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Al-Ahram Weekly 6 - 12 May 1999 Issue No. 428 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 6 - 12 May 1999 Issue No. 428
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Features Special Focus Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Building independence
By Ibrahim Nafie
By resolving to ignore the 4 May deadline for the declaration of a Palestinian state, the Palestinian Central Council has put itself in a better position to take the appropriate decisions with regard to the future of Palestine in light of the outcome of the Israeli elections. Moreover, the Palestinians have not encumbered themselves with specific commitments or deadlines that could hurl the Israeli-Palestinian track of the peace process into another futile vortex.
Of equal importance was the Central Council's decision to go ahead with the measures necessary to develop the institutions of the future state. It has formed a number of working committees, including one to draft a national constitution. One of the immediate problems facing an independent Palestinian state is the absence of concrete components of independence. For more than 30 years, the Palestinians have depended on Israel for such fundamental utilities as water, electricity and communications. Economic welfare, particularly the interests of Palestinian workers, has also been highly tied to Israel. Such considerations must be addressed before the state can take shape.
In all events, the declaration per se is no longer the crux of the problem. An independent Palestinian state will come into being: that is now virtually taken for granted. Rather, what was primarily at issue recently was the 4 May deadline. The deadline accorded with the end of the transitional phase stipulated by the Oslo Accords, and thus had a legal foundation. Other considerations were working in its favour. As the end of the five-year interim period approached, not only was there no progress towards the final-status negotiations; the stipulated terms of the interim period had not even been implemented. In addition, the Likud government had so stymied the peace process as to give it little hope for the foreseeable future. More significantly, the Likud government's settlement policies and unrelenting pressure on the PA were systematically eroding the foundations of any state that came into being. It was therefore tempting to declare statehood on 4 May whatever the consequences.
Weightier factors, however, made it more logical to ignore the deadline. Indeed, the Central Council's decision to do so has actually consolidated the basis for a state, perhaps even more than all previous resolutions and agreements. Above all, it has strengthened international and regional support. Even inside Israel, the chief of Israeli military intelligence recently recognised that "the international community is no longer asking itself whether or not the state should exist, but rather when it will be declared."
Arafat visited more than 30 nations prior to the Central Council's meeting. Certainly the international leaders he met advised him to defer the declaration, but it was clear that there was no question in their mind regarding the legitimacy of the Palestinian state. The decision will also capitalise on the unprecedented level of support the Palestinians have received from the EU. Last March, the EU issued a statement affirming the Palestinians' right to self-determination and a state. It further condemned Israel's settlement policies, which it views as contravening international law. The EU's position is a major asset, not least because Europe is a major donor for the various Palestinian development projects.
The remarkable changes in the American position were another crucial factor in the Central Council's decision. President Clinton's message to the Palestinian leadership, which was read before the Council, expressed a clear American commitment to the peace process in the framework of the land for peace principle and UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The message also expressed support for the aspirations of the Palestinian people, described Israeli settlement policies as detrimental to the peace process and pledged to tie certain procedural aspects to the time frame for final status negotiations. The US stance is particularly significant when seen against the Likud government's persistent attempts to impose new principles on the peace process, such as "land for security", and to freeze the peace process as a whole.
Perhaps one of the most encouraging factors, however, was the way the Palestinians themselves handled the issue. The decision itself was taken by a body that included representatives of Hamas and Jihad. The participation of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin is particularly indicative of the new climate.
The deliberations made clear that the Palestinians stood to gain by waiting for the results of the Israeli elections, although a major segment of public opinion was opposed in principle to linking the declaration of the state to the elections. Many argued that deferring the declaration of statehood would play into the hands of the Likud, which would claim that it had succeeded in pressuring the Palestinians.
Of course, there is a vast difference between electoral claims and the potential violence of the Israeli reaction had the Palestinians gone ahead and declared a state. More important, however, was the fact that the Palestinians would have been accused of violating the conditions of the Wye River Memorandum which, in turn, could have led to the annulment of the Oslo Accords and placed the Palestinians in an even greater predicament. In short, the Palestinians had to decide whether to improve the likelihood of bringing a more moderate government into Israel while retaining their international gains, or to help keep an extremist government in Israel, while risking the loss of international support. In deciding to defer, the Palestinians clearly opted for long-term interests over immediate gains. While there is no question that the Palestinians were fully prepared to bear the consequences of a unilateral declaration on 4 May if they had no other choice, although the Likud government would certainly have taken advantage of the opportunity to respond violently, circumstances, including the decision to declare a state within a specific time frame, will be better in the future than they are at the moment.
Egypt, of course, has had for some time its own views on the Palestinian decision to declare a state on 4 May. Egyptian and Palestinian officials were in continual contact to discuss this and related issues. Egypt's position, reiterated on numerous occasions by President Mubarak, has been that the Palestinians alone have the right to decide as they see fit, and that Egypt will support their decision, whatever it is. This has also been the stance of other Arab countries. The Arab nations, out of conviction that the Palestinians have already suffered too much, have always been a potential source of support. Nevertheless, judging from the reactions in various Arab capitals, there is a general relief that the Palestinians deferred a final decision. Arab support requires mutual understanding, and all Arab parties want the peace process to achieve its goals as smoothly as possible.
