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Al-Ahram Weekly 1 - 7 July 1999 Issue No. 436 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 1 - 7 July 1999 Issue No. 436
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Features Special Interview Travel Living Sports Time Out Chronicles People Cartoons Letters On Egyptian-American relations
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
If the curve of Egyptian-American relations could be drawn, using past developments as indicators for the future course of the relationship, would it be possible to optimise opportunities? Relations between the two countries were probably at their best in the aftermath of the Madrid 1992 conference, more precisely, after Itzhak Rabin came to power in Israel following the Labour Party's victory in the Knesset elections that year. Cairo, Washington and Tel Aviv were then working together to reach a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East.
It appeared at the time that Sadat had been right to sign the Camp David Accords. The other Arab parties had no choice but to follow in his footsteps and admit that peace had become their 'strategic objective', an admission the Arab states were later to endorse nearly unanimously.
Paradoxically, the Arab bid for overall peace with Israel was concomitant with the worst war ever to break out between two neighbouring Arab states. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1991, signaled to the Arab leaders that one of their own could represent a more immediate threat to their interests than the Zionist state. Sensing this shift in Arab perceptions, the US administration was swift to draw the hitherto reluctant Arab Gulf states into the Madrid process on the grounds that 'neutralising' the Zionist threat through peace talks would allow the oil rich Gulf states to devote all their resources to toppling Saddam Hussein.
The main thrust at the time was to win over the Arab states to the Madrid peace process, thereby crossing a major hurdle on the road to peace on which Egypt had been the first Arab party to embark. No longer ostracised by the other Arabs for the Camp David episode, and with its line apparently vindicated, Egypt was welcomed back into the Arab fold. For Israel, Egypt's rehabilitation was a sign that its dream of achieving normal relations with its environment was no longer out of reach. Both Egypt and Israel thus cooperated in implementing US strategic objectives towards the Middle East.
However, the new relationship between the two countries as partners complementing each other in serving US goals in the region did not last long. Like it or not, Sadat's signing of the Camp David Accords put him on a collision course with the requirements of Arab solidarity. True, Egypt's conduct did not contradict the approach to the peace process endorsed by the Madrid conference which made it possible for the various Arab parties to negotiate with Israel irrespective of their Arab solidarity engagements. It was, of course, in Israel's interest to deal with every Arab party separately as it had previously done with Egypt. It is also possible that certain Arab parties may have believed that negotiating separately with Israel would be more advantageous to them than engaging in collective negotiations.
What is certain is that the net result of the Madrid approach was to bring about further disarray in the Arab ranks. Where once the sharpest polarisation in the region was between Israel on the one side and the Arab parties on the other, now the most acute contradictions were those dividing the Arabs themselves. This 'transfer' of the most acute contradictions into Arab ranks gradually became a source of friction, not only between Cairo and Tel Aviv, but also between Cairo and Washington. A main target for Washington in brokering the Middle East peace process in the first place was to improve Israel's relations with its Arab neighbours. It cared little how this would impact on inter-Arab solidarity. Indeed, it may even have seen in inter-Arab friction a factor that could contribute to making the peace process with Israel irreversible.
The gradual transformation of the peace process into a source of friction between the Arab states goes against Egypt's strategic world view of where its interests lie, and has affected its relations with Israel and even with the United States. The question is whether it has also affected Egypt's position on the peace process itself, rather, the rank of the peace process in Egypt's list of priorities. For instance, does it still rank higher than the need to heal the rift in Arab ranks? Under Sadat, the requirements of peace with Israel took precedence over considerations of Arab solidarity. Is this still true?
The question should be placed in the broader context of global and regional developments. Egypt is less concerned today with the past history of the Arab-Israeli conflict than it is with its future -- particularly with the extent to which Israel continues, even in a context of peace, to pose a threat to Egypt's national security.
Israel considers that its survival entails maintaining an edge over all the Arab countries combined, not only in terms of military might, but also in terms of economic power. In this, it has been unreservedly supported by successive American administrations. The need to sustain Israel's superiority over its Arab environment has remained constant for Washington despite the peace process. Which is why it continues to uphold Israel's monopoly of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, a monopoly that is unacceptable for Egypt in the long term. On the economic front, Israel's GNP is now equivalent to 40 per cent of the GNP of all the Arab countries combined, including the oil-rich states. Israel is planning to raise the ratio to 80 per cent over the coming decade, thus paving the way for overwhelming economic superiority over the whole Arab world.
Egypt's population is soon expected to reach 70 million. The Nile Valley can barely accommodate, let alone feed, such large numbers, and the future health of the Egyptian body politic depends on the expatriation of substantial Egyptian communities into the Arab countries. For these communities to be treated with the honour and dignity they deserve, Egypt must prove its ability to uphold Arab interests vis-à-vis all possible encroachments from whatever quarter and particularly from Israel. This will not be achieved if Israel, not Egypt, is the regional power capable of shaping the course of events in the Middle East.
The real test of American-Egyptian friendship is whether the US administration is capable of adopting an even-handed policy towards the two key states in the Middle East. President Mubarak's current visit to Washington can be an opportunity to dissipate the misunderstandings which have recently soured US-Egyptian relations and been responsible for delaying this important visit several times. It should also be remembered that this is the first visit by the Egyptian president after the US has begun scaling down its economic assistance to Egypt. I mention this fact not because I am opposed in principle to the reduction of American aid, but to draw attention to the sensitive climate in which Egyptian-American talks are taking place. Nor are matters helped by what has become a virtual smear campaign against Egypt by a number of prominent congressmen, who have taken it upon themselves to denounce Egypt's human rights record, accuse it of violating democratic freedoms, and, in general, meddle in Egypt's internal affairs to such an extent that they are coming forward with suggestions that the persecution of Copts must cease and they should be guaranteed a certain percentage of government posts and parliamentary seats.
A US opening on both Israel and Egypt presupposes a Middle Eastern frame of reference that cannot, as far as Egypt is concerned, be limited only to the normalisation of relations between Israel and the various Arab countries. For Egyptians, the notion of Middle Easternism extends also to nations as deep-rooted in the region as Iran, Turkey and even Ethiopia, source of most of the Nile waters, Egypt's lifeblood. The US cannot consolidate its relations with Egypt if these fundamental tenets are not taken into account.
