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Al-Ahram Weekly 29 Apr. - 5 May 1999 Issue No. 427 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 29 Apr. - 5 May 1999 Issue No. 427
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Focus Special Travel Sports People Features Living Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters The 4th of May test
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
It might seem odd that while practically every concerned statesman in the world has advised Arafat to postpone declaring the creation of a Palestinian state on 4 May, the Palestinian leader is still reluctant to accept the advice. Observers question what backing Arafat enjoys to make him resist such tremendous pressure.
From a purely legal viewpoint, the case can be made that he is entitled to do so: on 4 May, the protagonists cease to be bound by the Oslo agreements. Israel will have failed to deliver its part of the deal. But the issue is political, not legal. Two arguments could be suggested as likely reasons for Arafat's tenacity:
- first, an objective reason, that of not wanting to acknowledge that Israel has veto power over a decision which, after all, is the exclusive prerogative of the Palestinian Authority (PA). The European Union has just emitted a resolution recognising the Palestinians' right to establish their state whenever they see it fit;
- second, a subjective reason, namely, that Arafat will soon be 70; his health is deteriorating, and he would not like to end his political career, after so many vicissitudes, by having to admit that he has failed to achieve his ultimate goal. From his perspective, facing everybody with a unilateral declaration on Palestinian statehood could appear as the lesser evil, even if it is to trigger a violent backlash on the part of the Israelis.
Arafat's final decision has been deferred to the very last moment, and will only be made public following broad consultations with the leading bodies of the PA and the PLO. The key argument for refraining from announcing the creation of the state on 4 May (that is, two weeks before the Israeli elections) is to prevent Netanyahu from taking advantage of the situation and drastically improving his electoral standing by using the statement as a pretext to reoccupy wide chunks of Palestinian territory.
On the other hand, if Arafat accepts to have the date of the declaration postponed, he cannot ensure that the great powers, notably the United States, will guarantee the creation of a Palestinian state at any subsequent date. On 4 May, Clinton cannot assume that Netanyahu will not be reelected. The US president knows how adamant Netanyahu is on the principle of Palestinian statehood. So how can he commit himself to the implementation of that principle before the Israeli elections? If 4 May passes without Arafat having proclaimed the creation of the state, he runs the risk of losing that opportunity forever.
Of course, a number of middle-of-the-road scenarios could be envisaged. Deliberations within the ranks of the various Palestinian bodies can be pursued without announcing any decision before the Israeli elections on 17 May or even beyond. Thus, the Palestinian factor in influencing the outcome of the Israeli elections could become an asset for the Palestinians rather than a liability. Palestinian negotiators could also try to explore further the extent to which the Clinton administration would be ready to support Palestinian self-determination, bringing Washington's commitment on this matter as close as possible to accepting full-fledged sovereignty. After all, Netanyahu cannot have history move back, nor downgrade the status the PA has acquired in its relationship with the US administration after having abrogated the clauses of the Palestinian Charter that Israel interpreted as negating its right to exist, while Netanyahu still refuses to evacuate parts of the West Bank, a commitment to which he is bound by the Wye Plantation Memorandum.
But what is also worth probing is the extent to which US diplomacy is ready to consider genuine Palestinian statehood at a time when the Middle East is witnessing separate crisis situations in a number of hot spots concomitantly, not only because of the ongoing Arab-Israeli dispute, but also because of the unsettled confrontation with Iraq over the UNSCOM inspections, the rather insecure situation in Jordan after the demise of King Hussein, Turkey's volatile situation after its parliamentary elections this week and, more importantly, because of the event that has eclipsed all others both regionally and globally: NATO's military intervention against Serbia over Kosovo.
One common characteristic of all these conflict situations is that they are no longer managed by the UN Security Council but by NATO, which celebrated its 50th anniversary this week with great fanfare. The anniversary seems to consecrate the fact that NATO is replacing the UN as supreme authority, able to decide what is legitimate and what is not in conducting world affairs. Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic and Abdullah Ocalan are regarded as "rogue" leaders defying World Order, and are categorised as perpetrators of "crimes against humanity". Even the Turkish elections seem to betray a rise in Turkish nationalism, on both the left and the extreme-right -- putting further strain on Europe's cohesion. A central question in such a context is whether Arafat is irrevocably absolved of having been formerly regarded as a similar "rogue" leader, and whether he can thus be entrusted with a sovereign state.
Moreover, with the Kosovo crisis eclipsing every other in the Middle East, a number of Middle East actors may be tempted to exploit the fact that attention is diverted to embark on adventures they would not have dared contemplate in "normal" conditions. If the tension inherited from the Wye haggling between Clinton and Netanyahu is not overcome, a scenario worth contemplating is an attempt by the still acting Likud government to take advantage of the precarity of Jordan's new regime and counter Arafat's threat to proclaim a Palestinian state by declaring that the proper place for that state is in Jordan. Netanyahu's foreign minister, Ariel Sharon, has always been an advocate of such a "solution" to the Palestinian problem. He might now believe that the opportunity is there to grab.
We do not know how far NATO's confrontation with Slobodan Milosevic will go, but what is certain is that the mass exodus of Albanian Kosovars is destabilising the entire political environment. It is also difficult to see how the Western alliance can maintain its cohesion with Europe marked ever more deeply by the crisis in the Balkans. Russia clearly sees NATO's involvement in Serbia -- particularly if the US and Britain decide to send in ground troops -- as a direct threat to Moscow's own security, with global implications difficult to predict. This is not a regional atmosphere conducive to the creation of a Palestinian state.
