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Al-Ahram Weekly 1 - 7 July 1999 Issue No. 436 |
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Features Special Interview Travel Living Sports Time Out Chronicles People Cartoons Letters New elements in the Kashmir crisis
By Gamil Mattar *
Kashmir is no doubt one of the most beautiful lands I have visited. Its gorgeous landscape and splendid snow-clad mountains have rendered it a perennial paradise: there, one can find the mountains and valleys of the Tyrol, but also Vermont in autumn, the southern provinces of Canada, and the rugged landscape of Scotland. But the British, forced out of paradise after long decades of occupation, decided to give their successors no chance to enjoy the pristine beauty of the country. Instead, as was their custom, they sowed the seeds of factionalism and left behind a legacy of ethnic violence and civil war. The British divided Kashmir into two unequal parts, and laid the grounds for countless problems, the most recent and important of which is the nuclear race between India and Pakistan.
Kashmir's geographical situation is the source of its problems. It is flanked by the plains of Sind, Bengal, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh on one side and the Himalayas and the Tibetan Plateau on the other. Kashmir borders or nearly borders on three states, two of which combined are home to nearly 30 per cent of the global population. The third is the gateway to northern and central Asia, with a wide variety of resources, religions, ethnic groups and other surprises.
The three states converging upon Kashmir have nothing in common. China applies communist policies with a capitalist heart, but not all its policies are strictly communist, nor is its economy in all respects capitalist. India is a parliamentary democracy characterised by a multi-party system, political pluralism and a mosaic of religions and languages. While China is distinguished by its traditional, ethnic and national identity, India is split into numerous identities and allegiances, and divided along regional, factional and caste lines.
Since its establishment, Pakistan has been singled out as a state in search of an identity. A well known Pakistani analyst wrote recently that, after fifty years of independence, his country is still seeking an identity. Who are we as a nation? he asked. Are we Pakistanis first, and Punjabis, Sindis, Baluchis, Pathalis second? Or is it the other way around? Are we part of South Asia? or of the Middle East? Do we want to be an Islamic state like Saudi Arabia and Iran, or more like Syria, Egypt and Jordan?
Since their independence, India, Pakistan and China have never been able to establish good neighbourly relations. India has waged one war against China and two against Pakistan. The kind alliance between Pakistan and China was countered by a similar pact between Russia and India, which outlived the collapse of communism.
The element shared by the three states bordering on Kashmir, however, is the unique density of their populations and their possession of nuclear technology and arsenals well stocked with weapons of mass destruction. The dispute over Kashmir erupted some 52 years ago, long before India and Pakistan had gained their independence. But when the division of the states became a reality on the ground, three principalities remained outside the direct sovereignty of either of the two newly established states. When the British suggested to the rulers of the three principalities that they each conduct a referendum to decide on complete independence or annexation to one of the two states, India worked behind the scenes to prevent any referendum from being held. In one province, ruled by a Muslim but with a largely Hindu population, the Indians used military force to thwart the referendum, and annexed the province. Kashmir was different. With a Hindu ruling a population with 80 per cent of Muslims, it was easy for India to bring pressure to reject the proposal.
On 27 October 1947, the population of Kashmir revolted, and the ruler called upon the Indian army to quell the uprising and restore order. The situation has remained explosive ever since. Military skirmishes raged for a while, until the two parties signed a cease-fire, but the status quo remained, each state exercising control over the areas which had been under its de facto military command. Thus parts of the province remained under Pakistani control, while the rest of Kashmir remained under Indian occupation.
India refused to conduct the referendum even after a United Nations resolution had been passed to that effect. With its victory over Pakistan established in 1965, India sealed its sovereignty over the occupied part of Kashmir. The next war brought the decisive secession of east Pakistan, which emerged as the state of Bangladesh. Its alliance with India is still strong today, although Bangladesh is Muslim and India has been at war with Pakistan for decades.
In 1989, Kashmir was the scene of another revolution, and the establishment of a movement for the liberation of Kashmir. India mobilised 600,000 of its forces at a cost of $4 million a day to put down the Kashmiris. New Delhi is urging Islamabad to honour its commitments under the 1972 Simla Treaty, signed after the war which led to the secession of Bengal. Pakistan claims that the Kashmiri militants are home-grown freedom fighters, not Pakistani soldiers as India alleges, and that India's allegations of Pakistani incursions into its territory are unfounded.
Against this backdrop, we must endeavour to review the situation, given the gravity of the developments on the ground today. The greatest threat is certainly the fact that the conflict is escalating between two nuclear states. In previous conflicts, there was always the suspicion that India possessed rudimentary nuclear technology or possibly a few weapons. It was also believed that Pakistan had been obtaining foreign assistance to keep pace with India in the arms race. Today, the nuclear might of both states is an established fact. Each party is aware that the other can at any moment use its nuclear capacity to bring some battle here or there to a decisive end. I believe, therefore, that advisers on both sides will seek to avoid an end game. Neither side must be made to feel that it is cornered, and thus find itself compelled to save face whatever the cost. Wisdom and statesmanship, however, do not always coincide -- otherwise, we would not have had to witness Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Zaire, southern Sudan, Angola, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Guatemala, Colombia, Mexico or Algeria.
Another new element in the conflict is the fact that both India and Pakistan have immediately turned to China.
While it is only to be expected that the Pakistani leaders bank on their 30- or 40-year relationship with China, seek to reassert their alliance with Beijing and look for reassurance of China's unwavering support, India's move came as a surprise.
Indo-Chinese relations have never been good. But if India and Pakistan were to begin an armed conflict within Kashmir or on its borders, neither of the two parties could guarantee that hostilities would not spread into neighbouring Chinese territory. Explanations and justifications could be delayed, and China could in the meantime find itself forced to protect its territory. On the other hand, if the war ends, the international community will interfere rapidly and on a large scale. I believe this will happen soon, and new peace arrangements, whether final or temporary, will be signed. China cannot be excluded from any negotiations, for the simple reason that any concessions between India and Pakistan must necessarily affect territory disputed by India and China.
I hope that none of the parties will adopt a position that might lead to the widening of the scale of the conflict. We must be aware of the fact that we are not equipped to defend ourselves, let alone others, in a nuclear war of this kind.
* The writer is the director of Arab Centre for Development and Futuristic Research.