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Al-Ahram Weekly 12 - 18 August 1999 Issue No. 442 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 12 - 18 August 1999 Issue No. 442
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Profile Books Features Travel Living Sports Time Out Chronicles People Cartoons Letters Getting through the Golan
By Ibrahim Nafie
Positive statements were exchanged recently between Syria and Israel; significantly, the US administration has also asserted that it is determined to focus on boosting the peace process. After his election, Barak noted the crucial strategic importance of Syria, recognising that peace would require compromises on the Golan. Syria saw Barak's statements as a means of achieving a just peace that meets both Arab and Israeli interests.
Such developments suggest that Syrian-Israeli talks could pick up speed soon. This track has always been problematic because of the vast gap between the positions of the two parties. Syria has consistently asked Israel to withdraw to the 4 June 1967 lines, rejecting any modification or amendment of those lines. While Syria has stuck to its position throughout, refusing to engage in any negotiations with Israel, it has also expressed its readiness to negotiate openly -- if it receives a pledge of Israel's complete withdrawal from the Golan.
Under growing pressure from the Israeli opposition, the settlers, and large sectors of the population, the Israeli government refrained from making any gestures to show Syria that it genuinely desired peace. Ending decades of distrust and hostility seemed impossible, particularly in view of Israel's constant provocation. Under Rabin, however, with US support, an agreement was concluded on 24 May 1995: the framework of understanding on security arrangements, to be implemented upon Israel's withdrawal from the Golan. This agreement, the first to be concluded between Israel and Syria since the beginning of the Madrid process, helped establish an understanding between the parties, based on proposals provided by the US.
The framework aimed at formulating security arrangements satisfactory to both parties, on the basis of mutual guarantees. Security Council Resolution 242 was designated as the frame of reference for both parties. The agreement opened the way for negotiations (the Israeli and Syrian chiefs of staff held talks in Washington in June 1995), but the two sides could not go beyond an "exchange of ideas".
Suspicion ran high. Syrian doubted Israel's desire for peace, and Israel wished to put Syrian intentions to the test before withdrawing to borders that had not been precisely defined. Technical and political points of controversy pervaded the process, from the political context of the settlement to the extent of withdrawal, security arrangements and the timetable. Syria insisted that the negotiations lead to complete withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 lines, and rejected the so-called international borders. These claims are supported by Resolution 242, which calls for Israel's return to the 4 June lines. Syria considers that this point is not open to discussion. It has persistently rejected the Israeli insistence that withdrawal exclude an area of 600 square kilometres, part of Syria since 1948.
The depth of the security zone is also an issue of controversy. Israel demands that security arrangements extend 40-60km inside Syrian territory, with Syrian troops stationed at 100km from the borders, a proposal Syria still rejects. Other arrangements, especially the demilitarised zone, early warning systems and the role of international forces in the Golan, are equally sensitive. Confidence-building measures are also a locus of disagreement. Israel wants extensive procedures to surround the security arrangements; Syria seeks to limit these procedures.
The timetable for withdrawal is controversial, too: Israel insists on gradual withdrawal to put Syrian intentions to the test, and demands the normalisation of relations in return. Israel also insists that security arrangements render any sudden Syrian attack impossible. Syria categorically rejects a gradual withdrawal, and will tolerate no Israeli settlements in the Golan.
The Syrians assert that Rabin verbally agreed to complete withdrawal. But no official document has been produced to this effect. When Netanyahu came to power, he sought to freeze the peace process and maintain the occupation. He therefore refused to honour Rabin's commitment to complete withdrawal, and rejected Syrian demands that negotiations resume at the point where they had ceased under Rabin and Peres. The Lebanese track was also stalled. Israel was ready to withdraw from southern Lebanon in return for security guarantees, but Lebanon declared that it would only abide by the Arab-Israeli Truce signed in 1948, and stated that Israel had to implement Security Council Resolution 425, which calls for immediate and unconditional withdrawal.
In this context, Syria was convinced of the futility of any settlement with Israel under Netanyahu. Today, things have changed. Barak has expressed his intention to make peace with Syria. Most importantly, he considers Syria the cornerstone of any settlement in the Middle East. An agreement was both strategically important in itself and key to a settlement between Israel and Lebanon. To abide by his commitment to withdraw from south Lebanon by June 2000 at the latest, Barak realised that reaching a peace settlement with Syria was imperative.
After the elections, the Israeli media released hints as to Barak's position on withdrawal from the Golan. He refuses a unilateral withdrawal from the south of Lebanon, and ties any withdrawal to a settlement with Syria. Barak seems ready to withdraw from the Golan, but is not ready to accept a Syrian presence on the shores of Lake Tiberias. His plan, therefore, is to institute security guarantees and a timetable for withdrawal from the Golan and south Lebanon. According to this plan, his government would immediately begin preliminary talks with Syria. Israel would recognise Syrian sovereignty over the Golan Heights; with the resumption of Syrian-Israeli negotiations, Israeli forces would start to pull out from the south of Lebanon with Syria's approval, on the condition that international forces assume responsibility for security in the evacuated regions.
On the Syrian track, Barak's plan is to evacuate the Golan eventually with tight security guarantees sponsored by the US. Withdrawal would take place in two stages. The first would return the greater part of the Golan to the Syrians, with the remaining parts to be returned over five years, after relations are consolidated.
To sum up: Israel agrees to withdraw from the Golan but refuses a Syrian presence on the shores of Lake Tiberias. The Syrians, on the other hand, insist that Israel withdraw to the 4 June lines, initiate confidence-building measures, and prepare to withdraw from the Golan. Syria also demands that Israel cancel the 1981 Knesset decision to annex the Golan Heights to Israel, and that it respect the special relationship between Syria and Lebanon. Negotiations for a settlement on the Israeli-Syrian track may be imminent, therefore, but this does not mean that the process will be smooth.
