 |
Al-Ahram Weekly 3 - 9 June 1999 Issue No. 432 
|
||
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
|
Al-Ahram Weekly 3 - 9 June 1999 Issue No. 432
|
||
| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Interview Travel Sports People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Good will measures
By Henry SiegmanThe most important consequence of Ehud Barak's victory in Israel is the elimination of the "clear and present danger" to the country -- to its security and domestic cohesion -- posed by the possibility of the return of Binyamin Netanyahu.
Netanyahu's three years as prime minister of Israel saw a dramatic haemorrhaging of Israel's national assets in every area of its life. The damage ranged from an unimaginable deterioration of Israel's relations with the United States, to a decline in the country's economy, to an exacerbation of internal ethnic and religious conflict, and to universal despair over the possibility of an Arab-Israel peace.
Having said that, it would be unrealistic to expect that Netanyahu's defeat will quickly resolve the many problems his administration created. Expectations in Israel, among Palestinians and in the Arab world, as well as in the international community, that Ehud Barak will bring the peace process to a quick resolution are bound to be disappointed, and the consequences of that disappointment could be grave indeed.
While Ehud Barak, unlike Netanyahu, has not foreclosed a Palestinian state -- indeed, he accepts its inevitability -- his vision of that state's geographic dimensions was never much more generous than Netanyahu's. When asked about this in the past, he always responded that the difference between him and Netanyahu is not the map, but that unlike Netanyahu, he intends to keep his word.
What really distinguishes Barak from Netanyahu is that the latter sees the peace process as a zero-sum game for Israel, while Barak, like Yitzhak Rabin, understands that satisfying Palestinian aspirations for national dignity and independence is a vital element in Israel's security, not a one-sided gift that damages Israel's interests.
It is for this reason that Barak will quickly implement Israel's obligations under the Wye Agreement, and then enter promptly into serious final-status talks with the Palestinians. But the more quickly Israelis and the Palestinians engage over the final-status issues, the more quickly it will become evident that the gaps in their current positions are not easily bridgeable. The disappointment, if not disillusionment, that will be created by this realisation will hold a very special danger. If the parties are to be able to work their way out of that danger and avoid deadlock, they must create the preconditions for an eventual agreement even before formal negotiations begin.
For the Palestinians, and even more importantly for Israel's Arab neighbours, including the Gulf countries, this entails an immediate and ungrudging public acknowledgement that the Arab world welcomes Israel's choice of a government committed to peace, and that this decision has consequences for the Arab world. Of course, significant substantive change will have to await an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, and even an Israeli-Syrian agreement. But important symbolic change must occur immediately. An example would be a visit by Egypt's Hosni Mubarak to Israel to meet with Ehud Barak, something he refused to do with his predecessors, whom he met with only in Egypt. Other measures, involving other Arab countries as well, will surely come to mind. What is essential is to give the lie to the argument of Israeli extremists that Arab countries will not change their hostile attitude towards Israel no matter what government is elected.
Similarly, on Israel's side, it is critical for Barak to reinforce immediately the principle that a viable Palestinian state, one that has a chance to succeed economically and politically, is a vital Israeli interest, for the instability of a Palestinian state that lacks such viability could only pose a threat to the security of the Jewish state. If this is truly Barak's conviction, then his map of an eventual Palestinian state will inevitably expand in the course of good faith negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, for his current map, like Netanyahu's, is a non-starter. But nothing less than such mutual confidence-building is essential to overcome the initial difficulties that are bound to emerge in the final-status negotiations and to prevent them from deteriorating into deadlock, or even despair.
It should therefore be the very first priority of the US administration to encourage these bilateral measures as soon as the new Israeli government is formed, if not sooner. Such encouragement would be fully consistent with President Clinton's and Secretary of State Albright's earlier insistence that if the Oslo process is to be revived, the parties must agree to the broad goals that the process will lead to. It was always understood by everyone that for Israel the goal is security and normalisation in the region. It is now time for both Israel and the US to confirm that for Palestinians it is viable statehood.
