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Al-Ahram Weekly 6 - 12 May 1999 Issue No. 428 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 6 - 12 May 1999 Issue No. 428
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Features Special Focus Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters In a state of suspension
By Gamil Mattar *
The fated day came and went without the Palestinian Authority (PA) declaring an independent Palestinian state. I do not believe it is fair or objective to pronounce judgment, either in support or in condemnation of the PA's decision. The ambiguously worded decision to postpone the declaration of statehood was in conformity with Arab positions, whether these were voiced openly or only hinted at.
History can be a useful ally in assessing recent developments. The five-year transitional period which ended on 4 May was an idea borrowed from the Camp David treaty signed between the late President Sadat and Begin in 1978. At that time, Begin's aim was to grant portions of the West Bank and Gaza self-rule as a permanent, rather than a transitional, status. In the end, Begin agreed to a two-phase process. It was thought at the time that he only assented because he was convinced that the two sides would never reach an agreement over final status before five years were up. Self-rule would thus continue under the pretext of not being able to reach an agreement rather than as a result of coercion.
In order to prevent self-rule from developing into true independence, Begin insisted upon defining it in terms of person rather than territory. He refused to grant the Palestinians authorities that they could interpret as manifestations of sovereignty, such as legislative powers and the issuing of passports and postage stamps. For this and other reasons, the Palestinians opposed Camp David. They refused to enter into a process that would not eventually secure for them an independent state.
In Oslo in 1993, however, the Palestinians agreed to a formula that was not too different from that of Camp David. This time they hoped that realities on the ground, regardless of the details of the Oslo Accord, would ultimately lend themselves to the creation of the state. As many writings of the period confirm, the Palestinian delegation in Oslo did not insist that the agreement contain an Israeli recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination. They did, however, succeed in gaining more powers and privileges than it would have been possible to obtain from Begin. They obtained, for example, limited legislative powers, the right to issue passports and postage stamps and the right to construct an international airport, however subject these concessions were to conditions and restrictions. Nor can it be denied that the provision for establishing a Palestinian security force was the "reality" that formed a major indicator of eventual statehood.
In considering the process devolving from Oslo, it is important to distinguish between two factors. The first is that the agreement between the PLO and Israel stipulates that the two parties must resolve their problems through negotiations and that neither side should take unilateral actions. These provisions were contained in an exchange of letters between Arafat and Rabin on 10 September 1993 and in the Declaration of Principles (DOP) signed on 13 September 1993. The DOP, it should be noted, is not linked to any deadline or other time frames. The second factor, which is linked to such time frames, consists of a series of agreements, namely the Cairo agreement of May 1994, the second Oslo Accord of 2 September 1995, the Jericho protocol of January 1997 and the Wye Plantation Memorandum of September 1998. All these agreements stipulate a transitional period ending on 4 May -- the fifth anniversary of the Cairo agreement -- by which time the parties should have reached a final status agreement. In other words, contrary to what is commonly believed, 4 May is not linked to the Oslo Accords.
Israel grounded its opposition to the declaration of a Palestinian state on this date upon the fact that it can easily and legitimately restore the situation to what it was before Oslo in accordance with the agreements. Under Oslo and the subsequent agreements, it was clearly understood that five years, and not a single day more, was the period in which the Palestinians could enjoy the privileges Israel granted them. Or, put otherwise, the authority granted to the Palestinians is of fixed duration and not absolute. In addition, Israel was confident that, through its peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan and its agreements with the Palestinians, it could free itself from all obligations towards Egypt and Jordan with regard to Gaza and the West Bank. Both Egypt and Jordan have committed themselves to the principle that the fate of the West Bank and Gaza is to be determined by direct negotiations between the Palestinians and Israel. Netanyahu, therefore, felt confident that, should his government react violently to the declaration of a Palestinian state, he would not encounter legal or political difficulties with Jordan, Egypt or the UN.
Everyone, including Arafat, Netanyahu, Mordechai and Barak, is aware that an independent Palestinian state awaits them at the end of the line. The crux of the issue, therefore, is not the declaration of the state per se, but rather the nature of the borders of that state. The Palestinians fear that Netanyahu, as Begin wanted to do before him, has stacked the deck so as to bring the parties to a dead end. For example, the Palestinian negotiators may be placed in a position whereby they would either have to agree to an unacceptable Israeli offer or see Israel close the doors to a final status solution. The most important card in Arafat's hand in the past weeks has been the threat that he will declare a Palestinian state, hoping that the threat will put Israel on the defensive. Of course, no one in the West or the Middle East really believed that Arafat would implement his threat. He had many reasons not to. Even if Netanyahu had allowed him to go through with the declaration, the state would have been little more than a patchwork of disconnected pockets of land. Moreover, the price paid for the non-state would have been the end of the peace process. This probably explains the decision to postpone the declaration of statehood and the ambiguous explanations given by the PA Central Council.
It is also important to remember, however, that Netanyahu is not as free an agent as many imagine. Naturally, he will attempt to manipulate the domestic situation inside Israel in the manner most advantageous to his political position. He has always been the most hostile Israeli politician to the Oslo Accord. Still, there are political circumstances he cannot avoid and the most he can obtain, or even hope for, in light of the restrictions he faces, is for self-rule to continue indefinitely, which is what Begin had wanted.
If Arafat had insisted on his interpretation of the Oslo Accord as ending on 4 May, and gone ahead with the declaration of statehood, Netanyahu would have been certain to score enormous electoral gains, particularly given the growing shift to the right and ultra-right in Israeli public opinion. Netanyahu would also have been able to wash his hands of Oslo without facing the charge of having caused its failure. At the same time, he would have been in a position to hold on to most of the areas of the West Bank in which there is only a medium or small Palestinian presence, and to relinquish the areas in which there are higher concentrations of Palestinians.
Netanyahu, however, is as aware as anyone that the Palestinian state is inevitable. He knows that when such a state comes into being, he will have to agree to hand over other territories in order to reach a final agreement. The size of these territories, furthermore, will be greater than that which Arafat would have obtained had he implemented his threat.
Even if Netanyahu is reelected, his attitude towards extending the transitional phase will be similar to Arafat's. Any proposal to extend the period of the Oslo Accords, even for a few months, carries with it the recognition that the accords are still valid. After the few months have ended, furthermore, he will find himself in the same position, but will not be able to assert that the term of the agreements can go on forever. As for Arafat, who had promised his people that he would declare a state on 4 May, he may still entertain the hope that he will get something in return for deferring the declaration, although he is perfectly aware that Netanyahu will never make concessions during the delicate run-up to the elections.
At any rate, the US has intervened to postpone the entire issue. It has fallen in with Netanyahu's stance that Oslo is an ongoing process and does not have a deadline. At the same time, it has recognised Arafat's insistence that he will not relinquish his right to declare a state at the end of the transitional period.
The purpose of the US intervention was to defer long enough to permit for new negotiations that will conform to Israel's political circumstances in the coming months. Yet this postponement, the US knows, must not be so long as to harm the popularity of the Palestinian leadership and to provoke outbreaks of violence in both Palestine and Israel, as well as in other nations of the Middle East. In all events, perhaps the outcome of the Israeli elections will encourage Arafat to make a clear, unequivocal statement on deferring the declaration of statehood.
*The writer is the director of Arab Centre for Development and Futuristic Research.
