable of laying the blame on others.
Had Egypt not signed the peace treaty, it would probably have had to wage a war or two in the past two decades. By signing the agreement, Egypt not only avoided the cost of such wars, it also opened the door to a brighter future. It would have been impossible for the open-door policy to be implemented and the shift to a market economy to be made had we remained in a state of war. Nor would it have been possible to move toward a multi-party political system, freedom of the press and the development of Egyptian society, had that society kept waiting for a war of liberation -- a war which might or might not have come about, depending on Arab whims and concerns.
*The writer is the director of the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
