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Al-Ahram Weekly 5 - 11 August 1999 Issue No. 441 |
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Cooperation, not coercion
By Galal Nassar
Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Focus Interview Features Travel Living Sports Time Out Chronicles People Cartoons Letters Will Egypt become a member of NATO? What formula is NATO seeking to guarantee Egypt's cooperation with the alliance's policies in the region? Are Egyptian policies compatible with the changes in NATO's strategies, most importantly in the Middle East, but also with regard to Egyptian national security? Finally, will Egypt be able to reach a recipe for cooperation that does not affect the principles underlying its policies?
These and many more questions were raised following US Rear Admiral David Stone's announcement, during his visit to Egypt several weeks ago, that strategic talks would continue between several countries south of the Mediterranean, including Egypt, and the NATO command. Egyptian and Arab political writers have also highlighted many indicators confirming reports that the final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict will take place under the NATO umbrella. Egyptian political commentator Mohamed Sid-Ahmed's series of articles in the London-based Al-Hayat are the most prominent case in point.
Sid-Ahmed pointed out that Egypt's cooperation with NATO on the peace settlement in the Middle East was certainly brought up at the Washington talks. Sid-Ahmed wrote: "President Mubarak was definitely presented with the American vision regarding a settlement in the Middle East during his most recent visit to Washington. Most probably it included technical ways of removing obstacles that have stood in the way of specific agreements on the most sensitive issues. In any case, NATO and its successful experience in the Balkans reminds the obstinate that there is no room for obstinacy."
President Hosni Mubarak's most recent talks in Washington triggered a further volley of questions, especially when the American media leaked news of a "secret" item in US-Egyptian discussions related to the upgrading of Middle East-NATO cooperation from a dialogue -- which actually began five years ago and included Egypt, Tunisia, Mauritania and Israel in the framework of "the Atlantic initiative for the Mediterranean" -- to cooperation. The upgrading would take place simultaneously with the progress of the peace process.
Al-Ahram Weekly interviewed Stone during his visit to the port of Alexandria, accompanied by eight ships from NATO's standing naval force in the Mediterranean. The flagship was the USS Deyo, an American naval vessel, which, accompanied by ships from Canada, Germany, Italy, Britain, Holland, Spain and Turkey, was on its third annual visit to Alexandria.
Stone declared that NATO had begun a strategic dialogue with six Mediterranean countries -- Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia -- several years ago in order to boost cooperation on issues of mutual concern. The tour of the formation under his command (which took in Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania and Israel), he said, constituted a continuation of these efforts. Stone also announced that NATO has invited "representatives from these countries to observe NATO exercises and to attend NATO training courses in Germany and at the NATO Defence College". He added that NATO's naval units in the Mediterranean are part of the alliance's rapid deployment forces. These units consist of nine NATO ships which carry out training and operations together. Eight of them were on the Alexandria visit; the ninth was stationed in the Adriatic.
The admiral's comments came against a background of major change in NATO's objectives since the end of the Cold War. The alliance now sees its main task as promoting stability in the region and ensuring the rapid deployment of NATO forces there should the need arise.
Stone, who commands NATO forces in southern Europe, had told the Weekly in an interview last year that he wanted to dispel any misunderstandings regarding the nature of the NATO ships' call at Alexandria. The aim, he said, was merely to convey to the people of Egypt and other Mediterranean countries the need to strengthen cooperation for peace and stability in the Mediterranean basin.
Since the early 1990s, NATO has carried out several military operations in the Mediterranean, and particularly in the Balkans. Foremost among them were the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, which brought about a major change in NATO strategy as the alliance celebrated its 50th anniversary. Middle East and Mediterranean security is now a high priority.
NATO's new principles include the following: the alliance's responsibility will extend beyond the Euro-Asian area to the rest of the world; NATO's actions will be decided by its command, whether unilaterally or in conjunction with the United Nations; NATO's military forces must be fully prepared for immediate involvement in crises around the world; crippling the enemy's capabilities, the strategy adopted by US President Clinton in the Balkans in accordance with lessons learned in Iraq, is the method NATO will use in many areas of the world, should it decide to intervene; this strategy will require the deployment of NATO forces in various bases all over the world, which will entail more alliances, increased polarisation and technological innovation.
NATO has therefore taken on the additional task of managing both conflict and cooperation. The alliance is now considering taking on new members, to be chosen from several lists of countries nominated to join. The list on which Egypt is included has been under discussion by NATO since 1995 and is now an important component of its new strategy. It carries special significance for the alliance, which desires closer relations with five countries -- Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Israel and Mauritania. These, indeed, are the countries Admiral Stone singled out during his interview with the Weekly.
If Egypt does join NATO, its participation will be underpinned by several years of cooperation. Under the auspices of the United Nations and then NATO, Egypt participated in peace-keeping operations in Bosnia, its forces directly contributing to maintaining European security. Egypt also adopted the signalling codes used by NATO forces in its peace-keeping work and during joint sea and land manoeuvres with a number of NATO countries, including the US, Italy, France, Spain and Germany. Next November, these countries will be participating in the "Bright Star" manoeuvres with Egypt. These military exercises are considered the most outstanding of their kind in terms of performance and the number of participants. Indeed, they compare favourably with NATO's own manoeuvres.
Egyptian strategic expert Abdel-Rahman Rushdi El-Hawari, professor at the Nasser Supreme Military Academy, believes that the cooperation or membership of any of the southern Mediterranean countries, including Egypt, is dependent upon NATO's vision for its new Middle East strategy. El-Hawari also believes that "the example of Kosovo is a harbinger of things to come," as a model for handling international issues that will be implemented in other places. He predicts that future NATO interventions will most likely be justified by the pretext of protecting religious or ethnic minorities.
According to El-Hawari, NATO has traditionally viewed this region as fraught with instability. The alliance's mission at the time of the Cold War was therefore restricted to clear objectives: blocking Soviet influence, protecting Western interests, especially oil, and supporting Israel, the West's satellite in the Middle East.
NATO's new regional policy, however, has expanded its sphere of intervention. The Arab world shares many political, economic, energy and security interests with the alliance, which also seeks to control Islamism, terrorism, and migration toward Europe. El-Hawari feels that migration in particular could lead NATO to look southward.
According to El-Hawari, NATO has already singled out the Arab world for possible intervention. Such intervention could be triggered by any perceived danger to NATO interests: terrorism, sabotage, or disruption of the flow of oil.
NATO uses both political and military means to achieve its ends. Political intervention could include encouraging a change of regime in a specific state; intervening to prevent self-determination for a national, ethnic or religious group (as in southern Sudan and northern Iraq); and granting self-rule to regions or parts of states.
Additionally, NATO has given itself the right to undertake "security tasks", which it defines broadly enough to include intervention in domestic matters. Examples of relevant scenarios include attempts to reorganise the internal situation within certain countries (Libya, Iran or Iraq); intervention in the internal affairs of Gulf countries and/or their neighbours under the pretext of consolidating Gulf security, ensuring the safety of important waterways and ensuring the constant flow of oil to Europe and Japan; preventing the production or stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons, and deterring countries that seek to achieve nuclear parity with Israel. Other pretexts NATO could deploy in justifying intervention are: confronting extremist or violent movements (as in Algeria or Afghanistan); or protecting human rights.
Strategic expert General Talaat Musallam argues that the idea of cooperation with NATO on the peace process or other regional issues is unacceptable. He describes NATO as an imperialist coalition, "a new version of old alliances between colonialist countries under the pretext of fighting the communist threat. The excuse used by the United States to defend NATO expansion through a role in the Middle East -- the alliance's success in achieving a settlement in Kosovo -- is weak if we take into consideration that NATO military intervention in Kosovo had no legal basis."
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As Musallam points out, cooperation with a military coalition like NATO is hardly a straightforward matter. "One important question is: whose side will NATO take? The answer 'the Arab side' lacks any strategic perspective. The US is the country suggesting NATO's participation, and the US itself has been protecting Israel since its inception. If we say that NATO will take the Israeli side, however, that is also inaccurate; Israel hardly needs the backing of a military coalition in its negotiations with the Arabs." Musallam believes that the initiative taken by President Mubarak to convene an Arab summit is the correct strategy.
Many points, therefore, remain shrouded in uncertainty. Clarification will depend on the Egyptian political and military leadership's vision of the country's national security interests. Egypt cannot afford to forego cooperation with a coalition whose members are neighbours. Furthermore, it is closely bound to the United States and the European Union, with which it shares security concerns and economic interests. Nor can Egypt afford to threaten the coalition's interests, in view of the new global balance of power.
It would seem that Egypt has chosen to enter a direct dialogue with NATO and open a strategic debate which would put its national interests on a par with those of the alliance. This may indeed be the best way to ensure continued cooperation on several issues while deterring NATO intervention in domestic affairs or attempts to impose certain policies. Such pressure would make dialogue impossible.