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Al-Ahram Weekly 22 - 28 July 1999 Issue No. 439 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 22 - 28 July 1999 Issue No. 439
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Features Focus Interview Travel Living Sports Time Out Chronicles People Cartoons Letters Why we are still confused
By Ziad Bahaaeldin
To outside observers -- Arabs and foreigners alike -- Egyptians must seem confused in their attitude to the peace process. While Egypt's Camp David peace treaty with Israel, now in its third decade, has proved to be a surprisingly resilient and lasting element of Middle Eastern politics, official and popular discourse in Egypt as well as general attitudes toward the former enemy have been generally marked by hostility.
This is not a new phenomenon. Enthusiasm for a peaceful and cordial coexistence with Israel and optimism about the peace dividends -- economic and otherwise -- lasted only for a short time in the late '70s. Rapid disappointment with Israel's intentions and continued aggression, the elusive nature of economic gains, and the revival of an Arab/Islamic identity, all contributed to an increasing rejection by Egyptians of all aspects of the peace process, except the actual cessation of war. Since the early '80s, we have seemed content with the return of the Sinai and the prospect of a continued peace, but uninterested in pursuing any further form of rapprochement or normalisation of relations with Israel.
But the two conferences held in Cairo last week concerning relations with Israel must have seemed even more puzzling. The first, held in the Marriott Hotel, advocated a warmer and more constructive peace with Israel, while the second, held in the Shepheard's Hotel, called for the rejection of the first. The pro-peace gathering organised by the Egyptian peace movement, was illustrative of the movement behind it in more than one way: it lacked a concrete agenda, was remarkable in its bad timing and its excessive emphasis on propaganda over content, and it failed to convince anyone that it represented more than the individuals present. More importantly, it failed to make any significant contribution to the debate about the peace process, except some fringe gains for the Israeli side.
The anti-normalisation conference, on the other hand, did not project a better image. It was big on symbolism -- stepping on the Israeli and US flags, the sheikh/priest embrace, the anti-Israel chanting and archaic sloganeering -- but equally void of content. In fact, its only practical outcome seems to have been the introduction of a "black list" that will include all collaborators with the enemy, whatever that means. The truth is that neither end of the spectrum found a positive role to play or a significant agenda to pursue.
Aside from its failure, however, this double bill was indicative of two other important trends. The first is the almost total lack of genuine popular interest in the activities of either camp, and the second is the determination of government officials to remain on the sideline of any unofficial activity involving Israeli participation, whether in the negative or the positive sense. The events of two weeks ago confirm the starting point of this article: that the vast majority of Egyptians are still content with a lukewarm peace with Israel, one that guarantees that no more wars are waged, but which falls short of any pretence of pursuing common goals. More significantly, this is an area in which the officially declared policies of the state and its attitude in implementing them seem to coincide with people's wishes.
The dual approach to Israel seems perplexing to outside observers, more so since other Arab countries have concluded their own peace arrangements with Israel, or declared their intention to do so. Why Egyptians should insist on maintaining a hostile attitude towards Israel when Jordanians, Lebanese, Syrians and, most of all, Palestinians have accepted the principle of peaceful co-existence?
The answer is simple. The Arab-Israeli conflict may have begun as a primarily Palestinian matter. But as it evolved over half a century, each of the Arab countries directly involved developed its own experience. Egyptians remain unsympathetic to cordial Israeli gestures, not only out of a sense of obligation and solidarity towards fellow Arabs and Palestinians, although that is an important factor, but because of their own experience and distrust of the Israeli side.
A Palestinian friend recently seemed surprised that Egyptians still refuse to go to Israel even though, according to him, this only prevents their useful contact with the Palestinian people and perpetuates their ignorance of Israeli society. Although both his arguments are convincing in their own right, what seemed to escape him is that Egyptian popular hostility towards Israel is an indigenous matter that is the outcome of various sentiments: disappointment with unrealised peace dividends, annoyance at what is perceived as Israeli arrogance and aggression towards the Arabs, irritation with Western support of a society where one segment boasts of its democratic values while the other lives under primitive colonial ethics and laws, and despair at the continued land confiscation that alters political realities every day. For many, unfortunately, it is also the expression of a belief in the inevitable conflict between religions, nationalities and ethnicities. And it is, to all of us, illustrative of the difficulty of facing up to our own failures, defeats and disappointments.
It is precisely because of this confusion that both conferences held in Cairo two weeks ago were disappointing. Whereas one went too far in denying recent Arab and Egyptian history and imagined that a simple handshake could achieve miracles, the other went even further in its obsession with the past and refusal to admit new and changing realities on the ground. Whereas one was willing to ridicule sacrifices made by honest people when war was the order of the day, the other insisted on more sacrifices by the same honest people, irrespective of who pays the price. And whereas one displayed a narrow view of the future, the other did not seem to care about the future at all.
The result is that we find ourselves faced with few choices: either unconditional normalisation with Israel, or total rejection of any fresh thinking about the whole matter. That these limited choices persist after more than 20 years of dealings with Israel is a sign of the failure of our intellectuals to come up with other alternatives, to provide some original guidelines, and to help us think about this matter constructively.
The truth is that what we need today, more than ever before, is an open debate and honest reflection about our relationship with Israel, in order to assess and understand what alternatives we have, what realities we need to accept, and what dreams we may still hold. Until that time, it is understandable that the vast majority of us choose to ignore both of the conferences that took place two weeks ago, and decide to wait and see.
