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Al-Ahram Weekly 1 - 7 April 1999 Issue No. 423 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 1 - 7 April 1999 Issue No. 423
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Focus Interview Profile Features Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Twenty years of experience
By Ahmed Nafie *The 20 years that have passed since the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty have not relegated it to the annals of history. It is still one of the principal factors in regional stability, and remains highly significant with respect to current developments, particularly those relating to the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The question we must ask is: what lessons have been drawn from this treaty, and from the process of its implementation during the past two decades? What elements must be considered, carefully analysed and observed within the framework of the current peace process in the Middle East?
The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty had and still has great significance, if only in terms of its historical, legal and political framework, not to mention the process of its implementation. In addition, it is a model of the criteria laid down for the settlement of a bitter conflict that lasted more than 30 years.
The treaty represents a turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict with respect to the recognition of peace as a crucial instrument of conflict management. In the '50s and '60s, military action was the principal mode of operation for both the Arab and Israeli parties to the conflict. Towards the end of the '60s, the concept of peace entered the conflict. It began to be perceived and understood as a mechanism among others -- not the only one, to be sure, but still a tool worthy of consideration. Territorial occupation, at that time, still meant that the Arab countries could contemplate only limited military action. The developments that took place in 1973 made peace, at least as far as Egypt was concerned, the most important instrument in its conflict management efforts. These events, in turn, paved the way for the resolution of conflict, and the conclusion of peace.
The important point here is that the treaty did not emerge from a vacuum. Other developments had preceded it: the truce of 1949, concluded under UN auspices; President Nasser's acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 242; the two agreements on disengagement concluded between Egypt and Israel following the October War of 1973. All of these contributed to shaping the precise features of the cease-fire arrangements prior to the conclusion of the first comprehensive treaty, which put an end to the state of war between the two countries. It prepared the ground for a more extensive peace, which in turn led to the establishment of diplomatic and economic relations, as well as security arrangements. It was impossible for other parties in the region to ignore this "peaceful option", since it was founded on principles of legality. Consequently, the Arabs officially recognised it at the Fez summit of 1983.
The Egyptian-Israeli treaty was by no means a simple process. The settlement included two levels of procedures. It was a model for a comprehensive peace, founded not merely on the idea of putting an end to the state of war, but on efforts to establish normal relations based on the desire to resolve problems between the two countries.
The main issue was Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. It matters little whether the problems were resolved concomitantly with or prior to the special arrangements regarding the normalisation of relations. What is important is the fact that a binding commitment between the two sides was established and respected.
In this respect, the treaty also serves to underscore the parties' awareness, then and now, that peace must be comprehensive. The Egyptian move in that direction did not aim at limiting the principles of reconciliation to the agreement between Egypt and Israel, but sought to extend these principles to relations between the Arabs and Israel as well. The substantive issue underlying the reconciliation was the settlement of the Palestinian problem, at the core of the conflict, as well as the Egyptian-Israeli problem. Bilateral negotiations in that connection sought to achieve a framework for Palestinian autonomy, since both Egypt and Israel realised that settlement of the conflict could not be merely a bilateral matter.
As a model for conflict settlement, the accord provides a viable framework for the resolution of potential problems that could present an obstruction to implementation. One crucial point is that it did not leave any issues unresolved, which could subsequently have led to serious crises, as in the case of the Israeli settlements in Sinai. That problem, at present, is more complicated than it was at the time. Nonetheless, the principle should be respected: arrangements must be made to ensure that all problems are resolved. Outstanding issues can only create problems. Experienced negotiators know that solutions can be found to all problems, if good intentions and practical awareness of the requirements for peace prevail.
With creative thinking, and some assistance from the countries sponsoring the peace process, the principles of a lasting or sustainable peace have been laid down in the treaty. Even in the case of problems that were not resolved immediately, such as the border demarcation points, a specific mechanism was decided upon for their settlement. The issue of Taba, as well as other related administrative points which were resolved through arbitration, proved the effectiveness of such a mechanism.
The experience gleaned from the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty confirms the important role played in the negotiating process by the US, the principal sponsor. During the late '70s, the US was not merely a sponsor; it participated actively in the negotiations, was co-signatory of the treaty, and acted as the guarantor of its implementation. It was not just a mediator; it was deeply involved in the negotiations as a party with a special capacity for suggesting viable compromises whenever differences flared up and nearly caused the negotiations to collapse. It also took on full responsibility for facilitating the resolution of several vital problems. This role was performed by the US in accordance with agreed-upon principles which guaranteed the rights and interests of both parties concerned by the process.
Twenty years of implementation have been enlightening. The framework of the treaty, threats of war aside, has proven the chief factor in the stability of the two countries' relations. It is true that these relations have weathered many crises. This has been possible because of the treaty, which was not breached by either side. In fact, both parties respect it and consider it an achievement that must be preserved.
At the same time, the anticipated level of peace between the two sides has not been attained. The "cold peace" currently prevailing does not entail any extensive degree of cooperation. But the reason for that is not difficult to discern.
The peace process was conceived from the start as an Egyptian-Arab-Israeli decision. As long as Arab issues affecting the process remain unresolved, problems will persist. Egypt's position on the Arab map means that "Arab concerns" are necessarily and inevitably Egyptian concerns as well, not to be ignored or shunted aside.
The concept of peace as presented by some Israeli governments corresponds to Egypt's vision. This vision is based on a balance of interests, not of power; on parity at all levels, not on domination or superiority. Egypt's concept of peace is based on fundamental and mutual respect. Thus, the form the peace process has taken to this date is not what the region should have witnessed.
The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty is part of a heritage of regional cooperation. It should be preserved as a basis of stability. More important still, we must reflect upon it and benefit from its lessons -- particularly since the past two decades have witnessed so many developments which could be of great value in establishing real peace in the Middle East.
* The writer is a senior political analyst at Al-Ahram and an expert in Arab affairs.
