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Al-Ahram Weekly 3 - 9 June 1999 Issue No. 432 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 3 - 9 June 1999 Issue No. 432
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Interview Travel Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters A step for a step
By Ibrahim Nafie
Henry Siegman is a senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations. His article on the prospects of an Arab-Israeli peace, republished here, is highly thought-provoking. One fears very much that his prognosis will fulfil itself in the near future, as, in essence, it is a reformulation of previous views, which does not draw much from lessons learned in the recent past -- both the arduous period of progress in the peace process (1991-1996) and the subsequent period of Likud power.
With regard to the latter period, we can only agree with Siegman that Netanyahu's three years as prime minister of Israel saw the "haemorrhaging" of the peace process and of Israel's relations with the US (to which we add its relations with the Arab world and Europe). It is also true that Israel, during this period, suffered severe economic decline and an exacerbation of internal ethnic and religious conflict.
I cannot agree, however, with the thrust of Siegman's subsequent analysis. He says Barak's victory has given rise to high hopes for the peace process. Yet he also admits that Barak's views are not substantially different from those of Netanyahu, although, unlike Netanyahu, Barak intends "to keep his word". What really distinguishes Barak's and Netanyahu's views, he continues, is that while the latter sees the peace process as a "zero-sum game for Israel", Barak, like Yitzhak Rabin, sees it as a profitable enterprise, vital to Israeli security. Siegman, however, also recognises that there are still enormous gaps in the positions of both sides. If we are to avoid the dangers of a deadlock in negotiations soon after they begin, he believes, the Arab world should take the initiative of creating a number of "preconditions" for an eventual agreement. Towards this end, he argues, the Arabs should demonstrate that they welcome the Israeli people's choice of a government committed to peace. Among the symbolic gestures Siegman suggests the Arabs could make towards this end is a visit by President Mubarak to Israel.
It would appear that Siegman has put the cart before the horse. It would seem more fitting that an expert in foreign relations, who readily admits that the Israeli leadership was responsible for bleeding the peace process dry, should suggest that Israel take the initiative in generating the necessary "preconditions". The steps the Israelis should take towards this end would entail compensating the Palestinians for the hardship they endured under the previous Israeli government. For instance, they could start by implementing the Wye Memorandum immediately, but they could also reaffirm Israel's commitment to the principle of land for peace.
In other words, the Arabs should not be expected to go it alone and create the "preconditions" necessary for the eventual success of the negotiations. Rather, this task falls first and foremost upon Israel, whose prime minister-elect has disappointed everyone by announcing his rejection of items previously included in the final-status negotiations. This responsibility should also fall upon the US, and particularly moderate American Jews (like Mr Siegman himself), who have been outspoken in their criticism of Netanyahu's destructive policies over the past three years. Certainly, once these parties assume their responsibility for generating a climate conducive to serious and just negotiations, they will find attentive ears in Cairo, which has been at the forefront of the peace process for 25 years. The idea that one side alone, especially the side that has had to bear the brunt of Israeli policies, should be expected to "reward" Israel for its change of government is not only a misreading but a completely inverted interpretation of the situation.
Egypt has always insisted on providing all the "preconditions" for successful negotiations, when negotiations were actually in progress and the peace process was properly on course. Egyptian-Israeli relations have not been "cold", as many Israeli and American sources have claimed. On the contrary, they grew gradually warmer with each successive step forward in the peace process, from the Gaza-Jericho agreement to the signing of the interim agreement calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces, and the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty.
Egypt's non-petroleum trade with Israel has increased eight-fold since the peace process began. Egyptian and Israeli businessmen have begun plans for a number of joint ventures. Indeed, some of these projects, such as the natural gas project, are massive, while others, such as those in agriculture and the manufacture of clothing, have actually begun operations. In addition, the level of official and unofficial visits between the two countries has risen, as has the volume of tourism.
Moreover, shortly after Netanyahu himself came to power, in autumn 1996, President Mubarak was ready to offer him the opportunity to hold the economic summit in Egypt, which had just hosted the peacemakers' conference -- attended by 14 Arab nations, Israel and 15 other nations -- in Sharm Al-Sheikh the previous spring.
Siegman places interesting emphasis on a visit by President Mubarak to Israel. His argument that Mubarak has refused to meet with Israeli leaders in Israel in the past and that this has fed the arguments of Israeli hard-liners is spurious. President Mubarak has never objected in principle to visiting Israel. Indeed, the Egyptian president had agreed to meet then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in Bir Sab', and would have done so had it not been for Rabin's death.
Whether Mubarak actually visits Israel or not is irrelevant. The crux of the issue is what Israel can do to restore the confidence of Arab public opinion in its commitment to the peace process. Toward this end, Israel should immediately implement the articles of the agreements that have already been signed. It should also enter into serious and equitable negotiations with the Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese parties on the bases that have been agreed upon. When it does so, Cairo will respond. As it has always done, it will furnish all the necessary conditions for successful negotiations to reach their logical, ultimate aim: a just and comprehensive peace on all fronts.
In all events, Cairo will have to wait and see what the process of forming the new Israeli government will bring. If it appears that the new government intends to follow Rabin's course and begins to implement the Wye Memorandum, if it acts to guarantee the safety of the Palestinians and if it reopens negotiations with Syria and Lebanon, Cairo will match every positive Israeli step. A presidential visit to Israel will not be a problem, since it will come naturally as part of the improved climate of peace in the region as a whole.
