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Al-Ahram Weekly 5 - 11 August 1999 Issue No. 441 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 5 - 11 August 1999 Issue No. 441
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Focus Interview Features Travel Living Sports Time Out Chronicles People Cartoons Letters Procrastinate and incorporate
By Salama Ahmed Salama
In less than two weeks, Barak has swung from "peace of the brave" to "peace of the greedy", or at best "peace of the deaf". His meetings with President Mubarak and Arafat in Alexandria have not dispelled Palestinian and Arab doubts about Israel's commitment to implement Wye. What is clear, on the other hand, is the tone of chastisement used with the Palestinians in cautioning them that rejecting Barak's proposal would open the peace process to untold hazards.
Arafat only grudgingly agreed to the 15-day grace period and to participate in the joint committee that will study the Wye Memorandum. The air of uncertainty generated by Barak's ambiguous statements will only be dispelled two weeks from now, which happens to coincide with Albright's arrival in the region on 14 August.
Barak's proposal to defer the outstanding points of the Wye Memorandum and to incorporate them into the final status talks was very slick. His concept of "deferment and incorporation", however, is not all that different from Netanyahu's insistence on entering immediately into the final status negotiations. Barak has always been opposed to a rapid redeployment of Israeli forces and returning most of the West Bank and Gaza before beginning talks on such issues as the status of Jerusalem, borders and the right of return.
To Barak's mind, rapid redeployment and transfer of land to Palestinian control would encourage the Palestinian negotiators to raise their expectations. He also believes that there is no compelling reason to deprive the Israelis of useful pressure cards with which to link the implementation of the outstanding points of Wye to Palestinian concessions on the more difficult issues. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Barak's proposal to "defer and incorporate" rudely awoke the PA from its optimistic reverie about the new Israeli prime minister and his government.
The PA could find some of the plans Barak brought with him to Alexandria attractive. He offered to release a few Palestinian detainees and to relax somewhat the caveat applying to those accused of killing Israelis. He also offered to reopen Palestinian representation offices in Jerusalem and to implement the second phase of redeployment -- a purely formalistic arrangement under which the PA would participate in the administration of some additional portions of the Occupied Territories. In exchange, however, Arafat must agree to defer the third and major redeployment phase and include it within the final status negotiations. Yet, since there appear to be no deadlines at all, if we are to go by Barak's very flexible statements, the Israelis will have ample opportunity to exploit the time factor in negotiations on the competing yet complementary Palestinian and Syrian-Lebanese tracks.
Barak has also made vague statements regarding the relocation of Palestinian refugees using generous amounts of US aid. Where they will be settled and who is entitled to assistance, however, has been left open. Syria and Lebanon have shown that they are ready to resume negotiations. They have formed delegations and exchanged letters with Israel via intermediaries. There also appears to be some form of division of labour underway: Egypt with the Palestinians and Jordan with Syria.
In spite of the grumbling and sometimes angry noises within Palestinian and Arab circles, and despite intimations to the contrary, it looks like Barak has won the first round. Otherwise, how does one explain the meetings that are being held in Cairo to bolster what is called the Palestinian national unity? This is the first time the PA has met with delegations representing Fatah, as well as Palestinian opposition factions such as the PFLP and Hamas, all of which oppose Oslo and all subsequent agreements. Moreover, the meetings took place after Assad notified these factions that now was the time to shift from paramilitary to political action.
From such signals, it is clear that Barak's scenario for "deferment and incorporation" will be the key to action on the Israeli-Palestinian negotiating track, despite strong opposition. The key to the Syrian track, however, is still obscure.
