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Al-Ahram Weekly 13 - 19 May 1999 Issue No. 429 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 13 - 19 May 1999 Issue No. 429
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Features Books Travel Living Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Opening up for Khartoum
By Abdel-Azim Hammad
Diplomatic successes made recently by the Sudanese government in breaking out of its isolation could be attributed mainly to regional and international changes. The way in which Khartoum has handled those changes reflects the maturity and skill of the government and its leader of 10 years, President Omar Al-Bashir.
In the past three weeks, the Sudanese government has made several important moves. Early this month, Bashir signed a reconciliation agreement with his Eritrean counterpart, Issaias Afewerki, in Qatar thus restoring diplomatic ties that had been severed between the two countries since 1994. A day later an unprecedented meeting took place in Geneva between Hassan Al-Turabi, Sudanese parliament speaker and leader of the National Islamic Front, and former Sudanese prime minister and Umma Party leader, Al-Sadeq Al-Mahdi. Around the same time, former Sudanese President Gaafar Numeiri, exiled in Cairo since his overthrow in a military coup in 1985, announced that he was planning to return to Khartoum to form his own political party. Bashir welcomed Numeiri's decision and ordered the formation of a special committee to prepare for his return.
The outcome of the meeting between Mahdi and Turabi is not yet clear, however informed sources said that the two political leaders dealt mainly with broad-lines of a proposed agreement aimed at reaching comprehensive national reconciliation between the government and the opposition-in-exile.
The Sudanese government has meanwhile announced, for the first time, its readiness to discuss the possibility of creating a separate state in southern Sudan in order to end the ongoing war there. The Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) led by John Garang may have been weakened by the loss of one its most important regional allies, Eritrea, and the further possibility of losing its northern allies after the meeting between Turabi and Mahdi. In a further blow to Garang, Washington announced last month that it would partially lift an economic embargo imposed against Sudan in 1995 for its alleged involvement in supporting terrorist activities.
It is difficult to ascertain the exact reasons behind these recent Khartoum government successes but it would appear that there were other regional and international players involved. Is American policy responsible for allowing regional disputes and conditions surrounding Sudan to deteriorate so that the present government benefits? Or does the change in US policy towards the Sudanese government stem from those deteriorating conditions?
The Sudanese opposition, and hostile neighbours, particularly Eritrea, Uganda and Ethiopia, were known to have started the count-down to the fall of the Khartoum regime. In 1997 US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright openly declared the US administration's support for the Sudanese opposition parties. In a December 1997 meeting in Kampala of the foreign ministers of Sudan's neighbours Albright announced that the regime in Khartoum was a danger to all and that they should seek to overthrow it.
At that point Sudanese opposition leaders hitherto unwelcome in Washington found a sympathetic ear in the US capital. Eritrea and Uganda agreed on the appointment of Lieutenant-General Abdel-Aziz Khaled, a northern Sudanese Muslim officer, as leader of the northern opposition's military wing from bases in Eritrea. His troops were expected to open an eastern front against the Sudanese government while Garang fought them in the south. Unfortunately Khaled's forces achieved limited success.
Observers of US policy in East Africa believe that the change in American strategy was part of Clinton's project for the Horn of Africa which aimed at the establishment of a group of allies loyal to US interests in the region. This group would include Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan, and both the Democratic and Popular Republics of Congo. April Gillespie, the former American ambassador to Iraq was put in charge of the project and was known to be stationed in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, on a near-permanent basis.
Everything did not go according to plan. The civil war against President Laurent Kabila raged anew in the Democratic Republic of Congo with Uganda and Burundi supporting the rebel troops. Kabila had replaced France's old friend the late President Mobutu. This was seen as part of a US plan to reduce French influence in the region. The border dispute and fighting between Ethiopia and Eritrea also stymied US efforts to build unity.
It is not known precisely how these developments led to the paralysis of Clinton's project for the Horn of Africa. Has Washington attempted and failed to stop the disputes in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region? Was that failure behind its decision to freeze the execution of the grand plan, at least, temporarily? Or has the US, because of that failure, concluded that conditions in the region are not yet ripe for the implementation of, let alone expenditure on, the project? Has Washington decided to let the regional problems run their course?
Whatever the reason the outcome is the same. The international front against the Sudanese regime has collapsed. Eritrea has accused Washington of being biased towards Ethiopia in their ongoing war. Uganda is also angry with the United States for assisting Kabila and seeming more willing to compromise its support for Garang's SPLA rather than lose the war in Congo. Furthermore, Eritrea admits that it cannot fight against both Ethiopia and the Sudan at the same time which explains why it opted for a cooling on that front and accepted a compromise with Khartoum.
Throughout these events Egypt has refused to participate in any military action against Sudan insisting that Sudanese nationals residing in Egypt restrict themselves to political opposition only. It was clear to Egypt that the American plan for the region and events in East Africa and the Lakes did not favour Cairo's best interests. As a result Egypt used its political and diplomatic influence to try and achieve a comprehensive national reconciliation between Khartoum and Sudanese opposition groups in exile.
In spite of its reservations regarding some of the leaders in Bashir's government, particularly Turabi, and the policies of the regime, Egypt established close contact with all parties to the crisis. Libya, by way of repaying Egypt for its part in the Lockerbie negotiations, also resumed its mediation between Cairo and Khartoum. In recent statements, Foreign Minister Amr Moussa told members of the Arab and Foreign Affairs Committee at the People's Assembly that there was sufficient reason to be optimistic about future relations with the Sudan. The results of these efforts might be apparent by the time the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) meets in Algeria in June of this year.
Finally, there seems little doubt that the ability of the Sudanese government to remain in power for 10 years and withstand internal and external strife is one of the chief factors in its success and has given pause for thought to all parties opposing it.
