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Al-Ahram Weekly 17 - 23 June 1999 Issue No. 434 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 17 - 23 June 1999 Issue No. 434
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Commentary:
Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Features Living Travel Sports Time Out Chronicles People Cartoons Letters Mahdi's choice
By Mahgoub Othman *Last week, members of the Sudanese opposition -- the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) -- opened a critical meeting in the Eritrean capital, Asmara. The first item on the agenda was a briefing by former Sudanese prime minister and Ummah Party leader, Sadeq Al-Mahdi, on the reported agreement he reached with Sudanese parliament speaker, Hassan Al-Turabi in Geneva at the beginning of last month.
Mahdi was expected to explain to the different political and military factions within the NDA his view on how reconciliation with the present government in Khartoum could be reached. They were expected to decide whether to accept or reject Mahdi's solution in light of their understanding of the present situation in Sudan and the agreements previously made between the NDA members. The Asmara meeting is critical for it will determine whether members of the NDA will continue to be a united group or will decide to go their separate ways. A failure to agree might lead to a split in Mahdi's own Ummah faction and leave him without allies.
The NDA comprises political parties from both north and south. Of the southern group the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) led by John Garang is the best known. The NDA also includes representatives of trade unions dissolved by President Omar Al-Bashir shortly after he took power in a military coup in 1989, former army commanders, the Democratic Alliance which is a military faction, the Beja Tribes Union, the Darfur Citizens Union and a number of independent figures. Statements made by leaders of the different NDA factions regarding their reaction to the meeting between Mahdi and Turabi do not reflect any overall support for Mahdi's position. On the contrary, some leading Sudanese opposition figures have openly criticised any move towards reconciliation with the government, while others have emphasised the importance of maintaining the unity of the opposition factions.
Mahdi described his meeting with his brother-in-law, Turabi, as "an opening of a political dialogue which would lead to a political agreement." As a result, he is expected to ask other NDA members to agree on a mechanism which would allow him to continue with the dialogue.
Sudanese opposition parties are not against a peaceful settlement. In spite of its earlier decision to use force against the Khartoum government the NDA has detailed in many of its declarations the principles that could lead to a peaceful settlement. What the NDA is unwilling to accept is a reconciliation on the lines of "let us all forget about what has happened in the past." This would require the opposition groups to forget the unjust suppression of democracy and ignore some of the worst crimes committed against the people both inside and outside Sudan. They assert that such an approach far from ending the crisis in the Sudan will aggravate it.
All NDA documents, and particularly the 1995 Asmara Declaration, clearly state a commitment by the parties involved to liquidating the current regime in Khartoum and holding its leaders responsible for their actions. This is the most important point of departure between Mahdi's view and that of his opponents inside the NDA's leadership. For many, accepting reconciliation with the regime means recognising it and sharing power with it. This is seen to be a temporary expedient but cannot be regarded as a permanent solution to problems that have plagued Sudan for the past four decades.
Why is such a power-sharing arrangement unacceptable? First, this would mean tolerating the supporters of religious fanaticism such as Turabi's National Islamic Front or the Bashir-led Salvation Front. Accepting reconciliation with such groups would imply that some parties shared their views on using religion for political purposes.
Second, such a reconciliation would affirm the supremacy of the north -- in a national and religious sense -- over the whole of the Sudan. The whole question of regional supremacy is at the core of the ongoing problem and explains why the south rebelled against Khartoum. An alliance with the present regime will strengthen calls for creating a separate state in the south or granting it autonomous status within Sudan.
Third, any opposition faction, regardless of its popularity, that decides to ally itself with Khartoum will be accepting a client status. The ruling regime is undoubtedly the strongest party in the Sudan having spent its 10 years in power exploiting all means at its disposal -- including much of the national wealth -- to shore up its regime. In recent years the traditional Sudanese capitalist class has disappeared and been replaced by parasitic capitalists loyal to the regime. The army and the police have been co-opted by the regime to be its own private militia. Paramilitary organisations have been set up to assure the regime of the loyalty of its citizens.
Such facts make any alliance with the regime an act of political suicide. If the Ummah Party continues to be part of the NDA and its leaders agree to pay the price for confrontation with the regime, that will strengthen the solidarity of the Sudanese opposition and support its goals. However, if the Ummah leaders choose the alternative -- compromise with the present regime -- they will split the opposition and in so doing help Turabi achieve, at least temporarily, his goal.
* The writer is a Sudanese journalist and former minister of national guidance.
