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Al-Ahram Weekly 29 July - 4 August 1999 Issue No. 440 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 29 July - 4 August 1999 Issue No. 440
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Travel Living Sports Time Out Chronicles People Cartoons Letters After the settlement
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
At the joint press conference they held after their summit meeting in Washington, President Clinton and Israeli Prime Minister Barak announced that they are determined to achieve peace within the fifteen coming months and that they will meet every four months to assess the progress made in that direction. If they succeed in reaching their stated target, the intractable conflict that has bedeviled the Middle East for close on a hundred years will have been resolved, and altogether new regional dynamics will come into play.
With the end-game approaching, the Arabs cannot afford to sit on the sidelines while others determine the shape of the post-peace situation. The establishment of peace in the region is likely to confront them with new types of problems that they must be well prepared for. The Middle East peace process has travelled a long and bumpy road, and the seemingly insurmountable difficulties and obstacles along the way may have justified the lack of any serious attempt on the part of the Arabs to contemplate the post-peace situation. However, now that two very relevant parties to the peace process have committed themselves publicly to a 15-month deadline, and given the very real possibility that during this period they will issue a declaration claiming that peace has been achieved, there is a pressing need to try and anticipate what this peace will really mean.
But first let us consider whether Barak and Clinton are equally interested in having the whole deal wrapped up within the time-frame of 15 months, which is, incidentally, the time remaining for Clinton in office. Clinton has every interest in meeting the deadline, as this will secure his place in history as the American president who brought to an end the century-long conflict between Arabs and Jews. After Roosevelt, the American Constitution was amended to bar any incumbent president from serving more than two terms in office. Clinton who, by and large, has been a successful president but whose image was tarnished by the Lewinsky affair, is eager to crown his second and last term with a spectacular feat that would go far towards rehabilitating him. That is why he would be particularly interested in a declaration announcing the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
It is not obvious, however, that Barak is similarly interested. In the same press conference at which he and Clinton vowed to bring about peace in just over a year, he made it clear that the US should keep a low profile in the coming stage. As he saw it, its role should be more that of a 'facilitator' than anything more assertive, its main contribution being material assistance. Moreover, Barak has capitalised on his strong showing at the polls to create a wide coalition government, thanks to which the Likud opposition has been thrown into still greater disarray and in which the more prominent figures in his coalition have all been assigned to posts with little impact on the peace process. Thus Barak has guaranteed for himself virtually unlimited authority.
Israel's new prime minister is determined to develop the peace process in a way that would reinforce the direct exchange of views between the protagonists, as borne out by his approach to the negotiations with Syria. Syria is demanding total withdrawal from the Golan in exchange for total peace. Barak's position is that the extent of the Golan restituted to Syria will depend on Syria's attitude towards all key issues in the conflict, including security, terrorism, normalisation, early-warning systems, water, diplomatic relations, economic cooperation, etc. At the same time, he is talking about meeting with Assad "at the appropriate time", implicitly dismissing Syria's all-or-nothing approach: either total withdrawal for total peace or no direct contacts whatsoever. To avoid any confusion on this issue due to a 'chance' encounter with Barak at King Hassan's funeral, Assad decided not to attend.
Barak has said he will be dealing with all the Arab fronts, Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian, simultaneously. Whether he will in fact do so remains to be seen. What is certain is that this will give him the opportunity to play one Arab party off against the other, to exploit a crisis on one specific front to turn to another, especially if all external parties, including the US, are required to downplay their role and he alone is left to decide how the peace process is to be conducted.
What should one expect after 15 months? The most probable scenario is that Clinton will require that a declaration be made announcing that the main guidelines for a comprehensive peace have been reached, and that whatever has not been agreed upon should be considered secondary issues on which the protagonists will state their respective attitudes in written letters, along the lines of those exchanged in the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel. With Clinton in a hurry to have an overall peace declaration signed, and with the Arab parties unable to coordinate their stands and present a common front, Barak is well placed to exhibit firmness and inflexibility, and the Arab parties will be confronted with an American ultimatum to either take or leave whatever is offered, on the grounds that they are unlikely to find better conditions for a breakthrough towards peace in any future situation.
The thorniest issue in inter-Arab relations is the implacable hostility between Syria and the PLO -- a situation that forebodes the appearance of two distinct axes, one revolving around Israel and Turkey and extending to Jordan and the Palestinian Authority (even if the latter would come under intense pressure from a number of opposition groups within its ranks) and the other around Syria, which would necessarily include Lebanon, probably Iran (whether the current power struggle is resolved in favour of the conservatives or the reformists) and eventually even Iraq.
Where will Egypt be in all this? Barak insists on keeping his bridges open with Cairo. Today he is visiting it for the second time since he has come to power. But Barak's real objective when he comes to Cairo is to urge Egypt to adopt an even-handed approach towards the protagonists and not support the Palestinians against the Israeli positions.
To face the intricacies of the coming period Egypt is required, starting now, to formulate a clear view of what it expects the post-peace challenges to be. This is a prerequisite if it is to have a say in determining the shape of the post-peace situation. What that situation will look like depends to a very great extent on what the key actors in the Middle East do now. Egypt cannot ensure the stability of the area if Israel demonstrates that it alone is in a position to determine the course of events. The battle for what the post-peace Middle East will become has already begun.
