![]() |
Al-Ahram Weekly 22 - 28 July 1999 Issue No. 439 |
||
| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
|||
Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Features Focus Interview Travel Living Sports Time Out Chronicles People Cartoons Letters A suspicious past, an irrelevant future
By Wahid Abdel-Meguid *Some of the most intriguing political tales of recent years, regardless of their veracity, have been those involving some businessman or another. This seems odd in a society with some 23 years of political pluralism under its belt, during which three generations have grown up with no recollection of totalitarianism.
It is true that this pluralism is restricted and controlled from above. Still, such restrictions alone do not explain the curious situation prevailing at present. Popular aversion to political parties is growing, due to their perceived inefficacy; and scepticism still surrounds the role of the business community in public life.
Presumably, businessmen, like other sectors of society, have a role to play in politics. This is their right as citizens with social and economic interests. But within the business community itself, we find diverse and sometimes conflicting views on how best to defend common interests. In this, too, businessmen are similar to other sectors of society.
To be sure, the socialist legacy, which portrayed businessmen as unscrupulous bloodsuckers with overblown paunches, or as agents of colonialism or imperialism, still echoes. Even this, however, does not fully explain the widely felt suspicions about their aims and motives and the general anxiety over their growing political influence -- that is, if we do concede that the business community's influence is growing.
Perhaps political parties are ultimately responsible for their growing marginalisation in public life, but are businessmen responsible for the prevailing cynicism and the wild surmises about the strings they can pull in decision-making circles? This is not an easy question, even for someone who has observed the development of Egyptian society for many years. It is unfortunate that the worst behaviour of some businessmen provides the dominant theme of popular discourse. At the same time, businessmen who do not engage in corrupt practices have offered nothing to counter that image, thereby further entrenching the stereotype, despite the injustice this does to the many honest entrepreneurs who have invested their own money and worked earnestly to promote the economic reform accomplished during the '90s.
Such integrity and dedication are not on people's minds when they discuss the conspicuous consumption that is scandalous in a country taking its first steps toward economic reconstruction and still suffering from widespread poverty. Top business magnates and senior government officials are always on the guest lists of grotesquely exorbitant and widely publicised weddings and parties. What could give a more concrete impression of an unholy alliance between money and power, or offer better grist to the rumour mills? The growing influence of businessmen on government policy is now seen as an established fact.
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between fact and rumour because of the absence of transparency, the poor flow of information and the deep crisis of the media in Egypt. The business community, furthermore, is commonly perceived as a homogeneous social stratum, even a monolithic entity. People may raise their eyebrows when they learn of antagonism between businessmen, but rarely do they see such conflicts as indicative of considerable diversity.
Let us take one aspect of this diversity and examine its political implications. There is a considerable disparity of wealth within the business community, which has direct relevance on the community's proximity to political power. It is possible to discern three groups. The first, the upper bracket, comprises the most prestigious business magnates. Most of these are prodigiously wealthy and do seek proximity to power. Some enjoy the patronage of the government, and are therefore envied by their peers. This rivalry takes many forms, some of them illicit. The prime motive for the rivalries within this category of businessmen is individual personal interest, in the narrowest sense. No cohesive socio-political force is at play, expressing the interest of a specific class with its own programme for the future. This also means that the members of the upper bracket have no source of influence independent from the government that can be used as leverage. Thus, they either seek or derive influence through patronage relations. For this reason, they cannot form a pressure group in the customary sense. Some are able to use their connections, at times, to influence the decision-making process, but again, the dynamics are more personal than political.
Even when several members of this upper bracket spoke of forming a political party, it was conceived as a second government party, rather than an independent grouping. Moreover, the idea is hardly a concrete reality, contrary to the many rumours in recent weeks to the effect that a new party, called the Future Party or the Third Way, is about to appear on the scene. The idea was first mooted in late 1997 by a prominent businessman belonging to the upper bracket, who also is a member of the People's Assembly. Several other noted businessmen joined him, as did some politicians who had left the ruling NDP and Wafd parties, and some intellectuals looking for any avenue to bring them closer to power.
When representatives of the proposed party put the idea to a top government official, he promised that he would bring it up at the appropriate time. More than a year has passed since then. In the interim, many of those who had backed the idea at first forgot all about it. Others kept hoping. Some eventually despaired, while others thought that President Mubarak's new term would be the occasion for the realisation of their project.
The very notion of such a party expresses a particular way of thinking about the political process. Businessmen in the upper bracket cannot imagine themselves functioning outside of the realm of executive power, even if an independent party does not mean opposition. They cannot feel comfortable unless they feel close to the centres of government, where they can find security, reassurance and support in times of need. A real businessman, in contrast, manages his affairs under any circumstances, is bold when dealing in the market, takes risks when investing his money. Most of the businessmen in the upper bracket are, in effect, an extension of the public sector, although many of them truly believe in the market system. Even those who do not want the government to protect them from outside competition still find themselves unable to stand alone. This bracket as a whole, albeit to various degrees, is therefore not conducive -- indeed, is sometimes inimical -- to democratic development.
These businessmen, however, are not alone. In the middle bracket, we find businessmen who are generally comfortable in the market, although they would like to expand their activities. As a result, many aspire to the upper bracket in terms of both wealth and proximity to power.
Still, a handful of businessmen in this category belongs to the opposition parties, the Wafd in particular. Many others have more or less concealed pro-Wafd sympathies. At least, this was the case when the Wafd was still active, before the gradual stagnation that may soon bring its obsolescence.
Most of these businessmen, however, seek proximity to power. Their route tends to be the People's Assembly, where this group is represented by about 40 MPs. One cannot expect considerable enthusiasm for true democratic development from this quarter, though. Their campaign tactics have not shown them as paragons of the democratic process, and their passion for democratic development usually surfaces when the traditional routes to seats in the People's Assembly are closed. In a few instances, some join the opposition or adopt causes such as human rights in order to pressure the ruling party or its leaders, who control the selection of candidates in the elections.
If the stereotype of the rapacious businessman is unrealistic, therefore, the truth is not much more pleasant. Instead of constituting an autonomous special interest group that seeks to influence government, individual members within the group derive influence through links of patronage and not through their economic activity or position in the market.
The same applies to the lower bracket of businessmen, who, in fact, cannot be said to be businessmen in the entrepreneurial sense. Most of the members of this category have to struggle to stay afloat in a market that is highly distorted, partially because it is in the interests of the middle and upper businessmen to make it that way. Perhaps because the modest businesses of the lower bracket frequently teeter on the verge of bankruptcy in this market, many members of this category are more politically active and more acutely attuned to developments in public life. This trait is particularly prevalent in the '70s generation, which participated in the student movement. The majority of these tend to favor democratic development, regardless of their opinion with respect to democracy or their familiarity with the democratic process. Their participation in politics has no connection with their current economic activities, but with their earlier political experiences. This lower bracket of businessmen as a whole carries little political weight.
Whatever progress we make towards greater democratic development in Egypt, the business community will not be responsible. How far this reality is from the expectations and assumptions that prevailed when limited plurality was first introduced.
* The writer is chief editor of the annual Arab Strategic Report issued by Al-Ahram's Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.