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Al-Ahram Weekly 5 - 11 August 1999 Issue No. 441 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 5 - 11 August 1999 Issue No. 441
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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The bloodshed may have abated, but the country is still torn. Amira Howeidy, in Algeria, investigates the plans and problems of some very uneasy bedfellows as the "new era" -- complete with conflict, broken promises and efforts to make the best of a bad situation -- dawns on a country still reeling from seven years of civil strife
Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Focus Interview Features Travel Living Sports Time Out Chronicles People Cartoons Letters Days of confusion
The FIS is struggling to cope with Bouteflika's legal offensive and its own internal divisions
It started when the military wing of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) announced a self-imposed cease-fire in October 1997. It is no secret that the truce was the fruit of extensive negotiations between the AIS and the Algerian army, which had to step in and open a dialogue with the AIS after the then president, Liamine Zeroual, announced that the FIS file was closed, a well-informed source told Al-Ahram Weekly. But the AIS truce went unrecognised: the regime seemed determined to ignore it. At any rate, no official statements were made.
This changed, however, when President Abdel-Aziz Bouteflika took office last April. FIS founder Abbasi Madani, who is currently under house arrest, was encouraged to issue a statement supporting the AIS truce following Bouteflika's election. The AIS emir, Madani Merzak, also issued a statement addressed to Bouteflika voicing the AIS's commitment to the cease-fire and recognising the need to put an end to the violence.
Merzak's statement was broadcast on television, a clear sign of the state's approval. Furthermore, Bouteflika's response to Merzak was also broadcast, giving unprecedented publicity to the state-Islamist dialogue. The president's statement described the AIS's stance as "a daring initiative" that requires a legal basis to allow its implementation in accordance with the law and the constitution. Hence the Civil Concord Law.
According to a source close to FIS leader Abdel-Qader Hashani, the message sent across by the state to both Madani and the AIS was that those who had not participated in any massacres would enjoy full amnesty. This would allow FIS cadres and leaders alike to obtain full civil and political rights in return for a permanent cease-fire and clear renunciation of violence. "This is why both Merzak and Madani issued their statements," the source said. But when the Civil Concord bill was issued and passed by the upper and lower houses, allowing the FIS to read it for the first time, the source revealed, "Madani suffered a nervous breakdown and was taken to hospital. It wasn't what they promised him. He said he felt 'deceived'."
The bill does indeed offer amnesty to those who did not kill, rape or place explosives in public places. It basically addresses those who are in hiding in the mountains. They are encouraged to hand themselves over within a period of six months; they will be eligible for the pardon only if they confess to what they did and provide the security forces with all the information needed. But the major setback of the bill, critics say, is that it stipulates that even those who are pardoned will be prohibited from engaging in political activity for a period ranging from three to 10 years, until the administration examines the veracity of their confessions.
In other words, the FIS's founders, leaders and a vast majority of its members will not return to the political arena for some time. Bouteflika's administration, however, hastily added a new provision after the law had already been passed by the parliament. This significant addition stipulates that the Concord Law will be applied when necessary, giving the authorities a legal channel to manoeuvre if they see fit.
"The FIS is in a very difficult situation," said the source close to Hashani. "The law did not offer anything new. Nor is the administration new: it's like a snake that changes its skin, but inside remains the same." FIS leaders who were released in 1997 such as Abdel-Qader Hashani, Ali Jeddi, Abdel-Qader Boukhamkham and Kamal Qamazi are not allowed to travel outside Algeria and must report to the authorities every week. Madani, says a FIS source, whose house is located above a police station, is never permitted to go out. "When we went to visit him during the feast, they wouldn't let us in. He's a prisoner still, not in a prison, but in his father's house," claimed the source.
FIS hopes that reconciliation would mean a comeback for the Front have not been fulfilled
Bouteflika's statements gave the FIS hope that reconciliation would necessarily mean the party's comeback, albeit under a different name to comply with the 1992 decision which banned the group. "But we were disappointed. In the end it was all speeches, nothing else." Moreover, the FIS source said, "each time the president made a speech, he would back down on the promises he had made before. Even the number of [FIS] prisoners he said he released, which according to him was 2,500, was actually approximately 1,000."
When he came to office, Bouteflika stated that he was offered the presidency in 1994 but refused because he wanted to open a dialogue with the FIS. When his request was turned down, he refused to take office. "Today, he says he can't open a dialogue with the FIS because it is banned and he can't break the law. Then he said that cancelling the 1992 elections was an act of violence. Later, he stated that it was an act of 'counter-violence'. What is all this supposed to mean?" demanded a source close to FIS leader Ali Jeddi.
Omar Belhouchet, editor of Al-Watan newspaper, also has the general impression that the president's policy on the FIS is unclear. "I've lost track. I don't know what the official policy is regarding the FIS, it keeps changing all the time," he said.
As far as the FIS is concerned, "the authorities have not yet reached out to us. They have only made it clear that they don't want Madani to return to politics." Commenting on the option of forming a new party under a different name, the source argued that, in theory, changing the name is a practical alternative, "but we got nothing in return: were never offered anything serious. We can't start making concessions at this stage, and we can't give up our basic principles."
If anything, the FIS has no idea what to do next. Prominent FIS sources who requested anonymity told the Weekly that, although the AIS is committed to the cease-fire, it will not hand over its weapons. On the other hand, the FIS has to deal with the contradictory views voiced by prominent members like Boukhamkham, who are "tired" and prepared to accept the status quo. Others, such as Hashani, are against the Civil Concord Law altogether.
Abdallah Gaballah, former leader of the Islamist-oriented Al-Nahda Party and founder of the Islah Party, believes that the FIS made excessive demands under Zeroual. "They were offered much more than what they have today, but they thought that by pushing further, they could get even more. It didn't work and that is why Zeroual announced that the FIS file was closed," he said. According to Gaballah, Zeroual wanted only one thing from the FIS leadership: a renunciation of violence. In return, he would have recognised it as a political partner and even allowed the Front to form a party under a different name. "Zeroual may also have been prepared to pardon those who were armed. The FIS interpreted all this as a sign of weakness and pressured for more. They lost," he argued.
When the FIS file was closed, said another source, the army opened a dialogue with the AIS, which finally resulted in the truce. "Of course, this unprecedented position demanded a response from the government. Zeroual couldn't reverse his position at that stage and open the FIS file again. So he resigned. Bouteflika took over to complete the deal."
The AIS made two mistakes, explained Gaballah: it forged a deal with the army without consulting the political leadership and announced its total loyalty to the state in addition to a permanent truce even before the Civil Concord Law was issued.
Today, the FIS is officially blamed for Algeria's seven-year crisis. It must deal with a carefully worded and restrictive law, and with what appears to be at least a minor division in its leadership. As one observer put it, "they're trapped, and if they don't react carefully the FIS file will indeed be closed -- forever."
