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Al-Ahram Weekly 8 - 14 April 1999 Issue No. 424 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 8 - 14 April 1999 Issue No. 424
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Focus Profile Features Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Iraq after Saddam
By Abdel-Azim HammadAs the US administration continues its resolve to remove Iraq's President Saddam Hussein from power, many political analysts argue that America has so far not conceived of a practical plan with some chance of success on what would happen afterwards. In a recent seminar at the Hart Senate Office Building on Capitol Hill, four US experts on Iraqi affairs were invited to propose possible scenarios on the future of Iraq after Hussein.
The panel comprised Ellen Laipson, vice-chairman of the National Intelligence Council and former CIA officer in charge of the Iraqi file; Patrick Clawson, director of research at the Washington Institute for Near East Politics; Andrew Parasilliti, director of programmes at the Middle East Institute; and Rend Rahim Francke, executive director of the Iraq Foundation. The seminar was chaired by Chas Freeman, president of the Middle East Policy Council. James Moore, of the directorate of strategic analysis at the Canadian Department of National Defence, took part in the panel as a commentator.
Laipson initiated the discussions by defining the idea of 'Iraq after Hussein'. He said neither Hussein's sons, Uday and Qusay, nor members of the inner circle of his Takriti clan should be expected to stay in power once the regime collapses. However, he said the Baath Party, the Republican Guard and the security apparatus will remain major players.
According to Laipson, the Iraqi people will not be masters of their own destiny after the fall of Hussein. Iraq will be the product of interaction between domestic parties and external parties comprising Iraq's neighbours and international powers, such as the US and probably the United Nations.
Laipson said Iraq will probably continue to exist as a unified state in the short term, since the Shi'ites are not currently planning to declare an independent state in the south, and the Kurds will not be allowed by Turkey or the US to declare full independence in the north. However, he said that while the Kurds appear to be postponing their decision at the moment, they may declare an independent state after the regime collapses.
According to Laipson, it is unlikely Hussein's regime will be replaced with a more democratic one, but he conceded that a new regime is more likely to be less authoritarian and repressive. He said Washington, which has successfully interacted with pro-Islamic regimes in the region, such as in Saudi Arabia, might also have to face the challenge of traditional Islamists participating in a post-Hussein government.
Laipson says that while Iraq's neighbours could play a role in shaping the country's future, that role is bound to be greatly diminished because its Arab neighbours are going through an uncertain period themselves. Syria, Kuwait and a number of Gulf states are all governed by aging rulers. Jordan is currently undergoing a transitional phase with its new king, Abdullah, who has little political experience.
Clawson concentrated on the future of Iraq-US relations and Iraq's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. He based his argument on the assumption that current plans to overthrow Hussein, by strengthening the Iraqi opposition and stepping up US military support, will succeed in getting substantial divisions of the Iraqi army to support US plans. If such a scenario materialises, a regime friendly to the US and involving traditional Islamists will be established in Baghdad. This would give the US another ally in the region besides Saudi Arabia and, as a result, US military presence in the Gulf would be reduced and Saudi dependence on the US would decrease.
Such a development, said Clawson, would cause Israel to lower its guard with respect to the security of its eastern front. He argued that this may induce Israel to be more flexible in negotiating the future of the West Bank and the Golan Heights.
But Parasilliti contended that the so-called 'Iraq liberation strategies', which rely on the Iraqi opposition, are doomed to failure. He said the opposition groups have no grass-roots support within Iraq. He said that even if the Iraqi opposition succeeded in establishing military bases, it would have little hope of defeating Hussein's forces without foreign military support. But it remains to be seen how far the US would intervene under such circumstances. Former US President George Bush called on the Iraqi opposition to rebel in 1991, but watched from the sidelines as Hussein's tanks and chemical weapons crushed the rebels and decimated them in the country's north and south.
Parasilliti suggested another scenario. He said that if the opposition to the regime within Iraq has sufficiently permeated the Baath Party and the army, a joint declaration by the US, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to lift the sanctions and cancel Iraq's debts and compensation it owes for damage inflicted during the 1991 Gulf War, would spark the change. He also said a Marshall-type plan could be adopted for the reconstruction of the country.
Francke, meanwhile, cast doubts on the scenarios put forward by Clawson and Parasillini. He criticised the latter's on the grounds that it relied on a traditional rebellion staged jointly by the army and the Baath Party. He asserted that Hussein had so far succeeded in keeping the major forces in the army and the Baath Party in a state of rivalry and equilibrium, to ensure they would never join forces against him.
Francke also asserted that Iraq's neighbours are not yet prepared to confront the consequences of rebellion or revolution in the region, which could lure other parties to intervene.
Moore summed up his reactions to the panelists' views by pointing out that the wishes of local, regional and international parties to see Hussein ousted remain just that -- not expectations. He argued that the problem in Iraq would not be solved as soon as Hussein was removed from power. He said Iraq would undergo a period of unrest and turbulence. Internal strife could threaten neighbouring countries; weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical and biological, could be used, and large sectors of the population displaced.
While Moore's prediction of Iraq's future after Hussein appears to be more plausible than those of the other panelists, further comments on the scenarios put forward are needed.
First, US strategy appears to be pursuing a cautious approach by seeking to bring about real change which will cost the minimum in humanitarian and political terms. The US administration and Congress have decided on the overthrow of Hussein's regime without coming up with a practical plan for Iraq.
Furthermore, there is the question of Iraq's future in terms of its sovereignty. Will the country remain united? Will it be divided along other political lines to form separate, if not independent, entities, never to be the same Iraq we have known within its current borders? Will the different Iraqi regions end up in a federation (an option which US Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk did not rule out in a recent interview with me) or a confederation?
Renowned Egyptian political analyst Mohamed Hassanein Heikal disclosed another possible option to bring about change in Iraq. Rudimentary information leaked to the press claims that before his death, King Hussein had discussed a plan for the Jordanian army (instead of American ground forces) to support a civil rebellion in Iraq. If successful, the Hashemites would regain the throne in Baghdad. But does this scenario fit with Clawson's assertion of the need for a US military role to support a people's revolt in Iraq? Furthermore, would Saudi Arabia and Syria agree to Jordan playing such a major role in Iraq?
Finally, the question which remains to be answered is, what will happen if Hussein remains in power for another decade? None of the speakers at the seminar ruled out this possibility. Francke, however, adopted a singular position, predicting that the sanctions against Iraq would remain as long as Hussein stayed in power. But such a scenario would be tantamount to a catastrophe at all levels: human, moral and political. It would be an unforgivable crime which would weigh heavily on the conscience of mankind.
