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Al-Ahram Weekly 27 May - 2 June 1999 Issue No. 431 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 27 May - 2 June 1999 Issue No. 431
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Living Features Travel Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters NATO's bill of rights
By Karim El-GawharyJust in time for NATO's 50th birthday, heads of the Alliance states signed the most offensive strategic document in the organisation's history. Known as the "New Strategic Concept" and released on 24 April, the text reads as a licence for world-wide interventionism. Brussels' strategists have discovered new risks to "Euro-Atlantic peace and stability", many of which have nothing to do with the traditional sphere of action of the Western military pact.
Seen from the perspective of the Alliance's periphery -- for example, from the viewpoint of the Arab world -- the document reads like a recipe for nightmare. The southeastern flank of NATO is being indirectly drawn into NATO's zone of influence for, as the paper itself puts it, the security of Europe is "closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean".
That this is not only a theoretical link, but one which in the long-run will very likely have military consequences, can be seen from the various crisis scenarios that are laid out. The new risk criteria that are relevant to the region are numerous, and can be manipulated at any time to suit the West's needs. "Some countries in and around the Euro-Atlantic area face serious economic, social and political difficulties, ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights and the dissolution of states", warns the paper. Which just about covers most eventualities.
Under the chapter heading "Guidelines for the Alliance forces", the document unveils the mechanism through which future crises on the periphery will be dealt with -- the so-called "crisis response operations". This is simply a new formula to refer to out-of-area operations. The document states quite openly that "the Alliance's military forces will reflect its commitment to collective defence and to conduct crisis response operations sometimes at short notice, distant from the home stations, including beyond the Allies' territory." Thus is a rapid deployment force à la Ronald Reagan born.
Various scenarios for "crises" that would need such a "response" are mentioned, among them "acts of terrorism" or the "disruption of the flow of vital resources". The authors also make much of their concern at the spread of NBC weapons on the Alliance's periphery.
Nothing new, some might say. All this sounds quite familiar. Similar arguments were often used in the past to justify US military interventions in the region. After all, Libya, Sudan and Afghanistan were bombed in the name of Washington's counter-terrorism policy, Iraq in the name of disarmament, while fear of the disruption of vital oil supplies is the main reason for the presence of at least 20,000 US military personnel in the Gulf.
But that, in a sense, is exactly what is so new and so radical about the document. It might have been designed by Washington, but it is signed by all the 18 other NATO member states. As a result, future operations against, for example, Iraq -- or, for that matter, any other defiant state on the Euro-Atlantic periphery -- can now be performed in the name of NATO, and employ the forces and personnel of other NATO states. The Pentagon is no longer alone. Now, it is NATO headquarters in Brussels that will give the order to attack.
Doubtless this is something Washington has been dreaming about ever since the glorious days of the Gulf War, when they managed to assemble such a formidable alliance against Saddam Hussein -- an achievement which they have since singularly failed to repeat. The best example of this failure is the latest war of attrition to impose no-fly-zones over Iraq, when the US and British air forces were effectively left to do the job by themselves.
The new NATO doctrine, however, will make the formation of a broad interventionist pact much easier in the future. Washington can use the new "concept" to demand compliance from other NATO members, if need be. In this light, the most astonishing fact is that all the NATO member states agreed to sign a document that is likely to impose such uncomfortable obligations on them. That they did so can only be understood against the background of the present war in Yugoslavia. Indeed, it is probably safe to say that a tract that is, in every sense, so offensive, would never have been signed in any other circumstances. Of course, one day the war in Kosovo will come to an end. But the new strategic concept will still be valid. As the document states in its conclusion, "in an uncertain world the need for effective defence remains".
What matters, though, is the kind of defence NATO intends to mount: the defence of its territory, or of its interests. Previously, the former conception had always prevailed. But the new strategic concept is definitely geared towards the latter.
It is interesting to note that the UN Security Council, as an instrument to keep the international peace, is only mentioned in the new NATO document for appearances' sake. The spirit of the new doctrine really leaves no space for such external hindrance. In doing so, it only serves to confirm the fears that have emerged with the war against Yugoslavia -- namely, that NATO will in the future increasingly take matters into its own hands, consulting the Security Council only as and when it deems it may be beneficial. Thus, the new strategic concept effectively enshrines the right of the powerful to interpret international law to suit their interests.
The prominent Egyptian analyst Mohamed Sid-Ahmed has summed up the spirit of the new doctrine in a single phrase: "In future, Kosovo will not be the exception to the rule, but rather the rule itself."
