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Al-Ahram Weekly 20 - 26 May 1999 Issue No. 430 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 20 - 26 May 1999 Issue No. 430
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Supplement Travel Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters A strategic decision
By Mohamed El-Sayed Said *Politics are periodically marked by revolts against the "establishment". Monday's elections in Israel seemed to be an example of the opposite: the establishment turning on the ultra-right-wing coalition led by the particularly foolish Binyamin Netanyahu.
Barak's victory reflects not so much his personal charisma -- Barak's personality is no match, in purely electoral terms, to Netanyahu's -- or Labour's popularity as it does the establishment's rejection of Netanyahu. Barak's lack of communication and political skills will continue to haunt his career as Israel's top dog. The Labour Party, on the other hand, underwent a crisis of identity after its defeat in 1996. Its strong showing in these most recent elections is almost puzzling when contrasted with its internal fragmentation and the alienation of a large sector of its loyal rank and file until a few weeks before the vote.
The results reflect the influence of some new and important trends in Israeli politics. First and most important is the growing fear among secular social forces of the aggressive approach pursued by religious fundamentalism. The Russian vote's rapid shift away from Netanyahu and towards Barak is at least partially explained by this factor. The results also show the increasing feeling of uneasiness toward the erosion of Ashkenazi influence in Israeli society and politics. The prevalent feeling is that the state has moved a long way toward accommodating Sephardim demands for equality, at the risk of undermining the identity of the state as a bastion of "Western civilisation". The resurgence of Ashkenazi power as manifested in this election may explain the change in voting patterns among traditionally right-wing Israeli political families, which fear they may lose the battle over the identity of the (racial) state.
The results also show the shift in the mood of private business interests in Israel, which have voted to the right for the past 20-odd years. While it is still premature to draw definite conclusions, it seems that the business community in Israel is coming to grips with the lessons learned by others in light of the Asian financial crisis with regard to the state's role in the economy.
All these factors contributed to the downfall of Mr Netanyahu and his fanatical government. None, however, seem to have acted independently from the central role of the (security) establishment. In other words, the establishment used all these factors in order to break the ultra-right's stranglehold on power.
I believe that several crucial factors, embedded in the very foundations of the Israeli state, were at the root of the strong role played by the security establishment in dislodging Netanyahu from power.
One particularly important factor is the way in which the Israeli state has become constant fodder for scandal in world politics. Since coming to power in 1996, Netanyahu exempted himself from the implementation of Israel's diplomatic and political commitments under Oslo, arguing that these were the commitments of the previous government. This interesting interpretation of international law, whereby a government can renege on international treaties ratified by its predecessor, drastically undermined the credibility of the Israeli state as a whole. Netanyahu went further, refusing to implement even those agreements, such as the Wye Memorandum, which he himself had signed. The simple conclusion is that Israel cannot be trusted. This understanding formed an important impetus for decisive action on the part of the establishment as the guardian of the state and its international standing.
More broadly, it was evident to the military and intelligence establishment that Netanyahu's government and, indeed, the right-wing political coalition that brought it to power, has no understanding whatever of the importance of such international standing for the survival and evolution of the "Israeli state". It may be true that contempt for the international community is embedded in Israeli traditions. Netanyahu's government, however, has transgressed all limits, simply by stating explicitly that it could impose its will on the international community.
The price of this arrogant disregard for the foundations of diplomacy could already be assessed from the reactions of the European Union, including some of Israel's most faithful friends, during the past two years. The Berlin Declaration, which suggested that the EU would recognise a Palestinian state, even if unilaterally declared, was for Israel a diplomatic disaster felt so intensely that the strategic elite was forced to act, swiftly and decisively.
The increasing rift between Israel and the US administration was another important factor in the security establishment's decision to oust Netanyahu's coalition. Many observers underestimate the weight of this factor, given the incredible influence of Israel and the Jewish lobby inside the US. Crucial new features in the Israeli-American alliance, however, may have alarmed Israel's strategic elite. Among these is the increasing frustration among important sectors of the American political elite at Israel's lack of respect for America's global interests. The Jewish lobby in the US also seemed alarmed by the growing dissatisfaction with Israeli policies inside the US. In fact, Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in the last three years were conducted largely as bargains to be struck between liberal-minded American Jews and Netanyahu's fanatics. Israel's strategic elite was forced to conclude that the latter were not only damaging American-Israeli relations, but also relations with America's Jews. Fortunately for the Israeli establishment, the domestic performance of Netanyahu's fanatical coalition was unable to compensate for its disastrous foreign policy record.
This election can be seen, in effect, as a decisive battle over the future of the state, if one assumes, as I have, that the establishment was prompted to act by a strategic vision rather than by ad hoc opposition to the amateurish and damaging methods used by the fanatic fringe in Israeli political life. In this vision, peace is seen as a strategic interest. There is also some awareness that Israel may not be in a better regional and international position in the future. The problem can then be defined as one of how to make peace with the Palestinians without giving up certain conditions that have been elevated to absolute beliefs: Jerusalem, secure borders and settlements -- the very points spelled out in Barak's campaign.
Some analysts believe that, having been so thoroughly frustrated by Netanyahu, the Palestinians and the other Arabs have no option but to show greater flexibility. The Arabs, it is believed, will be willing to compromise if they are given considerably more than what Netanyahu was willing to give but significantly less than what they have always demanded.
It is more likely that Barak's government will engage in a series of goodwill measures in fields that matter very little to it, such as the issue of statehood. In this way, it can put the Palestinians on the defensive internationally on issues that are crucial to its local standing such as Jerusalem, settlements and security on the so-called green line.
Another possible exit from the stalemate lies in the further postponement of certain issues so that agreements are signed and negotiations are prevented from collapsing, but no final settlement is ever reached. In this way, it is believed, the Palestinians can be tamed.
*The writer is deputy director of the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
