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Al-Ahram Weekly 8 - 14 April 1999 Issue No. 424 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 8 - 14 April 1999 Issue No. 424
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Focus Profile Features Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Identity, entity, independence
By Abdel-Qader Yassin *The Berlin Declaration issued by the summit on 26 March triggered incongruous reactions. It adopted what may be considered as a new stance with regard to the "Palestinian state", which, Yasser Arafat has said repeatedly, will be declared on 4 May. The EU stance remains balanced, despite the not-too-narrow gap that separates it from that of the US.
It is true that, through this declaration, for the first time, the EU has voiced its support for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Prior to that, and since the Venice Declaration of 1980, the EU had only referred to the "Palestinian identity". In time, that reference was promoted to the "Palestinian entity". Only within the past few days has the EU acknowledged the "Palestinian right to statehood". It is equally true that the EU, for the first time, has set a date to declare that independent state -- one year from that of the EU declaration.
What may be counted against the Berlin Declaration is that it linked the Palestinian state to the final-status negotiations, and the limited Palestinian self-rule administration to the Israeli government. This restricts to a great extent the effect of the positive steps it represents: approval of the establishment of the state, in principle, and the commitment to a specified period, starting now, for its establishment.
This balanced stance seems to have increased the gap between the EU stance and that of the US. The latter continues to be biased to the Israeli side in the Arab-Israeli conflict generally and, in particular, with respect to the issue of a Palestinian state. What could possibly have generated such obvious differences between the Western European and the US stances?
Since 1970, the EU has known that the Arab-Israeli conflict constitutes a danger to European interests, due to the close economic, political and cultural ties between Western Europe and the two parties involved in the conflict. In defining its stance on the Palestinian problem, Western Europe has recognised and acknowledged the importance of its ties with the Arabs.
With the exception of Holland, none of the Western European countries moved its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem following the Israeli Knesset's decision to transfer the Israeli capital to the Holy City. What lies behind this relative reserve?
Consider Britain, with its guilt complex associated with the Palestinian people. Britain was the country that gave the greatest push to the Zionist movement. It was the British government, towards the end of the 19th century, that promised the Zionists that they would found a national home in Palestine. That promise was assured by Balfour on 2 November 1918. Over the three following decades, the British mandate administration exerted every effort, through iniquitous legislature and arbitrary procedures, to make Palestine the national home of the Jews. It opened the doors wide to tens of thousands of Jewish immigrants.
It must be conceded that British partiality toward the World Zionist Organisation abated greatly when the Zionist leadership transferred most of its influence from London to Washington in 1942. This was due to the realisation that, within the imperialist camp, the position of the US had reached the top. America had succeeded in taking Britain's place; Britain's economy, after all, had been dealt a crushing blow by the Nazis during the war, which the US had joined at a rather late date.
The post-World War II years, of course, witnessed a concealed but fierce struggle between the US, on one hand, and Britain and France, on the other. In that struggle, the US attempted by all means to take over Britain and France's colonies and spheres of influence. In other words, the US sought the redistribution of these areas, according to the economic, political and military weight of the three imperialist states. Within that context, the Zionist project, if implemented, would provide the US with the necessary support in its imperialist struggle against Britain and France.
Clement Attlee, then British Labour premier, resisted the pressure exerted by the American administration, and backed up by the Zionist military operations carried out by the Hagana, Irgun, and Stern gangs against British troops in Palestine. All this proved damaging to the government in London. Seeking a way out, it organised a conference, which was held in London in late 1946. Attending the conference were representatives of the Palestinians, the Jewish settlers in Palestine, the Arab countries, and Britain. The conference, however, came to nothing.
The British Foreign Office councilors then convinced Ernest Bevin to submit the Palestinian problem in its entirety to the UN. They believed the critical balance between the "socialist bloc", on one hand, and the US and its friends inside the UN, on the other, would render it impossible for the international body to reach a decision concerning the case. The UN would then refer it back to the British government. Their plan failed. The vote in the UN General Assembly on the partition of Palestine yielded a majority of 33 countries in favour of the decision, 13 against, and the abstention of 10 countries, including Britain. The resolution was adopted on 29 November 1947.
In vain, Britain did all it could to convince the Arab leaders in Palestine and elsewhere to support the continued British mandate administration of Palestine. But none of those leaders seemed to comprehend that the balance of power had tipped in favour of Zionism, whose capabilities they belittled and underestimated. Hence the resounding Arab defeat in 1948. This is the basis of the Palestinian disaster which has, at its core, the inception of the state of Israel on 15 May 1948.
European policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict turned very much in favour of Israel following its shabby victory in June 1967, and the simultaneous disclosure of the Arabs' weaknesses. In 1969, the Roman Catholic pope appointed an emissary to Jerusalem. But on 6 November 1969, the Vatican rejected the idea of the internationalisation of the Holy City, although it had long called for this very measure. The Western European countries, in solidarity with the Vatican, also gave up the notion.
The re-instatement of a large measure of the Arabs' dignity, particularly following the War of Attrition on the Suez Canal front in 1969-1970, together with escalated Palestinian commando operations, served to bring some balance to the European stance. France took the first step in that direction, seeking a new unified approach for Western Europe toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. The result of French endeavours in that respect was the Schumann Declaration, which called for the withdrawal of Israel from most of the territories it had occupied during the 1967 War. Meanwhile, the European group resumed the call for the internationalisation of Jerusalem.
The Arab decision to stop exporting oil to the West during the October War greatly shook the countries of Western Europe. Hitherto, they had relied on Arab oil for three quarters of their energy requirements. With this shock, Europe realised that the Arabs were not entirely subject to the American will.
At this junction, the European stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict began to lean towards international legality. This was especially due to the fact that the Arab countries were seen as a large market for Western European products. Apart from that, Western Europe was extremely keen to attract Arab capital, which was being channeled entirely to the US.
The repercussions of the 1973 War on Western Europe's view of the Arab-Israeli conflict have been singularly wide-ranging. Thus, the European Community's declaration of 6 November 1973 demanded that the Palestinian people's rights be taken into consideration in the conflict settlement process. The declaration also reiterated the demand that Israel withdraw its forces from the territories it occupied in the 1967 War.
Following the Camp David Accords, the European summit issued the Venice Declaration in 1980. Subsequent Arab efforts failed to obtain more than Western European recognition of Palestinian identity. Seven years later, Western Europe's demand for recognition of the Palestinian entity was issued -- a result of the impact the Intifada had had on the Europeans, and specifically the heroic resistance that had won the respect of Western public opinion in general. In 1991, the European Union proposed that elections take place in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as East Jerusalem.
Since the convening of the Madrid Conference on 30 October 1991, the European role in the settlement dwindled, until the EU did little more than provide financing for development projects.
On 13 September 1993, the results of the Oslo Accord were revealed. There, the agreement was reached that set 4 May 1999 as the date of the final transitional phase in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The European stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the problem surrounding the declaration of the Palestinian state in particular, must be developed by transforming theory into practice. The Arabs can help bring this about: first by keeping the resistance alive; next, by turning European and American interests to Arab advantage, while exploiting continued Israeli rejection of any European role that is independent of the US and its bias toward Israel. Without putting all of these to good use, the stance adopted by Europe towards the Arab-Israeli conflict will be worth no more than ink on paper -- and perhaps even less than that.
*The writer is a Palestinian scholar.
