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Al-Ahram Weekly 18 - 24 March 1999 Issue No. 421 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 18 - 24 March 1999 Issue No. 421
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Features Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters The future of the
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
Arab-Israeli conflict
The Beirut-based Centre for Arab Unity Studies organised a seminar in the Lebanese capital this week to discuss "The Arabs and the confrontation with Israel: future perspectives." Within the framework of this general theme, participants were invited to discuss four distinct topics. The first centred on the past: the lessons of history, the experience of the ongoing peace settlements, existing peace agreements, the world order. The second dealt with the Palestinian issue: land, people, resistance, the Palestinian Authority. The third addressed the respective resources of the protagonists: ideological, human, technological, political, military, economic. And the fourth focused on a plan of action for the future. In the paper I presented at the seminar, I raised a number of methodological problems, specifically, whether the shift from the previous bipolar world order to the present globalist order will tilt the regional balance of power in favour of the Arabs or the reverse.
Before attempting to answer this question, we should first come up with an answer to another question related to a watershed event that drastically altered the course of the conflict, namely, the late President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the conflict-resolution approach he adopted as symbolised in the Camp David accords.
A few days ago, Dr Abdel-Moneim Said, director of Al-Ahram's Centre for Strategic Studies, wrote an article (Al-Ahram, 22/2/99) commenting on an article I had published in Al-Ahali (on 17/2/99), in which I said that the Camp David accords had dealt a severe blow to Arab solidarity, the effects of which are still being felt today. In his article, Dr Said objected to what he called the "arbitrary" link I had made between Camp David and Arab solidarity, pointing out that Arab solidarity had been breached repeatedly by various Arab parties well before Camp David. In his words, "to maintain that Arab solidarity was in perfect condition until Camp David came along to shatter it... is a distortion of reality. A country of Egypt's weight, with its size and, yes, problems, had either to take active steps to liberate its land or wait until who knows when for Arab solidarity to come about and a united Arab front to be established." Thus Dr Said believes that no casual relationship exists between Arab solidarity and the Camp David Accords, and that, accordingly, Camp David can in no way be blamed for the disarray in Arab ranks.
He is not alone in this belief. Indeed, there are those who go even further in their defense of Camp David, holding that Egypt was one of the first countries to play by the rules of the new globalist game and Sadat the first world leader to seize the new opportunities available under this game, long before his Soviet counterpart, Gorbachev, appeared on the scene.
Before Gorbachev, bipolarity based on the notion of mutual exclusiveness at the global level encouraged the emergence of the same kind of bipolarity in a number of regional conflicts, particularly in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although the ideological content of the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, communism versus capitalism, differed from that of the confrontation in the Middle East, Zionism versus Arab nationalism, the Arabs could count on Soviet support in the area of arms supplies to counter America's military support of Israel. But that support disappeared with the disappearance of the Soviet state. From this perspective, the shift from bipolarity to a unipolar world order by way of globalism has been detrimental to the Arabs in that it has tilted the regional balance of power still more sharply in Israel's favour.
One way the Arabs can offset this tilt is to emphasise the ideological dimension of the Middle East conflict, which is essentially a confrontation between Zionism and Arab nationalism. Arab solidarity can hardly be discounted as a marginal factor in such an equation. We all know that an established pattern in all the agreements concluded with Israel to date is that they are bilateral agreements concluded with each Arab party separately, in isolation from the others. The Arab signatories of these agreements claim that circumstances forced them to break ranks and go it alone, although they are well aware that Arab solidarity is essential to redress the balance of power to their advantage.
Globalism proceeds from the assumption that all conflicts can -- and, indeed, must -- be resolved by peaceful means. One of the first converts to this line of thinking was Anwar Sadat, whose now famous declaration that the October War would be the last war was another way of saying that what was usurped by force need not necessarily be restored by force. However, Israel, which waged its war against Lebanon in 1982, nine years after the October War, has obviously not subscribed to this principle. Nor is there any guarantee that its current prime minister, Netanyahu, or foreign minister, Sharon, will ever be won round to the idea that waging war on the neighbours might be somewhat incompatible with the notion of globalism.
That is why I believe it is no longer possible to look to the future through the prism of Camp David, a moment in history which has since been overtaken by events. That is not to say that all the criticisms levelled against it proved true, only that we need to reevaluate Camp David in all its aspects, whether positive or negative. Its supporters must admit that it had basic flaws, its opponents that it can have had positive aspects. Such a reevaluation can go far towards overcoming the current disarray in Arab ranks and bring about an Arab reconciliation based on what Dr Esmat Abdel-Meguid called transparency and candour.
While the Palestinian problem symbolises the central aspect of usurped rights in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Egyptian-Israeli relations reflect the equally important issue of balance of power between the protagonists. Over the years, relations between Egypt and Israel evolved through three distinct stages: the first was that of total hostilities with no communication between the parties other than on the battlefield; the second stage, which came about in the aftermath of the Camp David accords and which culminated with the Madrid conference, can be described as one of partnership, in as much as both parties had a stake in the success of a peace process that served Egypt's interest by validating its previous peace treaty with Israel, and Israel's by opening the door to the normalisation of its relations with the entire Arab world.
But now the relationship is entering into a third stage, that of rivalry between the two parties as they compete for the leading role in shaping Middle East realities. Israel considers such a role to be indispensable for its survival. Hence its determination to maintain a military capability superior to that of all the Arab states combined. For Egypt which, with a population approaching 70 million, cannot live within the confines of the Nile Valley, a leading role in its Arab environment is imperative. But for Egyptians to be welcomed throughout the Arab world and treated with the dignity they deserve, Egypt must be capable of demonstrating that it can prevent Israel from taking steps that any Arab party would see as detrimental to its fundamental interests. With many states in the region still questioning the validity of the peace option, rivalry could well come to take precedence over partnership in Egyptian-Israeli relations.
The situation is compounded by the fact that the Middle East conflict, initially a conflict over land, could extend, with growing water scarcity throughout the region, into a conflict over water. If Israel continues its present trend of monopolising state-of-the-art techniques for desalinating sea water, as it monopolises the nuclear option throughout the Middle East, one cannot exclude the possibility of water wars in future. A main achievement of the Beirut seminar is that it addressed these crucial issues with remarkable candour.
