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Al-Ahram Weekly 13 - 19 May 1999 Issue No. 429 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 13 - 19 May 1999 Issue No. 429
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Features Books Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Kosovo and the Arabs
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
It is natural for the Arabs to side with the Albanian Kosovars, not only because the majority among them are Muslim, but also because of the ordeal they are going through. An entire people has been uprooted and compelled to abandon homes, possessions and all they hold dear, and travel miles on foot headed for no specific destination, to end up in over-crowded camps where, according to visiting journalists, they spend hours, sometimes the entire day, queuing for a loaf of bread. The camps lack privacy, security and hygiene; potential outbreaks of cholera and other life-threatening epidemics remain a very real threat. Most of the refugees have not had a bath in over a month, and visitors are struck by the stench from the makeshift latrines.
The Arabs are particularly sensitive to this appalling tragedy, which is a sort of déjà-vu experience reminiscent of the Palestinian exoduses of 1948 and 1967, now endured by other Muslims as the century draws to a close. The massacres that have accompanied the ousters, whether perpetrated by Serbian militias, regular Serb forces or by 'friendly fire' from NATO strikes 'mistakenly' bombing civilian targets, remind the Arabs of Deir Yassin and other atrocities deliberately carried out against Palestinians to force them to flee.
But sympathy for the Albanian Kosovars should not eclipse other considerations. For example, the replacement of the UN Security Council by NATO as the key instrument responsible for the attacks against Serbia in a region neighbouring the Arab world constitutes a direct threat to its security. Everybody knows how close successive US administrations are to Israel. Violating the Security Council's prerogatives as the only authority in charge of international legality deprives the Arabs of the protection of the rule of law in face of the West's overwhelming superiority.
Then too the Arab regimes cannot disregard the fact that the persecution, dispossession and alienation of Muslims in a variety of situations has encouraged radical groups to resort to violence and terrorism. The Washington Times reported that the Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA) sought the assistance of Osama bin Laden for training facilities and weapons, in line with the former activities of the well-known Saudi terrorist/millionaire in Afghanistan and Bosnia. Whatever their public proclamations, Arab leaders who feel threatened by the spread of destabilising forces cannot afford to stand unreservedly on the side of the Kosovar Albanians.
Of course, that does not mean that Arab leaders endorse the policies of Slobodan Milosevic. Arabs, particularly Egyptians, have had a special affinity with Yugoslavia since the heyday of the Non-Aligned Movement, which was led by Tito conjointly with Nasser and Nehru. Tito and Nasser enjoyed a close relationship. When Nasser found himself becoming increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union to counter-balance America's unwavering support for Israel, Tito, who for long years bore the brunt of Stalin's wrath for daring to step out of line, remained Nasser's closest adviser on how to resist a Soviet takeover. But Milosevic is no Tito.
Thanks perhaps to his formidable foes -- first Hitler, then Stalin -- rather than because of alliances he could have set up, Tito remained the symbol of the successful holding together of the Yugoslav mosaic, despite historically rooted antagonisms between the peoples of the Balkans. Milosevic, on the contrary, is a product of Yugoslavia's post-Tito disintegration. Today, with the process reaching Kosovo, the overspill of Kosovar Albanians into the surrounding countries is creating an acute crisis extending beyond the frontiers of the former Yugoslavia and threatening the whole of Europe -- even world peace. It should be remembered that instability in the Balkans had much to do with the outbreak of two world wars in this century.
Western capitals were wrong to believe that Milosevic's will would be broken in a matter of days, and that he would be forced to bend to the Rambouillet conditions. The full text of the document remained secret until recently; now it appears that Milosevic was required to accept a NATO presence in territory acknowledged as sovereign.
Milosevic's steadfastness yielded results. Most of Serbia's opposition forces rallied around him, while NATO's ranks quickly betrayed strains and stresses. Greece, a NATO member, refused to take part in the military action against Serbia. Italy and France wavered on a number of issues while Russia, which is not a member of NATO, expressed its disapproval of the whole enterprise in no uncertain terms.
The Yugoslav crisis revealed that there are limits to the unipolar world game and that Russia cannot be dismissed as irrelevant, whatever its present weaknesses, including its critical economic situation and its present dependence on loans from the IMF. All NATO powers, including the US and the UK, acknowledge Russia's indispensable role if a face-saving political settlement is to be reached. Now that Russia is back in the game, a UN-sanctioned final settlement has become a viable alternative, as none of the permanent members of the Security Council is likely to resort to the veto -- not even China, despite its anger at the bombing of its embassy in Belgrade, which was 'mistakenly' hit by a 'stray' NATO missile.
Things began to change when Jesse Jackson defied Clinton and met Milosevic in Belgrade. He returned home with the three American POWs and a letter from the Serbian ruler to the American president. Then Ibrahim Rugova, the moderate Albanian Kosovar leader was allowed to leave Yugoslavia with his family and take part in the search for a negotiated solution. Belgrade proposed to reduce its military forces in Kosovo. In the face of these initiatives, NATO had to admit that a negotiated settlement could be in the making.
Theoretically, a compromise solution cannot be ruled out. To ensure that the refugees will feel secure enough to return to Kosovo, an international military presence in the province is recognised as indispensable by all parties. A consensus could be reached over including the Russians in this force, as well as a NATO country like Greece which did not take part in the strikes, and eventually other NATO powers under the flag of the United Nations -- actually, the 'umbrella' flag of all the protagonists.
On the issue of Kosovo, no party is calling for total independence, because no party can guarantee preventing the domino effect that a restructuring of the international borders in the Balkans could trigger. What will have to be negotiated is the degree of empowerment the Kosovars, whatever their ethnic origin, will be allowed to enjoy.
To avoid a repeat performance of the Balkan crises, or their lingering on indefinitely, a Balkan 'Marshall Plan' may be needed as a guarantee for Europe's -- and not only the Balkan's -- stability. From an Arab perspective, none of the Middle East crises are expected to be resolved as long as the Balkan crises remain so acute. On the other hand, a breakthrough in the Kosovo crisis will certainly stimulate conflict-resolution efforts throughout the Middle East.
