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Al-Ahram Weekly 20 - 26 May 1999 Issue No. 430 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 20 - 26 May 1999 Issue No. 430
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Supplement Travel Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Barak with Sharon, or Beilin?
By Graham Usher"I respect the outcome of the Israeli elections and I hope it will move the peace process forward," said a demure Yasser Arafat on news of Ehud Barak's stunning defeat of Binyamin Netanyahu in the Israeli elections. Other Palestinian Authority officials were less restrained, reportedly hugging each other and jumping for joy when the first exit polls on 17 May flashed up a 58 per cent majority in favour of Barak (the eventual result was Barak 56 per cent, Netanyahu 44).
Given the three-year "nightmare" of Netanyahu's premiership, together with his declared intention to resign as the head of a Likud Party that has lost 13 seats in the new Knesset, the Palestinian leadership's response is both genuine and understandable. It is also shared by virtually every Arab leader in the region, though less so by their peoples. A recent poll in the Occupied Territories showed that 63 per cent of Palestinians saw "no difference" between Barak and Netanyahu.
Yet this widespread relief at seeing the end of Netanyahu is tempered by the two great unanswered questions about Israel's new political order: What will Barak's actual policies be toward the Palestinian peace process? And what will be the political composition of his coalition?
Palestinian leaders and people alike are already acutely aware of what Barak says his policies are. He again hammered them home before a packed Rabin Square on the night of his triumph. "We will move for separation from the Palestinians, in accordance with four red lines," he told his adoring supporters. "Jerusalem, united under our sovereignty for eternity. There will be no return under any circumstances to the 1967 borders. There will be no foreign army west of the Jordan River. And the majority of the settlers in Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] will be in settlement enclaves under our sovereignty."
Yet the Palestinian and other Arab leaders are also aware that there is often a discrepancy between what an Israeli leader says for public consumption and what he whispers to them across the negotiating table. They also know from bitter experiences, not only with Netanyahu but also from the "peace" governments of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, how such negotiations are constrained by the forces that make up that leader's governing coalition. And it is less to what Barak says than to the coalition he builds that most Palestinian eyes will be directed now.
Birds of a feather? Or will Barak make a genuine choice for peace? (T-D) Barak honoured by Likud premier Shamir in '91; Netanyhau grieves following this week's election photos: AP&AFP
On paper, the new Knesset gives a clear majority for parties on the centre and left of Israel's political spectrum, with the main winners being the secular centrist parties -- such as the anti-orthodox Shinui Party, which gained six seats -- and the main losers being the secular rightist and religious settlers parties -- such as Likud and the National Religious Party, which fell from nine seats in the last Knesset to five in this one.
Given this "embarrassment of riches" -- as expressed by the new Centre Party Knesset member and former Likud Finance Minister Dan Meridor -- most Israeli observers believe Barak can form two kinds of coalition. On the one hand, he could opt for a national unity government, in which Likud (minus Netanyahu) and the NRP would be invited to take part to build the widest possible consensus in readiness for the "historic decisions" Israel will have to take during the next Knesset. This would aim to marginalise less the extreme right in Israeli politics than the orthodox movements and especially Shas, which with 17 Knesset members is now the third biggest party in Israel.
For most Palestinians, including their leaders, this is the "worst case" coalition, since it would rescue Likud and the settler parties from the electoral drubbing they have just received, and signal that Barak's vision of a final settlement with the Palestinians (and perhaps even with Syria) is not substantially different to that of Netanyahu's.
The second option would be for Barak to revive Yitzhak Rabin's 1992 "peace coalition", but according to the new Knesset of May 1999. This would exclude Likud, the NRP and Benny Begin's National Union Party, but include Barak's One Israel, the leftist Meretz bloc, Yitzhak Mordechai's Centre Party, the Russian Yisrael Baaliya Party and, critically, Shas. Taken together, these would grant Barak a truly massive Knesset majority and in all likelihood consign Likud and the NRP to the political desert.
It would also command the support "from the outside" of the 10 Knesset members from the Arab parties, all of whom have made support for Barak conditional on the exclusion of Likud.
The "peace coalition" is favoured by such Labour Party "doves" as Yossi Beilin, Haim Ramon and Shlomo Ben-Ami, all of whom played a major role in Barak's election campaign, and have close relations with the PA leadership. It is also, in all probability, the preferred coalition for Yasser Arafat.
The problem is that while there is little difference between parties like the secular Meretz and the religious Shas when it comes to Oslo, there is a huge difference between them on social policy. The nine-member Meretz bloc have already ruled out being in any coalition that includes Shas, and especially its convicted leader Aryeh Deri. Nor is it clear that it will change its mind now that Deri has relinquished his parliamentary seat, possibly to enable the party to join a coalition led by Barak.
For Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, the differences between a national unity government and a centre-left coalition might seem scant indeed. But Arafat and the other Arab leaders are unlikely to be so blasé. A national unity government with Likud could drag the final status negotiations on for years, and would be unlikely to slow the settlement drive in the West Bank, let alone halt or reverse it. A centre-left coalition, on the other hand, may slow down the settlements' expansion -- if only by removing government resources from them -- and may be more generous in any final territorial dispensation with the Palestinians, though this is unlikely to cross any of Barak's red lines.
The choice then is between a bad Israeli government and a worse one, between Barak with Ariel Sharon as his foreign minister or Barak with Yossi Beilin as his foreign minister. But then, for most Palestinians, this has long been Oslo's choice.
also see Region
