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Al-Ahram Weekly 27 May - 2 June 1999 Issue No. 431 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 27 May - 2 June 1999 Issue No. 431
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Living Features Travel Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Mistakes and miscalculations
By Hassan Nafaa *With every new day, the situation in the former Yugoslavia takes on more complex dimensions. New players are lured into the arena, driven by a myriad of motives: to achieve some goal, deter some evil, plot some conspiracy or settle old scores. Confusion seems to prevail: perceptions of gains and losses, clear at the outset, are growing blurred.
In its decision to strike Yugoslavia, the US's calculations and assumptions were overwhelmingly inaccurate, and perhaps completely wrong. To a great extent, its faulty calculations have been at the root of the crisis in the Balkans and the threat posed to peace and stability in Europe and the world at large. The US took the decision to launch military operations against Belgrade upon the following assumptions. First, it believed that a decisive victory was possible without engaging ground troops. While NATO's military and technological superiority is certain, and such superiority allows it to strike at its targets without suffering grave losses. But NATO's members do not see eye to eye. How could the US be sure that they would remain united until Milosevic gave in? Nor does NATO have unlimited resources to support a protracted air campaign.
On the other hand, NATO's calculations regarding Milosevic's reaction and his ability to manoeuvre were at best grossly inaccurate. The Western allies believed that as soon as the military strikes began, he would collapse. But Milosevic proved quite a different kettle of fish. NATO aircraft screeching across the skies of Belgrade never prompted him to withdraw from Kosovo. Almost 50 days after the beginning of military operations, he shows no sign of giving in, or even of noticing that anything is amiss. In fact, he seems more in control of domestic affairs than ever; Serbs in Yugoslavia and abroad seem to back him more firmly today than they did before the strikes began.
The US also appears surprised, or at least taken aback, by the huge numbers of refugees coming out of Kosovo. They are proving an unmanageable burden upon neighbouring countries and, above all, are providing Milosevic with a perfect alibi. He is now claiming that NATO strikes, and not the brutality of Serb forces, have forced the Kosovars from their homes. The US administration can easily defeat that argument, but it cannot prove that military operations, and particularly air strikes alone, were the most effective means of addressing the crisis in Kosovo. The US has endeavoured to prove that ethnic cleansing and mass evictions had been going on for some time, but Milosevic has succeeded in placing it on the defensive. According to several analysts, the decision to initiate military action provided Milosevic with the pretext he needed to execute his plans. This, to conspiracy theorists at least, means that US and Serb policies are equally responsible for the tragedy, even though their motives and methods differ vastly.
Further, despite NATO's overwhelming military and technological superiority, its performance has not been without errors, a fact that Milosevic and all those opposed to a military operation without international consensus can exploit to their advantage. Yugoslav forces have succeeded in bringing down a number of NATO aircraft; most importantly, however, the much-vaunted sophistication of US technology has been put to a severe test, and has not passed with flying colours. NATO missiles and bombs have killed and injured hundreds of civilians, including scores of refugees. The Chinese embassy was hit by mistake, and several Chinese diplomats were killed.
The US's second assumption has been that neutralising Russia was possible. Before launching its attack, NATO was well aware that Russia, which maintains strong religious and cultural ties with the Serbs, would oppose the strike. NATO, however, gambled on Russia's political frailty and the political and economic quagmire to guarantee its neutralisation and submission to Western policies in the Balkans. These calculations were based on half-truths, although Russia did indeed abstain from entering the war, having neither the political will nor the economic force to challenge the West, which alone is capable of buttressing the Russian economy and providing political stamina to its ruling elite. NATO calculated that Russian reaction would never exceed a statement of opposition, which could in fact serve the alliance's purposes, particularly if matters got out of hand.
Yet NATO seems to have miscalculated the Russian people's condemnation of the strike and the possible repercussions of such opposition. Faced with a ground swell of anger, Russian decision-makers opted for a compromise by offering unofficial assistance. Among other moves, it made it possible for volunteers to fight alongside the Serbian forces. Russian assistance to Serbia must have been sufficient to prevent the deterioration of relations with Serbian while maintaining Russian influence in the Balkans.
NATO, however, made another miscalculation with regard to the repercussions of its military operations on the political crisis which has been raging in Russia for some time. Yeltsin found himself squeezed between NATO's demands and his domestic political opposition, which is playing up the crisis to reveal the weakness and incompetence of the regime and its subordination to the West. Against such a backdrop, Yeltsin appointed his former prime minister and old friend, Viktor Chernomyrdin as his special envoy to the Balkans, to perform a task which should have been given to the foreign minister or the premier. The appointment underlined the growing distrust between Yeltsin and Primakov and marked the beginning of the end for the prime minister.
The political crisis in Russia has its own dynamic, quite separate from the crisis in Kosovo. The situation, however, complicates matters in the Balkans further, and opens the door to further repercussions, which could be difficult to control. At any rate, the dissolution of parliament and a call for new elections seem imminent. Russia is destined to enter a period of instability which will directly reflect on the crisis in Kosovo. Either the instability will compromise Russia's diplomatic role, which may be urgently needed if an acceptable solution is to be reached, or it will turn the crisis into a forum for competition among parties struggling for power in Russia. Either option will certainly complicate the situation further.
The third assumption was that NATO's management of the crisis is the best available option. This assumption was based on the belief that world public opinion could be persuaded that NATO was right to act on its own. Yet the bevy of justifications given by NATO was not enough to dispel the doubts surrounding its objectives (which do not be necessity coincide with those of the international community). The validity of this assumption is still being tested, and its accuracy will be determined largely by NATO's ability to bring a decisive end to the crisis, enable the refugees to return to their homes, and secure their right to self-rule.
At this point, however, there is little room for optimism. NATO is demanding that Milosevic surrender unconditionally, but is not prepared to make the sacrifices needed for a decisive victory by involving ground troops, an option which, military observers contend, could ensure military success and possibly make space for a more effective Russian role than that afforded within the Security Council. In this context, there is a pressing need for a Russian role to broker an agreement not based on NATO's terms of unconditional surrender.
NATO today finds itself forced to pay an increasingly high political price for its "technical" mishaps and "unintentional" errors. The scores of civilians it has killed have forever shaken the belief, widely diffused by the media, in the absolute technological and scientific superiority of the Western war machine, believed capable of extracting any thorn in the side of the international community with no adverse side effects. It is a technical error, after all, that has brought a major new player into the arena. China, which condemned NATO's unilateral decision to use force against Belgrade from the start, initially only wished to make its stance known. Gradually, however, it began to feel that it was the only permanent Security Council member being excluded from negotiations for a solution to the crisis. The permanent Western members all belong to NATO, which sees Russia as most capable of brokering an acceptable agreement. Feeling bitter and isolated, China lashed out in protest against the bombing of its embassy in Belgrade and ignored the apologies reiterated by US officials at all levels. The president refused to answer President Clinton's request that he be permitted to explain the conditions in which the error occurred and to promise that the offenders would be duly punished. The Chinese masses took to the streets in demonstrations against US arrogance. Chinese communities all over the world came out in a show of solidarity, driving home the message that China is not to be slighted.
China's forceful entry into the conflict will certainly bring the entire issue to the United Nations sooner or later -- the very development NATO has been trying to avoid. Can we say that NATO is heading towards defeat? It may still be too early to know, although there are many signs that victory is not at hand in the current circumstances, that reaching a political solution without a role for Russia and possibly for China is inconceivable, and that any compromise settlement will be paid for by the Kosovars. If peaceful initiatives fail, and ground troops are introduced into the battle, NATO's ability to accommodate the repercussions depends on its ability to bring a decisive end to the military situation. If, on the other hand, military operations drag on, matters could get dangerously out of hand.
It seems clear that, despite all its defects and shortcomings, the UN remains the only framework for addressing international crises. Side-stepping ignoring it may weaken the UN or even lead to its death; but could another international system manage international affairs any better?
*The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.
