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Al-Ahram Weekly 8 - 14 July 1999 Issue No. 437 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 8 - 14 July 1999 Issue No. 437
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Features Focus Books Travel Living Sports Time Out Chronicles People Cartoons Letters Apartheid by any other name
By Gamil Mattar *
Since we seem determined to make overtures and exchange warm feelings with General Barak, hold conferences at which he can shine (as we did for his predecessor, Peres), perhaps an Arab summit would offer us a clue to understand our own behaviour. An Arab summit is needed as never before, to explain how the highly suspect can pass itself off as legitimate. I am not speaking of a mini-summit, convened to prevent an Arab country from rushing towards Israel too soon or without collective approval. The days when one state exercised its hegemony over the rest are gone. Today, summit meetings are held between parties which regard themselves as equals in sovereignty, free will and commitment, at least theoretically.
Many Arabs today believe in a reality sharply distorted by the advances in communications technology, and some of our politicians would not give up the illusions fabricated by their spin doctors and close advisers for anything. One of those illusions is the staunch belief that any given country is still able to wield enormous power. It can indeed do so -- in one area, at least: suppressing its people under the pretext of establishing political stability. The stability thus achieved is then used to gain political leverage in negotiations with external parties.
A comprehensive summit is imperative, but we need a summit of inequalities. The Arab system is a unique example of regional inequality. No two states are equal or nearly equal in any area. One may possess more financial liquidity, another a better communications system or more influence over public opinion, a third may be more isolated and a fourth more active; in a fifth country, the government may be cursing its Arab identity, and lamenting the fact that it is plagued by this language, this regional identity, this nationality. Yet each state, regardless of its overflowing coffers, its uncontested prestige and large delegation, is assigned a single microphone at the summit. The head of its delegation sits next to an envoy from a country which was too poor to send a delegation and received the travel expenses as a gift or an obligation.
Cruel and gruesome as it is, such inequality still plays an important positive role in collective Arab action, not least in sensitising the beneficiary state to the fact that its survival depends on the survival of the entire Arab system.
So when Arab governments become emotional about the new Israeli government, when important voices in the Arab world and elsewhere oppose a comprehensive Arab summit, we must probe the motives for their attitudes. In this regard, one analyst recently referred to a similar situation which developed some years ago, and reiterated the belief that the Israeli solution is inevitable, no matter how long it takes. Others examined documents related to similar incidents which, once the topic of the day, were abandoned either because they ceased to be relevant, or because settlements were being expanded as much as "possible".
Arab decision-makers became tired of waiting, or exasperated by the strange and at times incomprehensible "economic recession" which persisted despite all the reforms and open-door policies. Then again, perhaps they had grown tired simply because it is natural for people of their age to grow tired. Netanyahu's three years in power seemed much longer for some. This explains the sense of relief, the sentimental exchanges with General Barak, the revival of meetings and conferences "for peace" which had fallen into a coma. It explains the smiles of the Arab negotiators, the resumption of Indyk's intensive efforts and the renewed activities of Dennis Ross. It explains the resurgence of hope in the White House, where the man who has succeeded in destroying the infrastructure of Serbia and Kosovo sits.
This man, who has pledged that the Albanian refugees will return to their homes, does not see Palestinian refugees in quite the same light, as was made abundantly evident from his stuttering and stammering in reply to a question by Abdel-Moneim Said at the press conference held with President Mubarak. It never occurred to Said or to any other journalist that a question reiterated dozens of times a day in Arab homes would embarrass the US president to this extent.
Clinton's reaction proves that the Americans have deliberately obliterated certain issues related to the Israeli-Arab conflict, and have ultimately come to believe that what they refuse to acknowledge does not exist. Possibly, they see the issue of the right to return as one of the many issues which Arabs and Palestinians take "too seriously". Refugees, Jerusalem and water are not among the matters to which Washington gives much thought. As a result, the president was immediately corrected by Tel Aviv in a note of admonition from Barak's office, followed by another from Barak himself. The admonition was nothing less than an insult to a US president who has yet to recover from the celebrations for the greatest victory in US history, which has drawn a shroud over the defeat in Vietnam and embellished a less than perfect victory in the war against Iraq.
Will Barak justify Arab joy? "Give him time, help him, keep close to him to ward off Sharon and to protect him against the Israeli hawks": this very banal response has become an inherent part of the question, an oversimplification of the situation. The excessive glorification of Rabin on the anniversary of his assassination is only an attempt to conceal the failure of a policy that proved a fiasco long ago, equalled in futility only by the mammoth efforts to support Peres in the fear that someone would expose the truth: that the policy of supporting the doves so that they can accomplish what the hawks could not without going to war is a joke. Once the doves have lost their political clout, the hawks come in to win for Israel what the doves could not, despite all the support of the Arabs and Palestinians, and all the compromises they were prepared to make. And the wheel keeps on turning: the hawks prey upon us, the doves devour us, and in both cases Israel wins.
Barak declared his intention to build a bridge to link the various fragments of the Palestinian state. The plan has significant implications. Barak himself found no difficulty in admitting that he cannot see how the Jews will ever perceive the Palestinians as neighbours, and has suggested that they should not have to meet face to face. Barak refused to appoint a single Arab to his cabinet, although it is said that he received 90 per cent of their votes. In certain capitals, Arabs are bracing themselves to rally themselves behind Barak, to protect him and thus win his confidence. But the "dove" himself is drawing up the maps designed to guarantee that no Israeli will ever meet a Palestinian. If this is not a racist policy, then what is?
* The writer is the director of Arab Centre for Development and Futuristic Research.
