 |
Al-Ahram Weekly 8 - 14 July 1999 Issue No. 437 
|
||
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
|
Al-Ahram Weekly 8 - 14 July 1999 Issue No. 437
|
||
| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Features Focus Books Travel Living Sports Time Out Chronicles People Cartoons Letters On the eve of his departure
By Abdel-Qader Yassin *Ehud Barak has broken the Israeli record for the time it takes to form a government. Over 50 days having passed since his election as prime minister, he has beaten all his predecessors. Was all this time necessary to formulate the policy lines of the new government? Or was forming a coalition following the Knesset's 15th election all that tricky?
The answer to the first question is no. Barak, at the head of the Labour Party, entered the elections with a clear and detailed platform, to the degree that the Israeli Ma'arev newspaper described it as "Barak's Ten Points". These points were:
To resume negotiations with the Palestinians on the basis of the Oslo Accords. At the same time, Barak assured his constituency that he would maintain relentless pressure on the Palestinian resistance. He also promised that Jerusalem would be the undivided, eternal capital of Israel, that he would not accept the unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state, and that any agreement for a permanent settlement with the Palestinians would be put to a referendum (with the Israeli people).
To revive negotiations with Syria according to the principle of withdrawal proportionate to peace, and to withdraw Israeli occupation forces from southern Lebanon. The withdrawal from Lebanon would take place on basis of a political settlement, guaranteed by Syria, and a multi-national force would take the place of the Israeli army.
To require that ultra-orthodox Jews be eligible for conscription into the armed forces.
To strengthen the rule of law and the supremacy and autonomy of the judiciary.
In the economy, to give priority to education, health and infrastructure; to move toward privatising all public-sector companies and some public-sector services; to bolster the stock market, reform the tax structure and combat poverty and unemployment.
To extend free education from obligatory levels to the university, lengthen the school day and develop technical and occupational education.
To increase free health services, particularly to the elderly and retired.
To raise the level of women's participation in all economic, social, political and cultural sectors.
To promote Jewish immigration to Israel and to assimilate new immigrants into strategic locations.
To promote equality between minorities and Jewish settlers in all fields.
With regard to the peace process specifically, Barak is familiar with all the negotiating tracks. He participated directly in the negotiations with the Palestinians and in the talks pertaining to Syria at the time when Peres was prime minister, Barak was foreign minister and Uri Savir was leading the negotiations. Considerable progress had been made on these tracks until Netanyahu came along to derail them. Indeed, Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq Al-Sharaa has said that 80 per cent of the negotiating issues between Syria and Israel had been covered with the 1994-'96 Israeli Labour government. Barak has thus had ample time to formulate a clear position with regard to all matters pertaining to the settlement process, including a package of security arrangements and timetables.
As for the second question, regarding the difficulty of forming a coalition government, that too fails to explain the time Barak has taken. Barak knows the positions and platforms of all other Israeli political parties. He also knows that all political parties in Israel are extremely pragmatic: the Likud's former allies would scramble to take part in the government of its Labour adversary. The Likud government could have been out and the new Barak government in place in a matter of days.
It would appear, therefore, that Barak deliberately put off announcing the formation of his new government for more than 50 days in order to serve a number of objectives. Above all, the delay would give Netanyahu a golden opportunity to deliver a staggering blow to Lebanon and the Lebanese resistance. Netanyahu would thereby have the luxury of taking revenge for the part the Lebanese played in bringing about his downfall in the recent elections, which may well have spelled the end of his political career. In addition, the strike against the people and infrastructure of Lebanon would serve other purposes. It would camouflage the embarrassment of Israel's forced withdrawal from Jezzin in the south of Lebanon, which constituted a victory for the Lebanese resistance against Israeli occupation forces. Compounding that embarrassment was the fact the brutal armed assault against the Sidon court on 7 June failed to accomplish its political objective. It did not succeed in straining relations between the Lebanese resistance and the Lebanese army, which passed up the opportunity to round up weapons from the resistance on the pretext of tightening security in the country. It may also have been thought that a strike against Lebanon would precipitate a retaliatory strike against Israeli civilians in the north of Israel, which would have given the Israeli government an excuse for reneging on the agreement of April 1996.
In all cases, Barak would come out ahead. A debilitating strike against Lebanon would weaken the Lebanese negotiating position. Should the strike fail to accomplish its goals, Barak could leap forward to heap the blame on Netanyahu and the Likud. Moreover, after the terror perpetrated against Lebanon, he would come out looking a dove compared to the impression Netanyahu left on the eve of his departure.
There remains yet another question. Why did the Likud, under the temporary leadership of Ariel Sharon, refuse to take part in a Labour government headed by Barak, who had told the Likud that it would be Labour's main partner in a coalition?
Perhaps Sharon wants to tend to the wounds his party suffered during the elections. By staying out of the Barak government, the Likud will be able to set itself apart from the Labour Party and all other parties involved its coalition while simultaneously recuperating its forces.
Now that the Barak government has won the confidence of the Knesset and assumed its functions, the Arab negotiators should take care not to pin high hopes on the new government. Not only does this government enjoy a comfortable backing of no less than 75 out of the 120 Knesset seats, it represents the entire Israeli political spectrum, with the exception of the Likud, which is increasingly being ostracised from Israeli political life.
When the Palestinian and Syrians sit down at the negotiating table, they will find the Israelis under no pressure at home to make concessions, the only exception being on the Lebanese front where the Lebanese resistance is making life extremely difficult for the Israelis. We should also remember the four "No's" Barak he declared immediately after his election victory (no return to the borders of 4 June 1967, no dismantling of the settlements, no return of Palestinian refugees and no backing down on Jerusalem as the undivided, eternal capital of Israel).
Barak will give the green light to the creation of a Palestinian state, but only if he is sure it lacks the necessary components for independent viability. Thus, he will try to ensure that the Palestinian economy will remain dependent upon the Israeli economy, that politically it lacks sovereignty and a geographically unified territory, and that it is militarily powerless. For Barak, a Palestinian "state" will serve as a bridge between Israel and other Arab countries, and no more.
In short, the Palestinian and Syrian negotiators will have a long, nerve-racking, uphill journey.
* The writer is a Palestinian political analyst.
