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Al-Ahram Weekly 15 - 21 July 1999 Issue No. 438 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 15 - 21 July 1999 Issue No. 438
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Features Travel Living Sports Time Out Chronicles People Cartoons Letters Normalisation
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
Two conferences addressing the same theme from diametrically opposed perspectives were held on the same day last week at two different Cairo hotels. One hotel hosted the Cairo for Peace Conference, organised by the International Alliance for Arab-Israeli Peace, better known as the Copenhagen group, an unofficial grouping of Egyptian, Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian personalities claiming to represent the popular aspiration for peace in the four countries. Another hotel hosted the Anti-Normalisation Rally, which was attended by representatives of a wide range of political, intellectual and cultural forces categorically and uncompromisingly opposed to the normalisation of relations with Israel.
The second conference was held as a reaction to the first. It issued a statement underscoring the commitment of its participants to work for a comprehensive and equitable peace which would provide for the creation of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. The statement also denounced what it called the illusions of the opposite conference, which have nothing to do with genuine peace.
In short, the Anti-Normalisation Rally condemned the drive towards normalisation launched by the Copenhagen Group, not on the grounds that peace with "the Zionist entity" is rejected per se, but on the grounds that not making normalisation contingent on Israel's performance of its contractual obligations allows Israel to believe that it can achieve peace without having to relinquish the Arab territories it occupies. Indeed, contrary to the key argument advanced by the Copenhagen Group, the normalisation of relations with Israel is not a condition precedent for the establishment of peace. A case in point is the line adopted by Syria, which is holding out for an all-encompassing package deal (total withdrawal from the Golan Heights versus total peace) before establishing any relations whatsoever with Israel, let alone considering the issue of normalisation.
Syria opposes the idea of one step in the direction of peace in exchange for one step in the direction of normalisation because it fears this step-by-step approach could lead to consecutive steps towards normalisation without an agreement, or even a common understanding, of what genuine peace should entail. Beginning a normalisation process with no clear ideas of where it will lead could be counterproductive, distorting the image of peace and even, perhaps, reducing it to mere capitulation, especially when the balance of power is tilted in Israel's favour.
Yet the step-by-step approach could be tempting for some Arab parties who find themselves, because of the unfavourable balance of power, faced with two equally unattractive alternatives; either with having to make concessions they are not ready to admit openly; or, if they decide against making these concessions, to adopt a line of action they will find hard to implement if they disclose their intentions in advance. For the Palestinian Authority, it might be more profitable to try and implement its final objectives gradually without declaring them openly. But there is no reason to believe that the other Arab parties have anything to gain by following the same path; rather, they have much to gain by removing any ambiguity as to where they are headed.
Arab public opinion is not ready to see Arab negotiating teams working out deals that operate to Israel's advantage without producing any corresponding advantage to the Arab side. In the eyes of the national forces, any movement in that direction would be tantamount to a humiliating capitulation. Of course, an individual, even an individual leader, could run the risk of antagonising public opinion by adopting a flexible stand towards the demands of the other side, but the only way he could justify such a stand is by proving that it will bring benefits that could not otherwise have been reaped. Which begs the question of whether this applies to normalisation. In other words, would Arab interests be better served if they sit at the same table with Israelis -- other than in their capacity as negotiators -- before peace is established?
My personal opinion is that, within a given context and subject to certain conditions, some sort of dialogue is necessary. But for the dialogue to be a fruitful exchange between equals some serious soul-searching on the part of the Israelis is in order. So far, their attitude towards the Arabs has been fundamentally condescending and racist, regarding Egyptians and, more generally, Arabs, as objects, not subjects, of history, as mere instruments to be discarded, neutralised, and, if necessary, eliminated, so that Israel can achieve its objectives. Unless there is a real shift in Israel's perception of the Arabs, any attempt at normalisation, whether by the Copenhagen Group or others, is doomed to fail. This attitude is expressed in too many ways to mention here. To cite but a few examples:
1. Israeli generals have admitted that they ordered their soldiers to open fire on Egyptian prisoners of war in 1967 after they had laid down their arms. The only possible inference to be drawn from this cold-blooded massacre is that both the generals and the men who carried out their orders regarded Arabs as something less than human. How can the Israelis expect fraternisation after such acts without making an official public apology and without punishing the perpetrators?
2. Although the whole world knows that Israel has long had a nuclear arsenal, it still refuses to declare it openly. Moreover, it insists on maintaining a nuclear monopoly over the region, and has no scruples about violating the sovereignty of neighbouring Middle Eastern states in order to destroy whatever nuclear capabilities they may have. This kind of behaviour is unjustifiable between partners in a peace process. If Israel wants to normalise relations with its neighbours, it will first have to come out of the nuclear closet then commit itself to gradually dismantling its nuclear arsenal as the peace process moves forward. In such case, the Arab states will have every interest in cooperating with Israel to ensure that nuclear weapons will not fall into the hands of terrorists.
3. Then there is the issue of the Palestinian state which many Israelis (including the present Israeli prime minister) are not opposed to recognising, provided it remains disarmed and with limited sovereign prerogatives. Such restrictions, however, would transform the Palestinian state from the embodiment of the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people into a body whose function is to pacify and neutralise them for the account of Israel. There can be no question of normalisation of relations as long as Israel sees its security in isolation from, indeed, in opposition to, that of its environment. The only security concept compatible with normalisation is collective security for all the concerned parties.
4. There will always be voices raised against the normalisation of relations with Israel as long as it fails to demonstrate by deeds, not only words, that its presence in the area is more beneficial to the Arab environment than its absence. Until then, peace will continue to be regarded by the Arabs as an evil, perhaps a lesser evil than war, but an evil nonetheless that will not lead to a just resolution of the conflict. If Israel wants the Arabs to overcome their justified reservations about normalisation, it must endeavour to make it a rewarding proposition. It could, for example, offer to put its advanced technological know-how to use in helping solve problems of crucial importance to the Arab world, such as water scarcity, desertification, over and above implementing Security Council resolutions on the dispute. This and other similar confidence-building measures can help pave the way to genuine peace.
Finally, on the subject of soul-searching and self-criticism, an interesting analogy can be drawn with the efforts made in this direction by a number of contemporary Israeli scholars, collectively dubbed the 'new historians', who set out to prove that many of the "historical" facts from which Israel claims to draw its legitimacy are nothing more than mythology and folklore. This deconstruction of Israel's history was undertaken not in the aim of challenging the legitimacy of the Zionist state -- after all, most, if not all, the new historians are Zionist -- but in an attempt to discard some of the obvious fallacies which can compromise Israel's credibility, indeed, its very future. It is high time that similar efforts are made to serve the cause of peace in the region as a whole, not of one Middle Eastern country alone. Only then can there be talk of normalisation of relations.
