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Al-Ahram Weekly 15 - 21 April 1999 Issue No. 425 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 15 - 21 April 1999 Issue No. 425
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Features Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters A simple plan
By Salama Ahmed Salama
Before embarking on its military intervention in Kosovo, NATO had initially planned to launch an intensive air campaign against strategic Yugoslav targets. The aim was to break Milosevic's resistance in a few days and compel Serbian forces to cease massacring the Kosovars. According to the initial plan, NATO would not even have had to address the humanitarian disaster resulting from the expulsion of thousands of people. Milosevic himself, it was envisaged, would be forced to accept the terms of the Rambouillet agreement and grant the Kosovars self-rule, monitored by international forces, or rather supervised by NATO.
NATO's plan, however, seems to have been based on inaccurate information, reckless judgement, and total ignorance of the domestic political considerations in Belgrade, including the racist fanaticism of the regime, which may drive it to suicide if need be.
The Americans and Europeans spent years negotiating with Milosevic; that they were totally unprepared for what would happen if peaceful methods failed is inconceivable. Yet the rapidly deteriorating situation seems to have caught NATO and its intelligence agencies entirely by surprise. Despite NATO's assurances that strategic targets, including bridges and weapons depots, have been hit, it continues to blame the need for yet more strikes on poor weather. The air raids, furthermore, did not stop Serbian tanks from besieging Kosovo and compelling almost half its population to flee. Suddenly, hundreds of thousands of Kosovars were at the borders; Macedonia would not allow them in, and Albania was cracking under the strain. On the other hand, NATO members refused to take in more than a symbolic number of refugees.
While the US and Britain are managing the military operations, Germany and France are anxious about the protracted intervention. Excluding Russia could have adverse consequences on international relations. There is also the fear that Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia will be destabilised, possibly affecting Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria. Such developments can only benefit Milosevic, who will seize Kosovo when the storm has abated. There is already talk in Europe that the Rambouillet agreement is bankrupt. There is a general consensus that the information that prompted Clinton and Blair to take the military initiative was not accurate. The Albanians, like the Palestinians, Tutsis and Rwandans, may well have to become used to a life of exile.
Whether Milosevic surrenders or not then, NATO's declared objective will not be realised. The NATO ministerial meeting held in Brussels two days ago made it clear that the organisation is willing to accept Serbian forces in Kosovo and to include Russian forces in an international peacekeeping force. NATO is striving to conceal the sharp differences tearing its members apart. The price of such differences is being paid by the refugees, and only Milosevic stands to win.
