 |
Al-Ahram Weekly 5 - 11 August 1999 Issue No. 441 
|
||
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
|
Al-Ahram Weekly 5 - 11 August 1999 Issue No. 441
|
||
| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Focus Interview Features Travel Living Sports Time Out Chronicles People Cartoons Letters On state legitimacy
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
All political regimes tend to project their legitimacy as an invariable, a constant feature that remains unchallenged by the vagaries of time and, as such, justifies their remaining in power indefinitely. But overplaying the symbols of legitimacy can be counter-productive, especially if state institutions are unable to respond to the requirements of the age and the aspirations of society. It is precisely because this lag can, and often does, occur, that it is necessary to see legitimacy as a process that must constantly be renewed rather than as a quasi-divine attribute. For unless the reasons from which a state derives its legitimacy are constantly tested, the whole system could collapse.
This is all the more necessary in our contemporary world with its drive towards globalisation, and its transformation from a bipolar world system into a system whose features have yet to be finally determined. What could have been legitimate in the previous system need not be so in the new one. Nor can it be said that rules have been established to pass from one system to another without exposing state legitimacy to crises.
In the new era, international legitimacy has also acquired new connotations that are very different from what they were a decade or two ago. In general, issues of legitimacy are closely related to those of stability and security, and an effort must be furnished to try and foresee the course of events to ensure that deviations in undesirable directions are kept to a minimum.
The legitimacy of the Egyptian regime traces its roots to the 23rd of July revolution. But how true is it that the present regime in Egypt can be considered an embodiment of the aspirations of that revolution? There have been many changes since 1952, local, regional and global, which cannot be ignored if we want that legitimacy to be stable and devoid of contradictions.
It is no longer possible to claim that we still uphold the idea of revolutionary legitimacy with which the revolution identified so closely in its early years that a leading figure in the Free Officers' movement allowed himself to make the now famous -- or infamous -- declaration that "the law is on vacation!" Another defining feature of that period was that when it came to filling key posts, 'people of confidence' (a euphemism for members of a privileged inner circle) were given preference over 'people of competence' (i.e. those actually qualified for the post). This logic may have been necessary to protect the revolution against its foes, but was in obvious contradiction with democracy, civil society, the rule of law and constitutional legitimacy. Today, nearly half a century later, we attribute ourselves to constitutional, not revolutionary, legitimacy which is now condemned for its adoption of extra-legal practices.
We are now repudiating some of the policies implemented by the 23rd of July revolution in the name of revolutionary legitimacy as inimical to the very notion of constitutional legitimacy, such as the nationalisations, sequestrations and confiscations undertaken by the state, and, quite specifically, the land reform law. Promulgated in the name of revolutionary legitimacy, it was later repealed by Egypt's Constitutional Court on the grounds that it violated the principles of the Constitution. Egypt's shift from revolutionary legitimacy to constitutional legitimacy has brought about fundamental changes in the country's social, constitutional and institutional structure, which will remain brittle and vulnerable if not totally expurgated of whatever ambiguities and inconsistencies it might contain.
Constitutional legitimacy uses the law as a frame of reference and requires transparency, clarity of objectives and the strict avoidance of junta-style techniques of acquiring, wielding and consolidating power. Adherence to these principles, a prerequisite for the smooth transition of power, is particularly important at a time an entire generation of Arab leaders is facing the imminent prospect of handing over the reins of power to a younger generation. Strict observance of constitutional legitimacy is imperative at this critical juncture if crisis situations are to be avoided.
Only a few decades ago, the world presented a very different image to the inhabitants of the South from the one it now presents. Where we once saw the North as the mainstay of colonialism and exploitation and ourselves as freedom fighters for national liberation and social emancipation, today we see the North acclaimed as the champion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and the South regarded as a haven for terrorists. What personified Good now personifies Evil and vice-versa.
It has been argued that the July Revolution was organically linked to the confrontation with Israel. Now that confrontation is being replaced by peace, does this affect the revolution's legitimacy? Nasser resigned when Israel inflicted a devastating defeat on him in June 1967, but was called back to power when millions took to the streets to protest his resignation. Sceptics have questioned whether the supposedly spontaneous mass demonstrations on 9 and 10 June 1967 were not in fact carefully orchestrated, but even they cannot doubt that the massive outpouring of grief at his funeral was a genuine expression of popular will.
But though the slogan "let us continue in Nasser's footsteps" rang high and clear at his funeral, as long as the Egyptian people saw themselves as victims of a military defeat, the legitimacy of the regime was bound to remain shaky, especially after Nasser's death. Just how shaky became clear with the challenge to Sadat's leadership by what came to be described as the 'centres of power'. However, legitimacy was restored thanks to the successful crossing of the Suez Canal by Egyptian troops on 6 October. And yet it is not clear whether the restored legitimacy of the regime was a perpetuation of the 23 July legitimacy, a renewal of that legitimacy or a totally different legitimacy. The issue needs to be carefully scruitinised if we want to avoid disagreeable surprises in future.
The most critical question here is how to differentiate clearly between constitutional means and extra-legal means when it comes to social and political change. And this leads to another key question: how to reconcile between affiliation to a revolution and adherence to the rule of law, democracy, civil society, general freedoms, nationalism and pan-Arabism, while dissipating any ambivalence in respect of our identity?
Democracy itself is an ambiguous word in societies of the South. The regimes that emerged after independence do not owe their existence only to the national liberation movement but, more often than not, to a compromise, a tacit deal between the colonial power and the national liberation movement, as each party realised it had more to win by striking a deal with the other than by pursuing confrontation to the very end. The post-independence power structure in most Third World countries thus reflects the interests of both the national liberation movement and the former colonial masters. This is obviously at the expense of both democracy and genuine independence, particularly in an age when globalisation is making for an ever growing interdependence.
Egypt is thus faced with the need to update its legitimacy in line with the requirements of the age. To that end, it must uphold the positive legacy of the 23rd of July revolution -- the crucible in which the regime's legitimacy was forged -- and discard its negative legacy, while asserting Egypt's independence within and towards the process of globalisation and whatever new forms of hegemony are now emerging. At the end of the day, however, legitimacy will best be consolidated by ensuring that the body politic functions in a context of transparency, accountability, democracy, and active and equal participation in political life by all the constituent elements of society.
