 |
Al-Ahram Weekly 1 - 7 April 1999 Issue No. 423 
|
||
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
 |
 |
|
|
Al-Ahram Weekly 1 - 7 April 1999 Issue No. 423
|
||
| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
|
|
|
Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Focus Interview Profile Features Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters East of Egypt
By Ibrahim Nafie
"President Mubarak's visit to China, Japan and South Korea reflects the profound transformations Egyptian foreign policy has undergone over the past two decades, and the increasing prominence it has accorded the Asian continent. This new direction is gradually redressing the imbalance that marked this country's foreign policy from the 1950s to the early 1980s, a period during which other regions were given the highest priority -- mainly the African continent, besides the Arab world, of course.
It is only fair, however, to make clear the fact that Egyptian foreign policy-makers were not solely responsible for the underdeveloped state of relations with Asia. During the period in question, political conditions were characterised by a high degree of flux because of the many ethnic, religious, linguistic and political differences that divided the different countries of the region. These differences made it difficult for Asia to organise the various countries of the region into a major bloc or a forum with which non-Asian powers could deal. The climate of the Cold War also meant that any relations with Asia were fraught with tension and problems.
For all these reasons, Asia as a bloc was not central to the foreign policy concerns of the 1952 regime, although of course Egypt had strong relations with individual nations, such as Nehru's India or Sukarno's Indonesia. These relations, however, remained largely bilateral; when they did transcend one country, they were conducted within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement, and thus did not touch solely upon specific issues of concern to both Egypt and Asia.
In the 1970s, too, although the focus of Egypt's foreign policy preoccupations shifted, relations with Asia were not a high priority. When Sadat came to power, Egypt was especially concerned with the liberation of territory occupied by Israel; the late president and his foreign policy team naturally concentrated on enhancing relations with the West, and more specifically the US and Western Europe, in the belief that this region could play a prominent role in bringing about an Egyptian-Israeli settlement. President Sadat was also convinced that the West would assist Egypt in attaining its economic development goals, updating its armed forces, etc.
Beginning in the early 1980s, however, a growing interest in Egyptian-Asian relations became apparent. Political motives for this interest have varied over the past 15 years, but economic considerations have remained a constant factor. Recently, Egyptian concern has peaked, for four main reasons.
First, through the enhancement of economic cooperation with the Asian countries, Egypt could contemplate the possibility of emulating the great leap forward achieved by the Asian Tigers during the '90s. The presence of a major economic superpower such as Japan was also an incentive to strengthen ties with Asia. In looking eastward, therefore, Egypt could hope to benefit from relevant experiences in achieving regional economic integration while enhancing trade and investment ties with new partners. Despite -- indeed, perhaps because of -- the crisis that struck the ASEAN countries last year, Egypt can derive many important lessons from the region's development triumphs and setbacks.
Second, in seeking closer ties with Asia, the Egyptian foreign policy establishment was responding to changes on the international arena since the advent of the post-Cold War era. The collapse of the Soviet Union and, along with it, of the bipolar system that governed the world after World War II, made it imperative to combat the uncontested imposition of US hegemony on the world order. In order to buttress its position, Egypt sought to improve cooperation with many regional groupings, such as the Euro-Mediterranean bloc and the ASEAN countries. In this way, it hoped to safeguard its economic and political interests in the framework of international changes.
Third, there is every reason to believe that several major Asian powers -- China, Japan, and perhaps India-- will soon occupy a pivotal in the world, one they will preserve during the next century. Such a transformation in the international balance of power is bound to radically alter the political, economic and cultural realities with which we live today. This factor has prompted many political analysts to describe the coming century as the Asian or the Pacific century. Naturally, Egypt must take such important changes into account in formulating its strategy for growth and peace.
Finally, the possibility that Asian will witness civil wars and internal strife cannot be excluded, as recent events have shown. A sudden crisis, even in prosperous and stable nations, can trigger widespread social unrest, which is bound to have repercussions on the region and on the international arena as a whole. This possibility is in a great many ways related to the phenomenon we have witnessed in Africa. Again, Egypt cannot afford to ignore this possibility, and must formulate a consistent, principled and informed stance in order to neutralise the negative impact of any disturbance on our national interests.
For all the above reasons, the Egyptian foreign policy drive to strengthen relations with Asia is not motivated solely by economic logic, although naturally economic considerations are at its heart. In fact, much can be done to enhance trade and investment ties between Egypt and the Asian countries -- ties which remain weak until the present time. Egypt's exports to Asia do not exceed 10 to 11 per cent of its total volume of exports, while one third of our total imports come from Asia. Of course, President Mubarak's present tour of the continent will try to redress this imbalance; but it will also concentrate on areas of mutual political and cultural concern.
